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The Financial Outlook

BY JOHN PELL

Capitalism

THE essence of capitalism—as might be suspected from the name—is capital. In its simplest terms, capital is the earth and its products, distorted and refined by the ingenuity of man. In contrast with other animals, man is impelled by a desire to possess the earth. The capitalistic theory recognizes, above all else, the right of men to fulfill this paramount desire and to be safeguarded in their possessions. Capitalism is a realistic philosophy: it does not attempt to improve upon human nature, nor to protect the weak from their infirmities and misfortunes; it is neither idealistic nor humanitarian.

Capital should not be confused with certificates of ownership or of indebtedness—stocks and bonds—nor with money, the medium of exchange. Gold is, of course, a form of capital as are all commodities as well as farms, factories, houses, automobiles and clothes. Values are placed upon the various forms of capital by customs and conditions as well as by supply and demand. Capital, in its more refined forms, wears out, loses caste, depreciates, must be constantly refurbished and renewed. This renewing—investment—is the life blood of capitalism, the fount of “prosperity” in a capitalistic state.

Investment is the building of buildings, ships and cars, the laying down of railways and miles of communication, the exploitation of natural resources, the substitution of new machines for old. It should not be confused with trade—buying and selling for profit—nor with the flotation of sterile securities, such as refunding issues and investment trusts.

Since the basis of capitalism is man's desire to possess the earth, investment, to be fruitful, must be conducted by individuals for individual satisfaction or gain. The function of investment can be delegated, performed collectively by corporations and governments; but the result is that a few individuals are acting for many

and the result is apt to be abuse of privileges on the one hand, and loss of initiative on the other.

During the post-War orgy the capitalists of America delegated their privileges to a relatively small number of vast corporations. The privileges were so abused, and the function of investment was so grossly mismanaged that an inflation of spending and finally the great collapse ensued.

There is only one solution to our dilemma, and that is a curtailment of regimentation and collectivism and a return to the individualism which is the basis of our particular kind of civilization. When the desire to possess the earth has been rekindled in the breasts of many men, and when the function of investment is again performed by them with courage and confidence, there will be prosperity.

A good many observers, in my opinion, overestimate the importance of the forces which are, at the present time, carrying us in the opposite direction. They overlook the fundamental desires of human beings, and the dependable fickleness of the American electorate. To be sure, it looks as though the vast programme of Government “investment” and Government management and regulation of capital had only just begun, and that it would never stop until the wells of credit had run dry. But it is counter to human nature to permit investment to be conducted in a profitless or sterile fashion, and the American electorate is capable of reversing itself in a spectacularly sudden fashion. I believe that before many months have passed individual rights and liberty will be heard from again. It was less than two hundred years ago that our forefathers were burning effigies and destroying tea!

The Dollar

IN RESPONSE to the President's request, Congress has passed legislation which fixes the upper value of the dollar at sixty cents and the lower at fifty cents. The result of setting limits to the inflation—even though they may not

prove permanent, is that there has been an uprush in the market value of fixed interest securities.

Among the greatest impediments to recovery at the present time are the state of the bond market and the Securities Act, as a result of which new corporate securities issued in 1933 were but half in value of those issued in 1932. The principal dampener on the bond market is the Government which, only last week, issued a billion dollars of short term, high yield securities. As it is well known that this issue will be followed by many more billions in the near future, many investors who would otherwise be providing the funds so greatly needed for recovery in the "heavy" industries, will, as it were, mark time by placing their funds in short term governments.

In spite of this obviously dampening effect, we may witness the paradox of a strong corporate bond market running parallel to a weak market in long term governments. The reason for this is the simple fact that the supply of good corporate investment securities has been desiccated by the depression, and has not been replenished by the customary process of issuing new securities.

A great deal of wealth which fled the country last summer and autumn may return to this country, seeking investment in American corporate bonds, with the possible result that long term bonds will sell on an extremely low yield basis.

I do not believe that the devaluation move will have as great an effect on commodity prices as is generally supposed. If American prices begin to rise rapidly, buyers will seek other markets. Furthermore, the consuming public can not pay higher prices for most commodities. There have already been indications that in cases where the NRA has jacked up prices too rapidly, producers have found themselves unable to move their goods. The consumer is still king, and he can not be regimented by "Buy Now" campaigns nor by anything else.

Construction

THERE is no better indicator of the investing activities of individuals than the statistics of residential construction contracts compiled by the F. W. Dodge Corporation. There is, after all, no more primary investment than the

erection of a dwelling. It is not enough to possess the earth—man must have a place in which to live.

It is therefore encouraging to report that residential contracts let in December, 1933, in thirty-seven States totaled almost twenty-four million dollars, against thirteen million dollars in 1932. Construction costs have, of course, risen, but only about thirty per cent, against a ninety per cent increase in contracts. This favorable showing followed a similar one in November, and is likely to continue for some time, because of the fact that the early months of 1933 were almost devoid of building activity. The current figures are still little more than a third of those of 1930, however.

The greatest obstacle to building activity is, of course, the difficulty of placing mortgage loans. Very few investors are willing to tie up funds for a period equivalent to that of the usual mortgage. The Government is helping the holders of old mortgages, but has done little to stimulate the market for new mortgages and has, on the contrary, done a great deal to discourage investors. The outlook for the construction industry is brighter, but still far from rosy.

Gargantuan

THERE are few who do not admire the President for having the courage of his convictions, and for refusing to mince matters. The proponents of the plan for spending our way to recovery look upon the Government's function as that of lighting a cigarette at a football game. It can not be denied that the chances of succeeding are better if you set off all of your matches at once than if you strike one at a time. It is also true, of course, that the risk of failure is greater. But I am inclined to think that if there is anything in the priming theory at all, it is better to spend ten billion as rapidly as possible than to spend a billion at a time over a long period. Critics of Roosevelt should not forget that the Republican Administration was following the latter method and that the only change which Roosevelt has made was to set off all of the matches at once. It was a Gargantuan gesture when he announced that he intended to spend ten billion dollars in six months, and it is certain to produce a "pick-up" in business. Perhaps the most serious danger now is that the pick-up will turn into another

crazy boom and credit inflation, and that at the end of a few months we shall be ready for another collapse. Of one thing I am certain: we are not laying the foundations for a lasting period of prosperity.

Utilities

THERE have been several important developments during the last month which are of benefit to the utilities. The most important was the President's announcement that debts should be amortized, or in other words that the utilities should be permitted to earn enough to set up reserves for amortization. This obviously can not be accomplished if the utilities are to be taxed out of existence or if rates are to be constantly lowered.

The second development of importance was the decision of the Tennessee Valley Authority to buy certain properties from the Commonwealth and Southern system, instead of building competing and mutually destructive plants. It was such a surprise to find that the TVA possessed a sense of coöperation that utility men hailed the discovery with joy.

CWA

AN EVENT of great significance occurred this month when the CWA began to curtail its activities with the result that men were "laid off." Both the President and Congress were bombarded with letters and telegrams: legislation was hastily enacted providing the CWA with funds and the men were recalled to work. This is a sample of what we may expect when the President tries to call a halt to the spending spree. It should be borne in mind, however, that there are towns and villages in the country in which the CWA was literally the only source of income this winter. There are mill towns and coal towns in which not a single mill or mine is operating. Probably ninety per cent of the work provided by the CWA is made work and, in a sense, uneconomic, but it is possible that the billion and a half dollars which will have been spent, have averted worse things.

The PWA is only just getting under way. Very few men have actually been given employment on the Government construction projects. Many contracts have already been let, however, and during the next few months the PWA will tend to supplant the CWA.

Most of the actual upturn in business can be traced to Government spending, but, of course the priming theory has not yet been really tested. Several billion dollars will be spent on PWA projects this year and, as a result, a great deal of money will be put into circulation and a great many businesses rescued from failure.

Railroad Car Loadings

IT HAS been estimated that during the first quarter of 1934 railroad car loadings will run six per cent ahead of the comparable period last year. During the early weeks of January however, car loadings exceeded the estimate by almost one hundred per cent.

Automobiles

THE automobile industry is continuing to make rapid strides toward recovery. I understand that the executives of the major companies are more worried by the problems of production than by the problems of sales. Throughout the depression, the building of highways has continued unabated and the automobile has become more than ever an essential part of American life. There has been a very marked trend toward lower priced cars for reasons too obvious to need an explanation. The result is that the industry is in the hands of the three major producers, General Motors, Chrysler and Ford. The securities of only the first two are available to the public and I continue to feel that they will reach very much higher levels before many years have passed.

Stocks

JUST before and just after stabilization of the dollar, all securities rose in market value very rapidly. There are beginning to be signs of considerable public participation in the market and the time has come to mention the fact that markets are always in the process of swinging from one extreme to the other. Although there has been very marked recovery from the depression debts and although there is reason to believe that this will continue throughout the year, it must not be forgotten that the market always overreaches itself.

Commodities

THE one promise which the President has constantly adhered to is to increase the commodity level or decrease the purchasing power

of the dollar. It can only be said that his attempts to do so by manipulation of the monetary standard have so far been disappointing. There is no doubt, however, that he will continue to attempt to increase prices by one method or another.

People buy commodities for two basic reasons; confidence in the future or fear of rising prices. The emphasis of the Administration's programme has been placed upon the latter motive. But the difficulty has been that the American people refuse to be afraid of the inherent value of the dollar, even when its gold content is reduced. There is, perhaps, only one major bombshell left which can be used and that is to resort to the printing presses. It would not be surprising if this step were taken before many months have passed. The obvious excuse is given by the profit made on the capture of the gold by the Treasury. At the present time a paradoxical situation exists for there is more gold than currency outstanding, in terms of the dollar. The logical step for the Government to take would be to print currency against its newly found gold. This step will almost surely be taken.

Conclusion

THE New Deal is now almost a year old. It is in full swing and the country is moving rapidly toward the left. Business men are bullish without being confident. It is felt on almost every hand that as a result of burning the box of matches prices will surely rise and there will be a marked increase in business activity. The nearby trend seems assuredly bullish. But looking beyond that, there are not a few clouds in the sky. In the words of H. G. Wells: "The nations now are carrying on an intense self-destructive and mutually destructive warfare behind vast tariff barriers. They are also carrying on a cruel and disastrous financial warfare, a new sort of maneuvering with money and credit of which the happier world of 1914 knew little."

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The Reader's Turn

A Department of Comment and Controversy

From a Lucy Stoner

BY HELEN HEICK

To the Editor:

DR. ALVAN L. BARACH's article, *Modern Woman's Defenses Against Living*, in the February NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW is both reactionary and unscientific.

Such thinking should be protested by all women. No movement put on by man to get woman back into the four walls of his home and thereby restore all there is interesting in life to the male sex exclusively will make any headway. In the first place, the industrial revolution brought women out of the home, and they can't go back now despite anything men do. Women are valuable as workers. In the second place, the World War gave women confidence and pride in themselves, and, as E. F. Benson in the *Atlantic* for February says, the efficiency of women and their absolute equality with men in every human enterprise (save where sheer muscular strength is concerned) was the only consequence of the War on the credit side of the sheet.

Today forces are moving us in the direction which Russia has already taken. Russia is forging ahead and we might do well to look toward her for our example. The belief that "woman's primary fundamental preoccupation" is that of submission to love of husband and family went out long ago and I am surprised that any one still entertains such foolish ideas. The Russian woman works and has always worked alongside the man on an equality with him. Her equality is equality of pay and regard. She takes time out with wages to have children, but it is unheard of to believe that she is submissive to love or to man or to child. She has a future. She is holding high, if not the highest, offices in the Soviet Union. Her emotional life is stable because she is well adjusted (or fast becoming so) in a society conducive to bringing out the best in her.

The wife of Stalin held her own responsible

position in the government and only in her private life was she a wife. In her public life she was a person in her own right. When she died the Moscow papers reported on her activities, and only incidentally mentioned that she was the constant comrade of Stalin. The present Soviet president's wife is known only by her own name and her own high position. There is mutual respect between husbands and wives in Russia.

In the Western countries the modern woman has to combat thousands of handicaps within the social scheme which the modern man does not. We still have a patriarchal society. It is just as natural for a woman to want self-confidence and pride-in-work as for a man. She also wants success in the eyes of others. She wants to stand on her own feet and no longer be carried by man. If she goes back into the home she will be a parasite, for today there is very little to do in the home and less people there to do it for. We have had a revolution in housekeeping, and we have to a large extent birth control in practice if not yet in law.

As for the article being unscientific, (1) Dr. Barach takes two cases and generalizes from them, making all women fit into the little pattern he wishes to write about.

(2) He speaks of the "male's feeling of protection" as if that feeling were innate, as feeling and sex. All the leading psychologists say that the male's feeling of protection is acquired. If the status of women were to change suddenly into one of economic independence there would be no more myth about the "male's feeling of protection." It would be absurd to think that the modern Russian male worker has a protective feeling toward the modern Russian female worker.

(3) And my last point is to turn the table on one of his cases. Does not a man become overcome by, and submissive to, love for a woman or for the children of his wife? To often this side of the question is over-looked.

At the bottom of the article, Dr. Barach seems to be content that until the end of time women will be tremendously dependent on the great big strong male sex and that men on the other hand can get along whenever they wish without the help of the little weak emotional sex. Study the history of the matriarchal societies and you will see how very alike are women of such societies and men of patriarchal societies. Today men and women with the same average intelligence and as nearly as possible the same conditioning, act and think in similar

ways. Here is a big point which results in women turning out inferior to men: society has inflicted a different and an inferior conditioning on girl children.

I suggest that Dr. Barach read E. L. Thorndike on sex differences. He says "the most important characteristic of the differences is their small amount. The individual differences within either sex so enormously outweigh any differences between the sexes that for all practical purposes any such differences may be disregarded."

BOOKS IN BRIEF REVIEW

By VIRGINIA BARNEY

FICTION

The Dark Pilgrimage. By *Jacob Wassermann*. Translated from the German by *Cyrus Brooks*. New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation. \$2.50.
The compelling story of a prophet in modern times.

Arch Earth. By *Arnold B. Armstrong*. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$2.50.
The tense present-day struggle is relived in this strong and dramatic presentation of life in Tontos Valley, California, among ranchers, pioneers, itinerant laborers, employers and the City Council.

City Harvest. By *Margaret Cheney Dawson*. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$2.00.
The serious emotional problems in the lives of the American intelligentsia are effectively thrown against a frivolous background of a 1932-33 New Year's Eve party New York.

Drumbeats in Arms. By *Kenneth Roberts*. New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company. \$2.50.
History and romance are combined in this story filled with stirring scenes from the American Revolution. A sequel to the novel *Arundel*, it continues the narrative of the Northern Army through the second Battle of Bratoga.

BIOGRAPHY

Goetzsche. By *Gerald Abraham*. Great Lives Series. New York: The Macmillan Company. 75¢.
An account of the happenings in the various periods of Goetzsche's life.

Frederic Chopin. By *Basil Maine*. Great Lives Series. New York: The Macmillan Company. 75¢.
The story of the great musician's life is told and his character interpreted.

Cardinal Newman and William Froude, F.R.S. A Correspondence. By *Gordon Huntington Harper*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. \$2.00.

Most of these letters are unpublished hitherto. They are supplemented in this volume by the author's account of the life and ideas of Cardinal Newman and of his lifelong friend, William Froude, a leading scientist of his day, and freethinker.

LITERATURE

The Indian in American Literature. By *Albert Keiser*. New York: Oxford University Press. \$3.00.
The Indian is presented as an important figure in the literature of this country in this authoritative study. The writings of Irving, Thoreau, Longfellow, Cooper and others are discussed.

Edgar Allan Poe and The Philadelphia Saturday Courier. Facsimile Reproductions of the First Texts of Poe's Earliest Tales and *Raising the Wind*. With an Introduction by *John Grier Varner*. Charlottesville, Virginia: University of Virginia. \$1.60.

Students of Poe will find new light on the author in the *Courier* tales, which, it is thought, are his first attempts at the short story form. They show changes in style, when compared with later revisions, and they reveal aspects of character during the early period of the author's life.

HISTORY

The Victorian Aftermath. By *Esmé Wingfield-Stratford*. New York: William Morrow and Company. \$3.50.

A finely drawn picture of an active and colorful era in English history, the third and last volume of the author's study of the Victorian Age.

ECONOMICS

An Outline of the Principles of Economics. By *Clifford L. James*. College Outline Series. New York: Barnes and Noble. 75¢.

The basic principles of economics are explained briefly together with various interpretations of present-day economic problems.

Outstanding Books of the Season

The Idea of National Interest

by CHARLES A. BEARD

The manner of and the reasons for gradual substitution of "national interest" for "national honor" as a major factor in diplomacy is the theme of this important book by the author of *The Rise of American Civilization*.

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POLITICAL HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY

Who Rules America? A Century of Invisible Government. By John McCaughy. New York: Longmans, Green and Company. \$3.

A study of the American people and their ideal and of how, since Revolutionary days, they have been betrayed by unscrupulous people of power.

Urban Society. By Noel P. Gist and L. A. Halbert. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. \$3.50.

The fundamental principles of city growth and life are discussed with thoroughness. The student of sociology will find much of value in this book, the divisions of which are: The Rise of Urbanism, Distributive and Selective Aspects of the City, Social Relationships, Organization of Life, and Planning and Control of Urban Society.

VARIED OTHERS

Our Common Enemy: Colds. By the Editors of *Fortune* in Consultation with Eminent Physicians. New York: Robert M. McBride and Company. \$1.00.

An interesting book which tells what *seems* to cause colds and what *seems* to relieve them. It also analyzes businesses that make money on colds.

Women and Repeal. The Story of the Women's Organization for National Prohibition Reform. By Grace C. Root. New York: Harper and Brothers. \$1.50.

This account, authorized by Mrs. Charles H. Sabin, of the struggle carried on by women against the Eighteenth Amendment emphasizes the effectiveness of their work and gives the main steps in their campaign.

Tros Tyriusque mibi nullo discrimine agetur

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Apéritif

The Chicken or the Egg?

THE question has a medieval sound. Why, in a scientific age, should people be worrying about which came first, the chicken or the egg? But they do.

For instance, as between Rooseveltians and reactionaries, there is the question which came first before the present slim evidences of recovery, the Roosevelt measures or natural forces. After almost five years of near-starvation it might seem that the point was academic, but no one need do more than read the metropolitan papers to discover that it really matters. *The Herald Tribune* and *The Times* have it that eternal laws have been at work for human betterment and if only the Administration professors can be curbed, canned or killed all may still be well. On the other hand, *The World-Telegram* and, to an extent, *The Evening Post* under Mr. David Stern seem to be on the side of the Roosevelt measures, accepting the philosophical view that human beings are really able to influence their own destiny. Obviously, the only way to settle a matter of this kind would be to set up Mr. Adolph Ochs and Mr. Ogden Reid on one side, and Mr. Roy

Howard and Mr. Stern on the other, and allow them to hurl caviar at each other until some one got bored.

Then, in a similar vein, there is the matter of when CWA expenditures should end. Originally, Mr. Roosevelt intended that the final date should be May 1. His PWA was to be functioning at full speed by then and the combination of the two was to serve as a primer for private business that would, anyhow by 1936, have the latter in such a state that no more governmental spending would be needed. The CWA was set up because the PWA was slow in getting started, but that reasoning was soon lost sight of in the heady atmosphere created by \$75,000,000 flowing out into political channels every week. The question came to be whether the CWA funds by themselves would be sufficient to keep things going even if they stopped by May 1 or whether the clean-thinking legislators at our national capital could stop up the head of the pork-barrel by the same time. Admittedly, this is a confusing choice. Which came first? Or, in the final analysis, what? Either prosperity was to return in time to obviate the necessity for such relief funds, or such relief funds were to stop

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being handed out when prosperity returned. Caviar-throwing is no solution for a problem like this.

The commodity price level, embattled as it is on all fronts, should probably be left out of this discussion. However, there is a general question, or perhaps two general questions: (1) whether the price level has risen because of New Deal measures, or whether it just grew; (2) whether it really has risen. Mr. Bassett Jones says that the angels are unable to dance on a needle point at all, by proving, according to his lights, that such a thing as a price level is impossible anyhow. Mr. Roosevelt insists that first things must come first. The proof of the pudding may be, after all, in the consumer's appetite. But what in the world comes first?

The NRA, for instance, was intended to increase the purchasing power of industrial workers. Minimum wages and maximum hours were set, with the idea that if employers could be forced to augment their outlay to the masses their income from the same would be similarly affected. The argument in this case became immediately plain and vociferous. Employers wanted low minimum wages and high maximum hours and prices to come first; employees wanted the exact opposite. The results have not all been proven up yet, but there is at least a suspicion from what egg our chicken has been hatched.

Mr. William Randolph Hearst, incidentally, is the main proponent of one chicken-and-egg argument concerning the NRA. A typical editorial appeared in his *New York American* of February 4 containing this sentence: "While approving the benevolent aims of the NRA, Mr. Hearst described it as a measure of social *amelioration* and *not a measure of recovery*—a measure of

social and socialistic betterment which should be applied only when recovery has actually occurred and business is better able to sustain its requisitions and impositions." To use Walter Lippmann's terms—recovery first and reformation later. Those who disapprove this view of the case are graciously offered ammunition later in the same editorial thus: "Of course, it [the NRA] is a menace—and a serious one, to the individual liberty which is the very foundation of our American institutions. . . . It is a doctrinaire development of state socialism—a radical departure from American political and economic precedent, and an invitation to the bitter conflict between Fascism and Communism, from which our moderate American democracy has hitherto fortunately been free." Judging impartially from this kind of writing, it seems most likely that if Mr. Hearst had his way the egg would come first all right, but would be scrambled and eaten long before it had a chance to hatch into a chicken.

Mention of Mr. Hearst leads inexorably to the thought of national defense. In his *New York American* has been published a series of gruesome pictures taken during the War, the sort of pictures which have been used more or less surreptitiously now and then in the past dozen years as pacifist propaganda. But one of the Hearst headlines read: "Grim War Pictures Show That America Must be Ready to Protect Herself." The chicken-and-egg analogy is a little hard to work out in this case. Pacifists say that wars come out of overarmament; jingoists that underarmament tempts other nations to attack. Calling war the chicken, perhaps we could reduce the debate to a question whether it hatched from a vulture's egg

or a dove's—the trouble with this solution being, of course, that the recalcitrant fowl would go right on laying eggs of her own.

The recent stabilization of the dollar at 59.06 cents should have ended another such controversy, but at this writing there seems to be some doubt whether it will. Most of our conservatives had been arguing since last March that business recovery would never come until the dollar was stabilized; the Administration people had been arguing that stabilization could not be achieved until prices rose and a measure of recovery had appeared. Conservatives were outraged at a policy of deliberately depreciating our money; now they are inclined to argue that the thing will not work anyhow, that the dollar will refuse to stay down. And it does seem to bounce up after every Roosevelt move to lay it low.

Well, there are probably a thousand other examples of this sort of thing and it will get us nowhere to go on naming them. People with common sense say that hardly any argument would go on in the world if there were agreement on premises. There never is, of course, and it would be idle to bother about the matter if Mr. Roosevelt were not so insistent that "first things must come first." Since he is, however, so insistent, a tremendous clamor has arisen over which things really are first, and it promises to be hard to stop.

Our own view of the matter is that it will get worse. By 1935 an American Stavisky scandal may be accompanied by such extraordinary incidents as gentlemen of renown meeting in Madison Square Garden to hurl whole baskets of assumptions at each other's heads at twenty paces. Mr. Ogden Mills may be going around saying, "In my country

that word 'syllogism' means fight." Al Smith undoubtedly will have a postulate on his shoulder and a look of battle in his eye.

Maybe it all *is* more medieval than properly scientific and up to date. At least it assures entertainment for any who can keep from starving long enough to listen.



Obit

ASIDE from the founding of the Republican Builders in New York and a rumor that Mr. Roosevelt is edging toward the right, relying more upon the Douglasses in his administration, the strongest evidence lately produced that this country has not decided to stop cutting its hair is a newspaper story of the death of two young men. It may have been suicide, apparently, and they were Communists. If this means discouragement in the Marxists' breasts, conservatives ought to be told. They have had enough disturbed sleep in the last few years.



The Consumer

AS AN instance of the consumer's share in this new era, the recent taxi strike in New York City made interesting reading. People outside Manhattan could not be expected to remember the background of the little drama. Briefly, the late unlamented Tammany administration, in a desperate attempt to raise revenue, sought to impose a number of nuisance taxes, all of which were howled down by the irate citizenry excepting a five-cent-per-ride impost on taxi fares. Cabs had been charging fifteen cents for the first quarter mile and five for each quarter mile thereafter. Last fall their meters were changed to read twenty

cents for the first quarter mile. Some \$500,000 have been collected by the taxi companies to pay this tax.

But legal objections to the tax were raised very soon and while the case was still in court the new Fusion administration took office, contemplating severe economies and no additional taxes if they could possibly be avoided. For a while the companies went on collecting the extra five cents a ride without any one's seeming to think much what was going to be done about it. But gradually public sentiment was stirred up over the matter and suggestions began to be made. It appeared that the city government was willing enough to let the matter drop if the \$500,000 could be distributed in some equitable manner. Obviously, it was impossible to refund each nickel to the citizen who had paid it in. Some one suggested that the fund be turned over to charity, but that idea found no observable favor with the taxi companies. Then the point was raised that cab drivers had received less in tips since the tax went into effect than before, thrifty citizens feeling that the proper thing to do with a tax was always to pass it on as far as possible. Consequently, cab drivers felt that they should get some of the money.

Finally, Mayor La Guardia came forward with a suggestion that the drivers and their employers divide up the fund in a certain manner. Immediately a howl went up from the drivers and within a few days most of them struck, demanding all the money for themselves. Mr. La Guardia appointed a mediator who, for a few hours one night, thought that he had struck a compromise with a scheme to divide the fund equally between drivers and owners, but the hastily formed union of drivers turned it down and the strike went on. By

February 5, the union was declaring that the paramount issue was its recognition, that division of the fund was secondary.

How the fund eventually will be divided up is not known at this writing, but the consumer's side of the question is already very clear indeed. By the time the debate became warm it was being carried on on the assumption that the twenty-cent fare had become a habit with New Yorkers and that it might just as well be continued. No particular outcry was made against this assumption, but evidently the Mayor's mediator felt that some sort of sop ought to be thrown to the consumer, so he suggested as part of his compromise proposal that for three successive Mondays the cabs be operated at two-thirds of their regular fare. This unheard-of generosity was apathetically received.

Despite the Securities Act (still, perhaps, to be softened for the sake of tender lambs who distribute stocks and bonds) and sundry other New Deal optimisms, it seems just possible that the old sign "*Caveat Emptor*" will hang awhile yet.



The Market for Crowns

THE recent outbursts of rioting in Paris have doubtless been explained sufficiently in newspapers. Whether they die away or flare up again and end in revolution as well as devaluation, not even Walter Lippmann cares to venture a guess. However, it is entertaining to note that the press carries a report that two pretenders to the French throne are watching events with more than usual interest. These are the Duc de Guise and Prince Louis Napoleon. The former issued a manifesto in 1932 calling for establishment of a "dictatorship

under a monarchy," which at least showed some appreciation of the style trend in tyrannies.

Just what are the chances for royalty in 1934? A year or two ago observers were wondering whether Hitler would reinstall the Hohenzollerns in their former glory, though today he seems to feel his power secure enough to turn a cold shoulder to the former German Emperor. Spain, after a short period of experimentation with radical government, has turned perceptibly to the right, and the monarchists appear to have considerable strength, though Alfonso may not have much of a chance to regain his rakishly tilted crown. There were rumors that even the English King, so traditional a figurehead, in the crisis of 1931 assumed the prerogative of a ruling monarch. That faint apparition, the Grand Duke Cyril Vladimirovich, occasionally still presents itself in the news as the rightful Emperor of all the Russias. Our own country is happily in the hands of the royal Roosevelt family.

Still, if recovery keeps up and enough citizens can get their hands on a few extra francs, marks, pounds, pesos, dollars or what not, probably not a great deal will come of all this. Monarchies have,

after all, been as expensive and trying in their way as any Harding or Daladier administration, and are notoriously harder to get rid of.



Justice

OUR private nomination for something on the grandest scale is a case, presumably decided by now, in the Philippine courts. Three defendants went on trial in October, 1931, charged with forgery. Almost without interruption the court sat until our last report, in January, 1934. By that time there were 23,000 pages of transcript in the record and 46,000 exhibits—a number so monstrous that three different systems of cataloguing had to be resorted to in the attempt to keep things straight. The presiding judge was appointed to the insular Supreme Court during the trial, but had to defer taking up his new duties, probably because it would have been another two years before a new judge could assimilate the facts of the case.

If all cases in this country took as long, there might be less complaint about the delay in bringing them to trial, but we should certainly need a new Dickens.

W. A. D.

Free Silver

BY HERBERT C. PELL

*Bimetallism advocated as a monetary policy which would be
banker- and politician-proof*

WE ARE all sick of magic formulae. In 1929 our financial structure was overexpanded and blew up, leaving us the job of setting up a brand new one, designed to be more permanent but made mostly out of the old wreckage.

We can resign ourselves to the fact that no possible strengthening of the covering can permanently guarantee us against explosions. There must be safety valves and these valves must be banker- and politician-proof. To find such things is a large order.

Some years ago, when intelligent and honest financiers, conspicuously William Harding at the head of the Federal Reserve, suggested that there was too much easy credit, they were met by volleys of obloquy from Senators of the type of the Honorable Thomas Heflin and from the boy bankers whose exploits have been since revealed. Credit can not safely be left to shortsighted bankers or politicians, who, ignoring the long run, can see only an immediate profit for themselves at the expense of the interests entrusted to their care.

The best possible money imaginable would be a combination of cash and credit controlled by responsible and in-

telligent men, acutely conscious of the importance of their task, and considerate of their reputations, rather than of their profits. Such men should know their country and their countrymen. Where are they to be found? Among illiterate go-getters or politicians fearful of the next election?

In default of angels from Heaven, we can pass to the next alternative. We will not ask for a currency which can be well managed by honest bankers and courageous politicians, we will be more than content if we find one that can not be ruined by scoundrels and cowards.

We must not allow ourselves to be carried away by mere words. Expansion and contraction of what is generally known as money are continuous phenomena in every organized society. They are the systole and diastole of commerce. The law of demand and supply when applied to the currency is generally expanded into what is known as the quantitative theory of prices: prices depend on the amount of goods on the one hand and the amount of money on the other. Many students of economics conceive of these two fundamentals as being static, as if the determination of prices were a question of balance, somewhat like a see-saw, made immensely

more complicated by the great number of factors which are contained in the problem.

The question really is quite different. It is not a balance of weights, but a balance of momenta. On the commodity side, we must consider not only the total number of articles offered for sale, but the frequency with which they come to the market. One cow driven to ten different auctions will have the same lowering effect on prices as would ten cows each put up once. The enormous turnover on the New York Stock Exchange is made with a very small proportion of the total securities of the country. There are only 8,703,252 shares of United States Steel common stock in existence, and yet the average annual sales for the last five years have been well over nineteen million.

It would be a perfectly safe thing to say that less than three million shares of Steel have actually been sold in the last five years, and that these three million have been turned over about thirty times apiece.

Momentum, as we all know, is mass times velocity. The force of the downward pressure on prices exerted by commodities can be measured in much the same way—the total number of articles offered multiplied by the frequency with which they are put up for sale. The upward pressure exerted by money can be similarly measured—the total amount of money actually brought to market multiplied by the number of times it is offered; this may be expressed as sum times turnover.

IN PRACTICE in the United States, the actual amount of currency has varied comparatively little. The measure of the spending power of the nation has been increased or decreased by the

rapidity of turnover and by the use of credit.

In certain countries, conspicuously in France, a very large amount of money in the aggregate is held out of circulation by individuals. In France, a very much larger proportion of transactions than here is conducted in cash. This national habit accounts for the fact that there will be at all times in France an enormous amount of money which will be comparatively inactive. There is less metallic money used in the United States, in proportion to business done, than in any other country in the world. The momentum of the upward force is increased rather by a change in velocity than by an increase in mass.

An increase of the mass will very probably not raise prices to the full proportion of the increase in the quantity of currency in existence. The rate of circulation will, to a certain extent, decrease. Where we now do a million dollar business with a hundred thousand dollars, it is probable that with two hundred thousand we would only do a million and a half. But this would have a steadying tendency on prices. It is more difficult to affect the momentum of a large mass moving slowly than of a small mass moving rapidly. A ten-ton tractor, going five miles an hour, will be less subject to variations than will a medium-weight car going fifty. That is why France is less affected by the vagaries of credit than we are.

Since the introduction of steam power and transportation, the great commercial crises were 1857, 1873, 1893 and 1929. These affected the whole world, which took many years to recover from them. We may profitably consider the effect of these crises on France, England and the United States, as types of great and well organized nations. All three

suffered from these crises, but in a very different degree. In every case the United States was prostrated, and the suffering of England, although much less than that of the United States, was in every case greater than that of France. And yet, by a curious coincidence, three of them occurred at a time when the economic resistance of France was at its lowest. The year 1873 found the French just recovering from the loss of territory and the defeat of the War of 1870. In 1893 the French were recovering from the corrupt wreck of Panama, and in 1929 the ruin of the Great War still oppressed the French; 1857 left France practically untouched.

I believe that the principal cause of the comparative immunity of the French nation to these tidal waves has come from the habitual French use of cash. Before '57, '73 and '93, exactly as before the present crisis, the United States had been treated to a tremendous expansion of credit.

We all of us remember how six years ago every office was besieged by boy bankers, anxious to lend money on all or any or no security. There was no one who could not command a loan far beyond any reasonable need. Those who were overlooked by the wandering vice-presidents were raked out by the installment salesmen. Every hot dog stand in the country was urged to set itself up as a first class restaurant; every householder was urged to build an addition, and every citizen to buy a car—all of this to be done on credit. There was a carnival of debt, which ended almost in an hour.

In December, 1929, a hotel could not hope to get the credit which six months before had been liberally offered to its own newspaper stand. The purchasing power of the nation was almost an-

ihilated. Those who had succumbed to the call of the go-getter, urging them to risk their comforts to attain luxuries, found themselves suddenly with only a very weak hold on necessities. Chauffeurs, jewelers, house servants, stock brokers, salesmen, kept women and even bootleggers found themselves thrown on the pavement in droves with no prospect of employment. From a merely financial point of view, the wreckage caused by the first month of the crisis in the United States was more than the loss suffered by the French, as a nation, in a year of war. During the course of the crisis, many despaired; credit could be got nowhere; although the currency on which the structure of credit had been built still remained, every one feared to spend.

In France, when the crisis came, people spent less, but this meant that they kept money in their pocket, rather than that they ceased to borrow.

A slower rate of circulation would tend to avoid such performances as the great crisis through which we have just gone, which was largely caused by the enormous increase in the purchasing medium, made possible by leaving the credit of the country in the hands of men who really knew nothing of the machine over which they had control.

Some expansion and contraction of the purchasing medium is absolutely necessary, and its final and more delicate phases must be left to result from the actual contact of individuals. But these individuals, whether bankers or business men, acutely conscious as they are of their own needs, are not best fitted to control the great locks which govern the currency and maintain the equilibrium of commerce. The practical disappearance of credit, and with it of purchasing power within a few months

of the crisis, when offers of credit had been stuffed down everybody's throat six months before, goes a very long way to account for the violence of the crash. If in 1929, instead of having our dollars passing from one transaction to another so fast that they began to smoke, we had had twice the number going at a more leisurely pace, we would have suffered very much less. These solid dollars which operate slowly to raise prices will not disappear at the stroke of a banker's pen whenever danger may threaten.

SINCE the discovery of America, there has been produced approximately ten times as much silver as gold. During all this time, the destruction of silver has been vastly greater. Almost all the gold used in the arts is recoverable, and as a rule is recovered. Fragments of gold jewelry will be preserved and sold, whereas broken silver spoons are thrown away.

The opening of the mints of the United States to the free coinage of silver would have a very slight immediate effect on the economic structure of the country. The great advantage of the free coinage of silver would be that there would be many more metallic dollars in the country, and that it would be possible to lower the proportion of credit to cash, and, to a considerable extent, to slow up the circulation of the purchasing medium. Cash would not suddenly disappear at the first sign of trouble to anything like the extent that credit will melt away. Of course, in hard times there will be more hoarding and less spending no matter what happens. But with a very much larger indestructible base, we would find at least that our money supply could not contract out of sight over night.

It has been suggested that if silver were remonetized, enormous new silver mines would be developed. It is most improbable that this increased yield would amount to very much. Most silver is mined today in conjunction with copper and other metals and there are practically no first-class mines shut down. The increase in silver yield, although it would exist, would be practically negligible, and certainly would not amount to as much as five per cent of the silver mined annually. Very large supplies of already mined silver might come into the United States from other countries, for which we would be expected to pay gold. At this point, the unthoughtful gold bug is very likely to refer to Gresham's Law and to point out that if the United States Government offered an ounce of gold for sixteen, or twenty, or thirty ounces of silver, whichever rate might be adopted, the result would be that all the silver in the world would come into the United States, and all the gold leave this country.

If we conceive of silver as an object as common as salt water, this would undoubtedly be true. In actual fact, however, long before a quarter of the gold supply of the United States was exhausted, another great economic law (supply and demand) would begin to apply. The withdrawal of a hundred million ounces of silver from the available supply of the world would so raise the price that the profit of further sales to the United States, at the selected rate, would be very materially lessened, and when this point was reached we would find the United States with an enormously increased base of money which it could easily stabilize, that is to say, keep at the selected ratio in the markets of the world. If, for example,

there were a great increase in the gold supply, as occurred after the simultaneous appearance of gold on the markets of the world from California, and from Australia in the early 'Fifties, the United States would allow silver to go out and gold to come in. If in any country an enormous strike of silver were made, we could let gold out, take in silver, and in this way, keep the balance at any point we might choose.

Obviously the best course would be for the United States Government to buy silver on the market, and turn it into currency until the price of silver had risen to the desired proportion, and then open the mints to all who brought bullion, either silver or gold.

The advantage to this country is obvious. Since 1900, more than half the silver produced in the world has been produced in the United States, and in the year 1932, less than ten per cent of the gold.

In practice the people of the United States probably would not want to carry great masses of metallic money in their pockets; the actual circulating medium would be in the form of certificates of deposit.

The very great increase in the amount of available cash in the United States

would necessarily result in a restriction of credit and probably in a decreased velocity of circulation, that is to say, an unchanged momentum of purchasing power could be maintained with a very much slower circulation for a greater mass and, most important of all, with a much greater proportion of indestructible material money at the bottom.

With free silver, or with any other system of currency, the sudden withdrawal of credit would be a great misfortune, but it would not result in such a complete destruction of the entire economic structure as occurred four years ago. Although the immediate effect would be slight, I believe that such a widening of the base of our currency would very much lessen the violence of future shocks. It would add ballast to our financial organization, but of course it would have to be accompanied by laws increasing the amount of reserve necessary and probably a tax on bank cheques. The real advantage that could be got from opening the mints to silver, would be that it would provide the community with a money base which could not be withdrawn as suddenly as the credit collapse of 1929. Although more clumsy, silver currency would be banker- and politician-proof.



Japan and the Future

BY HANSON W. BALDWIN

*The naval conference year 1935 marks a fork in the road
for Japan, and her choice may decide world history*

FROM the felt tents of the Siberian nomads and the snow steppes of the north to the muddy floods of the Yellow River and the tangle of shipping in Shanghai's Bund the course of empire has swept across eastern Asia. Since September 19, 1931, Manchuria and Jehol have been conquered by Japanese armies; the rising sun ensign of Japan has floated above the ancient ramparts of the Great Wall and the sturdy little soldiers of Japan have pushed to the gates of Peiping.

In some twenty-two months of intermittent fighting Japan has changed the map of Asia. Great slices of territory have been lopped from the Chinese body politic and have been sutured by one means or another to the Empire of Japan. Japan's mainland empire, exclusive of Korea or her conquests south of the Great Wall, is as large as the area from Hudson Bay to Kansas City, from the Great Lakes to Wyoming.

While her soldiers have been trudging through snow and sand and mud, marching and fighting, Japan's salesmen have, on the economic front, been winning other battles. Partly aided by the depreciated yen, partly by the advantage of proximity and partly by cheaper labor, Japanese products have

invaded India and other parts of Asia to such an extent that British trade has been seriously cut. Forced by the Chinese boycott of Japanese products to find new outlets for their mills and their manufactured goods, the Japanese merchants quadrupled their exports of cotton yarn to British India in 1932, while India, the Dutch East Indies and Egypt "increased their purchases of Japanese cotton piece goods by more than fifty per cent," thus more than making up for the losses incurred due to the Chinese boycott. A temporary boom further aided the broken-down Japanese economic machine in 1932 and continued to quite an extent in 1933; commodity prices rose, and total exports and imports were both greater in volume than in 1931. While the rest of the world struggled in the slough of depression, Japan—despite her costly expeditions along the trails of ancient conquerors—experienced a sort of relative prosperity, incomplete and perhaps temporary, but nevertheless solacing.

Thus at the date of writing Japan has not only won her battles with bullets, but she has been, at least relatively, successful on the economic front. Because of the lull in hostilities in northern China following an armistice between

Japanese and Chinese armies, and because the spotlight of publicity has temporarily shifted in the rush of great events to other scenes and other nations, Japan and her future fate have been temporarily subordinated in the popular mind to domestic or European considerations.

But what of the future? Will China be the cockpit of the history of tomorrow? Has the course of Japanese military and economic empire been fulfilled; will the rising sun of Japan set in a slough of stagnant ambitions, as Napoleon's did on his retreat from Moscow? An old French proverb has it that "*L'appétit vient en mangeant.*" Will the Japanese appetite increase or is it already surfeited with conquest?

THE two principal factors which may be expected to affect Japanese policy in the future—political and economic considerations—are, in turn, so influenced by a complex variety of both domestic and foreign situations, situations ever-changing, that literally anything may happen in the Far East of the future. But at the present, and for the immediate future, Japan's policy is fixed and immutable.

Under the tutelage of General Sadao Araki, Minister of War, and real ruler of Japan, the Empire has firmly set its face toward unchallenged supremacy in the Far East. Supremacy may not mean dominion, but Japan today wants to be recognized as having a primary and paramount interest in China and in the islands of the southern seas that abut on Japanese territory. How far this sphere of influence may extend only time can tell; there have been various prophecies and various interpretations of what Japan intends. The Tanaka Memorial—the authenticity of which has been

consistently disputed by Japan—envisaged an Asia under Japanese domination and the conquest of America. This is certainly an ambitious and very probably an exaggerated interpretation, but it is safe to say that Japan will not admit, unless compelled to, any change in the *status quo* she has now established in the Far East. Rather than restrict her dominion she is more likely to extend and increase it.

Her policy, then, means a Japan supreme beyond question in the Far East. That in turn means Japanese domination of the western Pacific, with all that that implies, commercially, strategically and politically; it means an aggressive and extensive trade campaign in Asia and the islands of the Pacific; it means a revision of the *status quo* in China and the Pacific islands; it means absolute Japanese domination of the mandated islands; and it means—as past events have already shown and as Secretary Stimson pointed out—violation of the Nine Power and Four Power Pacts and virtual violation of the Kellogg Peace Pact.

The three treaties Japan has already violated with impunity; the mandated islands are reputedly fortified and are clearly under Japanese domination; the *status quo* existing in China and the Pacific islands at the time of the signing of the Washington Treaty has already been revised, and an aggressive trade campaign has been started in the Far East. But Japan is not yet supreme in the western Pacific.

There are several obstacles to such Japanese supremacy. The course of empire—as far as it can be seen—is not an easy highroad; stumbling blocks pave the future. Some of them that loom large today are: (1) the United States; (2) Russia; (3) Great Britain; (4)

China; (5) united anti-Japanese action by a combination of foreign powers; (6) Japanese internal discord.

THE policies of the United States and of Japan conflict at almost every point in the Far East. This clash is emphasized by the American possession of the Philippines and the current freedom agitation; the position of the islands which makes them geographically an outpost of American dominance within the sphere of Japanese influence is an added and constant irritant.

Our policy of preserving the integrity of China is in direct opposition to the Japanese desire for expansion. It is to the Japanese advantage to have a China dismembered, disunited or united under the Japanese ægis. Even our few gunboats on the Yangtze River—there to “protect the Standard Oil,” the navy says—and our marines in Peiping and Tientsin irritate the Japanese, who want no flag but their own to float above the crumbling temples and ruined beauties that Li T'ai-po immortalized in lovely verse twelve hundred years ago. Our “Open Door” policy has never met with Japanese approval, and Japanese authorities—the real rulers of the recently created puppet state of Manchukuo—have threatened to slam the “Open Door” in our face if we fail to recognize the nominal province of Henry Pu-Yi, the “boy emperor.”

Economic strife and racial differences have added more terrors to the international incubus. The Chinese boycott of Japanese products hurt and is still hurting the Nipponese pocketbook, and it was no balm to the injured to see Chinese traders dealing more and more with American and British merchants. In China proper, where the yellow race is supreme numerically, the problem of

the brown men from the islands off the coast is not primarily one of color, but the racial question has added another vexing difficulty to the economic imbroglio in the Philippines, in Hawaii and particularly along the western coast of the United States. The Japanese exclusion provisions of the post-War immigration act were one of the severest blows to amicable relations between Japan and the United States history has ever dealt. It is ancient history in this country, but its sting is still fresh in Japan.

The Japanese influx into Hawaii and the Philippines has produced an aftermath of distressing economic and social difficulties—so clearly exemplified by recent disturbances in Hawaii. In the Philippines the conflict between the natives and the immigrants is real and bitter, and will undoubtedly play some part in the independence decision. That question alone—the problem of the independence of the Philippines, is one which is unsettling to both countries. The Japanese undoubtedly would breathe more easily if this country withdrew its western outpost to Hawaii—or even to Guam or Samoa, which offer no threat to Japanese supremacy. But the Philippines under American control are a stumbling block to Japanese domination of the western Pacific. In the opinion of this writer they are also something of a stumbling block, or at least an irritant, to America, and were it not for the blow to national prestige that it would involve, complete withdrawal from the western Pacific would seem to be the most desirable course for the United States to pursue.

But complete withdrawal—abandonment of the islands to their fate—is not even practically contemplated; even those who most ardently advocate

Philippine independence want to keep a string tied to the islands—a string which would make this country morally and actually, if not theoretically, responsible for the Philippines for years to come. The very fact of independence agitation, however, and the strong possibility that independence in some form or other may be tried shortly may encourage the Japanese, under the protection of possible new Philippine immigration laws, to try peaceful penetration in the islands, and thus gradually still further extend their sphere of economic and political influence.

In addition to the political and economic aspects of the rivalry between Japan and the United States, the naval question looms large. The naval problem is, of course, only one phase of the more complex problem of economic and political supremacy in the western Pacific, but since the Treaty of Washington brought the issue into clear-cut relief, it has assumed an importance of its own. Washington was supposed to make the Japanese fleet preëminent in the western Pacific, and the American fleet preëminent in the eastern Pacific. To ensure this, the United States agreed not to fortify any further, or to change the *status quo* then existing of the fortifications in the Philippines and other western islands. The five-five-three ratio of the naval treaty was predicated, however, on the Four Power and Nine Power Treaties, the first of which guaranteed the continuance of the Pacific *status quo*, and the second of which guaranteed the territorial integrity of China. The succeeding naval conference at London, instead of continuing and amplifying the ratios which were built upon these two treaties, gave Japan a slight further concession—and the naval inactivity of the United States during

all the twelve years of Republican rule from 1921 to 1933 gave Japan still further advantages—so that today, taking into consideration bases and logistics, the two fleets are near a stalemate in fighting strength.

This situation has caused apprehension in both countries. In the United States that apprehension has, until recently, been confined to the navy and those familiar and close to the naval establishment; in Japan it has developed into more or less of a nation-wide insistence on increased naval strength. This insistence has led to a formal change in Japanese naval policy; in the years to come Japan will no longer be content with a ratio of three to the American five. She has already officially notified the world that after the expiration of the London Treaty in 1936 she will require a larger naval ratio.

At the same time, as former Secretary of State Stimson hinted, Japan, by her actions in the Orient, has violated the spirit of the Nine Power Treaty, upon which the Treaty of Washington, the keystone of the entire naval agreement, was based. With Japan striving for a larger navy, the naval problem is clearly assuming a more and more important place in Japan's future.

Recent events, however, have on the whole helped to better Japanese-American relations. The "Buy American" policy and the depreciation of the dollar—both a part of the economic nationalism sponsored by the Roosevelt Administration—have hurt Japan's export trade to this country. But the depression halted the American commercial conquest of the Orient. The United States has withdrawn into its business shell, and the commercial rivalry between Japanese and American interests in the East has, therefore, been somewhat

(though probably temporarily) lessened. Last summer's visit of part of the United States Fleet to the Atlantic has done much on the other side of the Pacific for the cause of Japanese-American friendship, and the tentative proposal of Japan for international conversations preliminary to the 1935 naval conference has eased the naval tension.

For the moment Japanese-American relations are clearly improved, and there is even talk of an arbitration treaty, but the basic and fundamental differences between the two nations will remain to perplex and irritate future relations, unless one or the other changes its foreign policy.

PERHAPS even larger than the United States—particularly since the recognition of the Soviet by the Roosevelt Administration—looms the menace of Red Russia to Japanese ambitions. Since the turn of the century Russia, with its interests in the East, has been the natural and nearest enemy to the pet projects of Japan. Since the great Communist experiment was started, however, Russia has been in no condition, or under no necessity, to oppose Japanese aggression. Except by infiltration, except by flooding China with Communist propaganda, by sowing the seeds of communism in Japan itself and by attempting to organize revolutionary units in both countries, she has not attempted militant measures. True, great slices of the Asiatic hinterland, vast steppes and wind-swept plateaus, quietly came under the Russian influence; most of Mongolia was Sovietized. But in late years some of the early Russian gains have been negated. Manchuria, which Russia looked upon with covetous eyes, has been lopped off by Japan, and some of Mongolia has come under the rule

of Japanese armies. With Manchuria has gone Mukden, important trading centre of the East, long considered fair game for Russian ambitions. With Manchuria also has inevitably gone the Chinese Eastern Railway, half-owned by Russia—a railway which made Russia's economic and strategic position in the East not unassailable, but vastly stronger than it is today. Negotiations for the purchase of that railroad have been held recently, but with the two principal countries far apart on terms, and with the negotiations daily more bitter and less likely of success. But with Manchukuo in Japanese hands the Chinese Eastern is practically no more Russian-controlled than the New York Central is French-managed.

With Japanese dominance in the East pushed up to the shores of the Amur River, the Soviet border, and with Japanese control of the Chinese Eastern assured by the conquest of Manchukuo, Vladivostock, Russia's only Eastern port of consequence, is dangling like a ripe apple, ready—when Japan shakes the branch—to fall into the hands of the armies of the island empire. At the end of the Trans-Siberian Railroad (single-tracked much of the way), 5,809 miles from Leningrad, Vladivostock—even in the old days—was strategically hard enough to defend. Today, with the Chinese Eastern short-circuiting Vladivostock, and the great hump of Manchukuo pushing up into the body of Siberia, Vladivostock is still nominally Russian, but to all intents and purposes it is Japan's whenever she wants to take it. Japan's rapid construction of lines of communication in Manchukuo, particularly her building of a railway from Harbin to Taheiho on the northern boundary, has made the wartime fate of Vladivostock and the contiguous area

more certain. By the Japanese conquest of Manchuria and Jehol and by the extension of the Japanese sphere of influence into Mongolia, Russia has been thrust back, strategically, to Lake Baikal, and has left Japan supreme in the northwestern Pacific.

Russia has watched with jealous eyes the ever-advancing frontier of Japanese influence, but she has done little—could do little—to halt it. There are signs that her attitude and her ability are changing. The strength of the bear that walks like a man is growing, though slowly; Russia is not anxious for conflict, is trying to avoid conflict, but she is more ready for war than at any time since the last of the Tsars met a miserable death in a cellar at Ekaterinburg. Her recent non-aggression pacts with the nations that border her western and southern frontiers and the recent recognition of Moscow by Washington and Peiping have relieved her of many of her international burden of fears, while the at least partial success of her Five Year Plans and the development of her army and her industrial plants have solved some of her domestic problems. The wily Litvinoff suggested a non-aggression pact with Japan, but the Japanese politely refused. Since then a series of "incidents" along the Russo-Japanese borders has heightened the tension between the two nations to such an extent that a Siberian war is openly predicted. But Japan is now bending backward to avoid such a war, and Russia is not completely ready. In another decade or so, perhaps Russia will be resenting such incidents with force.

JAPAN, in her march of conquest, has alienated even those nations who were once her friends. The French, apparently, are still sympathetic to, or

at least tolerant of, Japanese ambitions, but Great Britain, for long an ally in being, has drawn somewhat apart. This is primarily due to developments of recent months; Great Britain looked somewhat askance at the Japanese conquest of Manchuria and Jehol, but felt that the order established by the conquerors might help, rather than hinder, trade. But when the economic soldiers of the island empire began winning their profitable battles in India and Egypt—when the Indian market turned from the Lancashire cotton spinners to those of Nippon—then indeed England felt affront.

So severely has the British market felt the Japanese competition that the Indian Government imposed a supposedly prohibitory tariff on Japanese textiles. The Japanese spinners retaliated with a boycott of Indian raw cotton. Thus, with their best market for textiles at least partly closed to them, and with six months' notice served by the Indian Government that it expected to terminate a twenty-seven-year-old trade agreement, the Japanese responded, as one writer has put it, with a "natural if possibly misguided militancy." Posters—"Defend Asia: Drive out the British"—appeared in Japan; they were but expressing one phase of the old Japanese policy—"Asia for the Asiatics." In England this economic warfare aroused outbursts in the House of Commons. "The yellow peril is now upon us in a far more insidious form than that of war," one member declared, and added that "unless the Government can take immediate action every calico printing works in Lancashire will be closed within five years." In a more recent outburst the Japanese were accused of unfair trade practices. The House, on the motion of a Man-

chester member, adopted a motion which urged the Government to take every possible step to check Japanese competitors, who have been, it was clearly shown, underselling Manchester manufacturers in the world's markets. Japan's cotton piece goods exports, it was said, increased from 1,400,000,000 yards in 1931 to 2,030,000,000 in 1932.

India and Japan have been trying to settle their differences in a series of negotiations based on the principle of bartering raw cotton for cotton cloth, but to date the settlement is still incomplete and Japanese manufacturers have threatened to continue the boycott, unless India yields to Japanese demands.

The Chinese boycott of Japanese goods, which turned much trade temporarily into British channels, did not help Japanese-British relations. While Japanese merchants struggled for existence, their British neighbors in China thrived, making money from the very customers that once patronized Japanese shops.

The attitude of important sections of the Empire has also done much to change the traditional British policy of a close *entente* with Japan. Australia, New Zealand and Canada—particularly Australia—have long feared Japanese infiltration, and have long suspected Japan of ambitions which included in their scope the domination of these parts of the Empire. Australia has watched with great uneasiness every aggressive step of Japan; she has barred her door to Japanese immigration, and it was largely because of Australia's fear of conquest that the great British naval base at Singapore was started. Canada, Australia and New Zealand have supported the American policy toward Japan, and in all their relations

with the Nipponese they have been closer in spirit and in practice to the American attitude than to the British. All this has had its effect on the motherland's viewpoint; with the start of economic war she has been forced willy-nilly to relinquish that close *rap-prochement* with Japan which had distinguished her Far Eastern relations in the past.

Since 1922 England has watched with concern the rising might of the Japanese navy. During the War that navy was a friend indeed; it took much of the burden from the British fleet. But since the War the Japanese navy—like the Japanese army—has been gradually growing stronger and stronger and has consolidated its position in the western Pacific by extensive harbor improvements and naval base developments in many of its sovereign and mandated islands. Singapore—though mighty—is somewhat too far removed from the Japanese sphere of influence to satisfy Great Britain, and that country is apparently beginning to think that it is time to put a check rein on Japanese aggressions and ambitions. This does not mean that Britain is preparing for war with Japan; that is not the way British policy works. Her traditional system of playing off one nation against another, of friendships with all but too close alliances with none, is beginning to be revived. She is in a position today—if she shuffles her diplomatic cards carefully—to sympathize with the United States, thus appeasing her dominions, while at the same time she can retain friendly, if not cordial, relations with Japan. The rôle of Great Britain in the future is not likely to be a militant one in the Far East—except on the economic front—unless Japan stretches the hand of imperialism out

towards Australia and the southern seas.

In China itself—tortured China—Japan has grasped a tartar. Like Napoleon in Russia, Japan may lose herself in China's vastness. On the other hand it is just possible that Japan may know when to stop. China has absorbed "conquerors" before and will again; perhaps Manchuria and Jehol can well be shaped to Japanese designs, but China proper may bend but will scarcely break.

One of the very factors which thus far has aided Japan in her conquest of China has been China's disunity—the constant striving between the war lords—the division between Canton and Nanking, the continual strife between factions. But though this division has helped Japan in her military conquests, the very fact of it has been a source of economic weakness and a constant irritant to the conquerors. China as a country can never really be conquered by Japan, because there is no country to conquer. No sooner is one section pacified and reconstruction started than in some distant corner of the conquered territory a new war lord requires bribery or defeat if the tranquillity of the territory is to be preserved. Outbreaks are spasmodic, unpredictable; the territory is almost never conquered or is only pacified after years of effort. Guerilla warfare—the hardest kind of guerrilla warfare—drains the strength of the conquerors, saps their energy, and at the same time hampers the economic development of the country. The Japanese have found this to be true in Manchuria and Jehol; they are finding it true today in the so-called neutral ground of northern China. The very structure of China itself—its disunity, its chaos—though a help in the winning of military battles, is one of the greatest obstacles the Japanese have to over-

come if they hope to consolidate and make profitable their gains.

The passive resistance of the Chinese—probably the only spark of a country-wide nationalism that has been manifest in that war-torn country for years—reached its highest manifestation in the effective Japanese boycott, which is still causing Japanese merchants losses. This hurt, and is still hurting the Nipponese pocketbook; the battle on the economic front in China has been a losing one for Japan since her military conquests began. Before Japan can hope to realize any benefits from her newly-conquered territories she will have to be able to show a profit on the right side of her territorial ledger, and the passive resistance of the Chinese in the form of the boycott, and the intermittent, spasmodic, but nevertheless dangerous armed resistance of the scattered armies of the war lords are large stumbling stones in the way of such a success.

IN ADDITION to the opposition of single nations to the Japanese programme, there was a time during the course of recent events in the Far East when it was predicted that Japan—if she continued in her conquests—would find herself opposed by a combination of nations. The much-publicized proposed boycott of Japanese goods was to have been made a world-wide affair, but not at all oddly, a number of the nations were not enthusiastic about it. The League of Nations, of course, condemned Japanese aggression, but despite the apparently unanimous action of the League there were, and there are, some powerful nations in the world today who are sympathetic to Japan and are not actively opposed to her ambitious projects.

The difficulty of international action has been often enough demonstrated in the past. There is little likelihood, particularly in view of the present wave of nationalism that is sweeping the world, that a strong combination of nations, which might bring pressure to bear upon Japan in either economic, military or political ways, could be accomplished in either the near or more distant future.

Japan had no hesitancy in flouting the expressed wishes of a large portion of the world during her mauling of Shanghai because she fully understood the difficulties of international coördinated action. She apparently has little to fear from such action in the future; the League of Nations may exercise some moral suasion, but its prestige has been impaired, rather than enhanced, by the course events have taken in the Far East, and the League has never exercised other than a nominal influence.

But despite the unlikelihood of combined action, the recent recognition of Russia by the United States has clearly aroused Japanese fears. The possibility of a Russian-American alliance—though remote—has nevertheless become a real possibility in certain Japanese minds, and it is a spectre to Japanese statesmen which is far from pleasing. And Japan fears scarcely less than an actual alliance, signed and sealed, the *entente cordiale* that may readily result from the improved relations between the Soviet and the United States. To offset such an *entente*, there is the possibility—remote, but worthy of consideration—of a political *rap-prochement* between Germany, isolated in the West, and Japan, isolated in the East.

But what eventually may prove to be Japan's greatest obstacle to the real-

ization of her ambitions is not one of the world's raising, but a stumbling stone on her own doorstep. Japan's internal problems—at one time acute—now, not aggravated, but still grave enough, may some day assume tremendous proportions.

Her financial situation, though not desperate as yet, is grave, and the proper and rapid development of the territories she has conquered is essential. The tremendous expenditures necessary for her conquests and for building up the navy came at a time when Japan could ill afford them. In common with the rest of the world Japan suffered heavily from the depression. Great sums had to be appropriated for relief and for public works construction to make employment; the national debt increased by 231,900,000 yen in the year ended March, 1932. There followed Japan's "little boom," caused by the decrease in yen value when Japan went off the gold standard, and by increased governmental expenditures. But the boom has been so far of only partial benefit. Some classes have suffered from it; others have profited. In the meantime the Japanese Government approved the largest budget in the nation's history—2,239,100,000 yen, and "faces a probable deficit at the end of next March of between 890,000,000 and 1,000,000,000 yen."

"This," as one writer explained it, "must be added to a national public debt which stood at 6,521,800,000 yen in November, 1932, and has been increased since."

The tentative budget for 1934-35 will probably add another 1,000,000,000 yen to the national debt.

So far Japan has put far more money into Manchuria than she has got out of it. Exports to Manchuria have

increased, but those to China have temporarily decreased. Imports have increased but Japanese domestic producers have complained of the competition, and restrictions have been placed on such imports. Manchukuo's opium-growing possibilities are now being exploited, but much of the world is opposed to the opium traffic. Private investors have put large sums into the development of Manchuria—sums which can not possibly be repaid for some time to come. Some experts have estimated that the pacification alone of the conquered regions may take ten years, and until complete pacification has been achieved, it will be impossible for Japan to develop the mines and reap the full fruits of her military victories. In the meantime, while the Japanese Government is struggling to consolidate its territorial gains, the shoe of penury may pinch the Japanese people tighter and tighter.

Japan's population increased by more than 1,000,000 in 1932; she led the world in the ratio of increase. Only about one-fifth of the area of Japan proper is tillable; the pressure of the masses confined in the little islands is growing greater and greater. Manchuria offers no final solution for the overpopulation problem; the Japanese have found to their sorrow that this territory is not well suited for Japanese colonization. The masses—pressing for food, for employment, for land, harassing a Government dominated by a war machine, a Government deeply in the morass of debt—have found some political solace in the tenets of communism. The doctrines of Marx have sowed their seed in Tokyo as well as in Moscow; communism is not to be neglected as a factor of the future in considering Japanese internal prob-

lems. The religious and chauvinistic fanatics lend another note of fear to the future; plots and assassinations are part of Japanese life. Fascism, with its dictatorial form of government, seems, however, even more probable than communism, but the only thing certain is change.

There is a distinct possibility of an economic and political collapse of the present Government—a possibility which Professor Tyler Dennett of Princeton considers "eventually inevitable."

That Government has a far graver task ahead of it than the pacification of Manchuria; it must answer the cries of the people for bread, for land, for work, and at the same time it must keep the wheels of industry turning in Japan and keep the products of Japan moving across the seven seas—despite trade barriers, despite boycotts—in exchange for the products of other lands.

SUCH are Japan's problems of the morrow. She faces the future with a load of debt upon her back, and the territory she has conquered still unpacified and undeveloped. How is Japan's history likely to be written; over which obstacle, if any, will she stumble on the highway to empire?

There are inexorable forces in the histories of all nations which force them along the paths of destiny, regardless of the desires of the rest of the world—regardless even of the desires of the country itself. The pressure of an ever-increasing population is such a force in Japan. If the Japanese armies do not win new territory (but it is likely that they will), new room for expansion, the Japanese peasants will filter through the racial and economic barriers erected against them, and peacefully penetrate

other areas. No treaties can stop such a process; as Professor Frank R. Eldridge of New York University has said, they are driven by necessity.

"For Japan there is no military or diplomatic retreat, because there is no economic retreat," he has declared. "Millions of unborn Japanese are the dominant factors that set Japan's diplomatic course. The resources of Manchuria must support them.

"In time, perhaps, the resources of other undeveloped and empty areas of the world, now held in fief for unborn children of other nations, may have to be given up to the virile race that has proved itself unconquerable in Asia.

" . . . the battle for the world's resources is on and to the victor belong the spoils. As long as there are resources to be had we can not expect restriction of population growth."

Such then is the prospect of the future, but it is a long view. As Professor Eldridge points out, the resources of Manchuria must and can support millions of unborn Japanese. The problem of the immediate future is one of consolidation, of development, of reconstruction, of financial rehabilitation—of bread and work and land. If the present Japanese Government can solve this problem satisfactorily in the next few years it will doubtless remain in power; if not a new political dynasty, even a new political system, may prevail.

With the attention of the rest of the world focused inwardly upon domestic problems, and with the eyes of the Western world turned towards Europe, Japan has a breathing spell, diplomatically, in which to strengthen her position and consolidate her gains in the Far East. Between now and the expiration of the naval treaty in 1936,

there may be expected some slowing—some lull—in the rapid rush of events which have streamed across the stage of the Far East in recent years. Not until the conference on the reduction of naval armaments set for next year when Japan will surely and definitely insist on either naval parity with the United States or on a substantially increased ratio of naval strength is it likely that American-Japanese relations will suffer such a strain as that to which they have been subjected recently.

Certainly not before 1936 or even several years later can Japan hope to start reaping the fruits of her Manchurian venture; not before then can she hope really to accomplish much in the economic and financial rehabilitation of her Government and her citizens. By that time Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations will be an accomplished fact; she will stand alone.

Not until after 1936 and probably not until the 1940's, will the Japanese Government (if that Government survives internal discord and economic debacle, and that is touch-and-go) be ready again to challenge international, and particularly Russian and American, opinion. By that time Russia will probably be ready to answer sharply; by that time this country may be—and from present trends seems likely to be—almost as aggressively nationalistic as Japan is today.

But whatever fate holds in store for the Japan of tomorrow, it seems clear that the next naval conference will be a landmark of the immediate future in the course of American-Japanese relations. Friction at such a conference can be avoided only if the United States agrees to Japanese demands, and we are not likely to do that, with President Roosevelt in the White House. Bar-

ring that, Japan might sign, unwillingly, a treaty she would dislike—which she is extremely unlikely to do—or the world's attempts to limit naval armaments may be abandoned.

In the first case, the conference would produce an irritated, sore Japan; in the other, there is a possibility, even a probability, of unchecked building—an armaments race, with its inevitable consequences—which, it appears from recent events, has already started. Announcement of the American three-year construction programme was followed

shortly by revised estimates for Japanese army and navy expenditures in 1934-35. In turn, England announced that she plans to build up her fleet to a "safe" point, emphasizing cruisers and naval aviation.

Undoubtedly the conference year 1935 marks the fork in the road of tomorrow for Japan, and upon the road she takes will depend the course of world history. There is an intermission today in the "greatest drama of the Twentieth Century"; in 1935 the curtain will rise on Act II.



The Distressful Dairyman

BY MARK RHEA BYERS

While producers of other farm crops enjoy useful governmental aid, dairymen angrily watch prices for their much more valuable products drop further and further

THE dairy industry, depending upon the point of view, is either the problem-child or the step-child of the New Deal for farmers.

Out in the dairying districts of Wisconsin, Minnesota and northern Illinois the step-child theory is bitterly entertained by the farmers between milk strikes.

In Washington the problem-child thesis holds sway among bewildered experts. They have got most of the rest of the farmers feeling fairly happy and passing resolutions in praise of Secretary Wallace and the AAA—but they can't seem to do a thing with the dairymen except to make them madder.

The dairy industry refuses to yield to treatment. Just before Christmas, while the New Dealers were sending out holiday greetings to the public in the form of charts showing beautiful sweeping curves of prices rising from the end of 1932 to a nicely higher current level, the dairy industry suddenly developed acute melancholia. Down went butter to a thirty-five-year low, cheese nose-dived, the milk-marketing agreements for the cities grew pale and wan and turned up their little toes, and in Chicago and California 1934 was

ushered in by milk strikes with their usual accompaniments of violence, bombing, assault and the dumping of milk on the highways.

Whatever the New Dealers in the department of agriculture may have thought when they first tackled the farm problem—it is really a series of problems, all intricately related—they know by now that these symptoms of acute distress in the dairy industry bode them no good. The dairymen sourly avow that the New Deal has only recently discovered that the dairy industry is something more than a side-line to regular farming. They say—this is the step-child theory—that all the New Dealers could see when they went into their first huddle was wheat, cotton, corn and hogs, in that order of importance. (This is the reverse order of their importance, incidentally. Corn, cotton and wheat is the due order of precedence based upon the relative value of the crops.) But greater than all these is dairying, with which, so the dairymen believe, the Government has until recently concerned itself hardly at all.

The relative importance of the dairy industry in the total Ameri-

can farm industry can be seen from a few comparisons. Using 1929 figures, the total value of milk alone, on the farms, was more than two billion dollars, slightly exceeding the farm value of corn, the next most important crop. Wheat, the distress of whose producers has been the pet concern of farm relief specialists for years, compares unfavorably. The nation's milk in 1929 was worth two and a half times the whole wheat crop. Cotton, the first of the distressed farm industries to be tackled by the recovery programme, was valued in 1929 at nearly a billion less than the milk production of the nation. Add the farm value of cattle and calves for the year to the value of the milk produced and you discover that the dairy and beef industries—closely related over a wide area—accounted for almost as much of total farm income in dollars as wheat, cotton and hogs put together. The farm value of milk for the year was approximately twenty-five per cent of the total income to the farmer of all crops, livestock and other sources of agricultural income.

So why is dairy farming the step-child of the New Deal? ask the dairy-men; and what is going to be done about it?

These are the questions agitating the minds of the owners and operators of nearly one-third of the agricultural plant of the United States. The question has been asked with increasing vehemence ever since other lines of agriculture began to get out of the red last summer. It was underscored three times in 1933 by milk strikes which destroyed millions of dollars' worth of food; and italicized in January by the short, sharp and enormously effective Chicago milk strike. Unless the agricultural New Deal can find a reasonably

satisfactory answer to these two questions in a relatively short space of time, there may be a new political movement in the dairy States which will startle the country with its radicalism. That movement is already in its opening stages, an unbranded maverick running wild across all established party lines.

The attitude in Washington, where the industry this winter has been making its dissatisfaction loudly vocal, may be compared to that of the dance-hall management in the mining camp which hung a sign over its battered piano: "Don't shoot the professor; he's doing the best he can." It is probable that Washington has been doing the best it can. But that best hasn't been enough to satisfy, or even pacify, the dairy farmers. And it didn't help their frame of mind a bit to watch butter prices celebrate the New Year by falling to sixteen cents a pound.

That is significant. Butter is the basic dairy commodity—even much of the fluid milk bottled for city consumption is sold upon the basis of its butter-fat content according to the price of butter. The price of butter determines the price of whole milk, cheese, ice cream and condensed milk. And when butter, in mid-winter, drops to record lows—any consumer knows that butter normally costs most in winter—the state of mind of the farmer whose dairy herd is his means of livelihood may be understood.

The situation is not being helped by the fact that the dairyman is beginning to develop a fixed conviction that the New Deal not only is failing to help him out of his difficulties, but that it is even helping to push him further in. The NRA and its fair trade practice provisions, he is convinced, are pushing up the prices of the things he has to buy. The cotton programme has increased

the price of his overalls. The corn and wheat levitation projects have jacked up the cost of the feeds which he must buy to keep his cattle through the winter.

Nor is that all. The dairyman has not failed to note that wheat, cotton, corn and tobacco acres taken out of these crops for the coming year at Government expense will still be lying under sun and rain, raising something. And that something is likely to be grass or a forage crop of some sort, the most natural thing to do with which will be to feed it to cattle. Which means, unchecked, more and more farm acres going into competition with the dairyman, and a deeper and deeper flood of milk to drown the dairy business, already keeping its nose above the surface with difficulty.

Here is another curious fact: the CWA and public works programmes, substituting cash pay cheques for relief doles, have perceptibly reduced the consumption of dairy products. The reason seems to be that families receiving their first cash in months or years are buying butter substitutes in order to make the money stretch. The relief agencies supplied butter, milk and cheese as part of a scientifically balanced ration.

THESE are some of the reasons why the dairyman is asking why the dairy industry is being treated as the step-child of the agricultural family. Other reasons have to do with the manner in which his calls for help—such help as was rushed to the cotton and wheat belts—have been answered.

The only immediately tangible result of these calls for help have been two: the milk-marketing agreements for the large cities, and the purchase of butter

in the market for relief distribution through the Emergency Relief Administration.

It must be set down that the dairyman for the most part does not think much of these two gestures toward his relief. The metropolitan milk-marketing agreements, limited in scope, covered about 100 of the larger cities, and were worked out with great pains and detail by the AAA. Now 100 "milk sheds" in this large country handle a considerable amount of milk, but when considered in relation to the huge gallonage that flows into the milk pails of the nation night and morning it is little more than a drop in the bucket. The supply of fluid milk to the cities is a side-line—large, but a side-line nevertheless compared to the dairy business as a whole.

Moreover, the dairy-farmer outside of these "milk sheds" has a notion, however erroneous, that the most definite effect of the milk-marketing agreements was to fix prices at levels profitable for the big distributing companies. A few large concerns, owning distribution systems in most of the larger cities, dominate these fields. The milk-marketing agreements fixed prices the consumer had to pay, and promised fines and revocation of license to dealers who sold below these prices. They also fixed prices to the producer—for his "fluid" milk. Fluid milk is that part of the supply which appears on city doorsteps in bottles. The agreements left the "surplus" milk price to be set by the law of supply and demand. "Surplus" is that portion of the supply of a particular milk shed which can not be sold in bottles. It goes into butter, ice cream and condensed milk—chiefly butter and ice cream, since most of the condenseries are out in the country.

There was no set price on surplus milk.

What happened in effect was that the increased price to consumers cut down the consumption of fluid milk. So the surplus was correspondingly increased—it being all the milk consumers did not buy in bottles. The surplus was turned into butter, that being a form in which it could be stored conveniently without great spoilage or deterioration.

The result was that the enormous butter supply increased rapidly, and the butter price went to pot.

Incidentally, another reason why the butter surplus has gone to such unwieldy heights was the milk strike of late fall. The farmers by the thousands could not bring themselves to dump or destroy the milk which was not marketed during the strike. They turned it into butter, which would keep until the strike was over. In Wisconsin and Minnesota, where many dairy farms have so completely specialized in producing whole milk for condenseries and cheese factories that they possess neither cream separators nor churns, the family washing machine was frequently called into service. Thousands of pounds of butter with a faintly soapy flavor were ultimately rejected by dealers after the strike was over. Many more thousands of pounds of marketable butter were sold after the strike for what it would bring—and the surplus leaped.

Just how serious the surplus became may be seen by the fact that the cold storage holdings of creamery butter on December 1, as published by the *Wisconsin Crop and Livestock Reporter*, were about three times as large as a year previous, and twice as large as the December average from 1928 to 1932. Storage holdings of cheese were larger than either the previous year's volume

or the five-year average. It is little matter for surprise that butter dropped five cents a pound in the second week of December, and cheese went off two and one-half cents. Government purchases for relief distribution were simply unable to cope with the flood of dairy products coming on the market.

While all this was going on, with Washington apparently believing that the dairyman's problem was being solved by the fluid milk-marketing agreements, the larger part of the industry was slipping further and further down-hill. What the AAA was doing, as one of its officials has since ruefully remarked, was to raise the price of one-third of the dairy production, and slash the price of the other two-thirds. The more the milk-marketing agreements attracted milk to the cities by artificially higher levels of prices, the larger grew the surplus which went into butter and the lower went the price of butter fat. Along with butter went cheese and condensery prices.

Convinced, perhaps, by the farm strike of late autumn—it was most effective in the Wisconsin dairy region, where it persisted for a week after all other regions had called it off—the Chicago milk-marketing agreement was rescinded January 1. It simply hadn't worked. It had cut down the consumption of milk by city families, had increased the butter surplus alarmingly, and had involved the New Deal agencies in a few bitterly contested cases against independent milk dealers who refused to charge the prices set by the agreement. The independents, operating cash and carry stations, insisted that if they paid the producers the price set by the agreement they could charge what they pleased to the consumer. The price charged was less than the big

dairy companies got for delivered milk. So the independents were haled before the AAA authorities for trial and punishment.

But it didn't work out exactly as planned. The independents made out such a good case for themselves, and displayed such eagerness to take the whole matter into court for determination of the legal and constitutional angles involved, that the AAA took time out to think. Its thinking—aided no doubt by the vociferous displeasure of the dairymen outside of the "milk shed" territory—resulted in the abandonment of the milk marketing agreement in Chicago, with other similar agreements slated to follow into the discard.

Much to the disgust of the marketing authorities, the Chicago milk strike promptly followed, with the AAA refusing to take any steps in the situation. Washington declared it was all through with attempts to fix consumer prices or regulate competition. If the dealers and producers could get together on a buying price they would endeavor to enforce it by license—but all the rest of the elaborate marketing code was scrapped. The dairy industry was back just about where it had been before Washington endeavored to help it out of the hole.

Now let us see what happened to the other scheme for helping the dairy industry. Last August, after the summer milk strike in Wisconsin (the second of the three strikes of 1933 in that State), at the urgent request of Governor Schmedeman the Emergency Relief Administration agreed to buy and turn over to the Federal relief agencies enough of the surplus butter supply to reduce the stored butter to

normal proportions. The idea was that this would raise the butter price, and so lever up all dairy product prices. The size of the operation agreed upon was to be measured by an appropriation of \$43,000,000. By mid-December the Government had bought 60,000,000 pounds of butter. But the surplus was larger than ever, for reasons mentioned above, and the price was sliding. Discouraged, Secretary Wallace gave notice that the relief agency would buy no more butter. The Government was going to cut its losses, and the deal was off.

This was the occasion for the rather startling action of Governor Schmedeman in sending to a special session of the Wisconsin legislature, called to consider liquor legislation exclusively, a message calling upon senate and assembly forthwith to pass and send to Washington resolutions demanding immediate rescue of the dairy industry. In his message the Governor accused the AAA of breaking its word on the butter purchase agreement, and in general took its hide off for not doing anything to help the dairy industry.

This was all the more remarkable in that Governor Schmedeman is the first Democratic Governor Wisconsin has elected in forty years. He was and is a devout Roosevelt man, who has co-operated with the Administration in every detail of the recovery programme. But he was under severe pressure from his constituents. Wisconsin is the leading dairy State of the union, deeply concentrated on this branch of agriculture. No governor, whatever his party, could ignore the very serious situation—or the very urgent demands—of the Wisconsin dairymen.

The Governor had brought to an

end three milk strikes in the year by appealing to the farmers to resume marketing and abide the improvement measures of the Administration, with whom he promised to plead the cause of the milk-producers. It is small wonder he went off the reservation when the one tangible thing he had obtained for the dairymen of his State—the butter purchase programme—was summarily broken off.

“The sensational drop in the price of butter and cheese,” the Governor’s message told the legislature, “creates an extremely critical situation. Within a week the wholesale price of butter has dropped from twenty-three to sixteen cents a pound and the price of American cheese from ten and one-half to eight cents. This reduction . . . will mean a loss of several million dollars per week to the farmers of the State and will have a most disastrous effect upon all lines of business.

“The sensational drop in the butter and cheese prices is directly associated with the action of the Secretary of Agriculture in canceling the agreement made with the Dairy Marketing Corporation for the purchase of surplus butter and cheese and its distribution through relief channels.”

(The Dairy Marketing Corporation is an association of all the coöperatives in the dairy field. The agreement was that the Government was to provide a fund to buy up the surpluses. The Government relief agency was to pay only the same price it had been paying for butter substitutes and the Dairy Marketing Corporation was to make up the difference.)

“In the first weeks after this plan was adopted,” Governor Schmedeman continued, “some eleven million pounds of butter were purchased

through the Land O’ Lakes coöperative association (the largest dairy co-operative) and the wholesale price of butter advanced from nineteen to twenty-three cents. . . . Not until the last few weeks, however, was any of this butter actually distributed to relief authorities and the entire purchases to date have been only about 45,000,000 pounds at a total cost of less than twelve million dollars.

“Not one pound of cheese has been purchased, although the plan adopted in August contemplated purchase of surplus cheese as well as butter. During the last week Secretary Wallace announced the abandonment of the entire plan, which immediately was followed by a break in butter prices, and this compelled also a sharp reduction in cheese prices.”

Recounting the aid given the cotton, wheat and other farmers, the Governor declared that no effective aid had been given the dairymen, except this plan, which “was so slowly and ineffectually carried out that the excess in butter stocks above normal, which in August was twenty million pounds, has now increased to 100 million pounds.”

Strong words from one Rooseveltian to another!

The Governor submitted a programme for which he asked—and at once received—the united endorsement of the legislature, and a delegation went to Washington to submit it to Mr. Wallace, seconded by the entire Wisconsin congressional delegation. The programme demanded that the Government:

- (1) Raise dairy prices.
- (2) Convert surplus butter and cheese to Federally distributed relief foods.
- (3) Restrict production of dairy

substitutes by a quota system, and bar dairy imports.

(4) Get a \$100,000,000 appropriation from Congress to indemnify slaughter of cattle affected with tuberculosis or Bang's disease (contagious abortion), to cut production.

(5) Effect a plan by which lands withdrawn from other crop production will be kept from becoming pasturage and increasing dairy production.

IN THE meantime the Chicago milk strike blazed up under the griddle on which the Secretary was toasting, and a major split in the ranks of the dairymen developed to make it even harder for the distracted officials to satisfy the angry milk-producers. The Wisconsin Milk Pool, which conducted the three milk strikes in Wisconsin in 1933, appeared in the peculiar rôle of strike-breaker. One can well imagine the despair of officials whose apparently impossible job it became not only to check and turn the tobogganing price of dairy products but also to produce a solution which would reconcile the embattled factions in the industry.

Such a solution is still to seek, but Washington has produced some tentative ideas as to how it may be reached. They are designed to include something more than fluid milk prices—which is where the milk-marketing agreements gummed the works—but it is too early to say whether they will succeed in calming the tempest which has been roused in the dairy States.

Price-fixing at retail, it has been agreed, can not be made to work, which is a blow to the hopes of Schmedeman and other Western governors who have demanded some such instant remedy. But it is hoped that a fair base price to producers may be established with the

consumer price left to be set by competition between distributors. Most important of all, since experience has shown that the flood of fluid milk beyond market requirements will otherwise inevitably wreck cheese and butter prices, some form of production control is envisaged.

Production control is going to be hard. There are more farms producing milk in some quantity than any other farm crop, and they are scattered all over the country. The chief commercial production is centred in Wisconsin, Minnesota, New York and a few other States. But everywhere farmers are milking a few cows and sending the milk to market in some form. Cotton, corn and wheat occupy relatively restricted areas. Milk production control must operate everywhere if it is to be effective.

A proposal much favored—it was in the Schmedeman scheme—is the elimination of cattle with tuberculosis or Bang's disease, the Government to buy and kill these diseased animals. This scheme has a part in almost every programme advanced for relief of the dairy industry. But on analysis it seems to be only a minor detail so far as the major problem is concerned. It might considerably reduce the milk output of the non-dairy States, but in the large centres of production it will help very little, because of the fight which has been waged against these diseases in such areas for many years. There are large regions in Wisconsin and Minnesota, for example, where whole counties are Federally attested to be completely free from tubercular cattle. Slaughter of diseased animals would make but little impression on the main stream of milk production.

Voluntary reduction of output will

also be hard to handle. If the Government buys milch cows as it has leased corn and wheat acres, it will be sold only the poorest producers of the herds, and the payments, it may be feared, will be used for intensive feeding of the remaining cattle, with consequent increased production per head. The most feasible suggestion to date seems to be to couple any cattle-slaughtering scheme with a pro rata limitation on purchases of milk by cheese factories, condenseries and creameries. Even so the surplus milk will continue for some time to be the knottiest of problems.

Equally hard to handle will be the evident tendency of farmers enjoying benefits under the cotton, wheat and corn-hog schemes to put idle acres into pasture and add milch cows to use the pasture. The dairy States have a real fear that their supremacy in the field may be challenged if they submit to a general restriction programme without safeguards. They demand assurance that the cash-crop and livestock farmers of the South and West who would be ineligible for milk control benefits on a large scale will not be permitted to increase their herds and grab the markets. Signs of a strong movement toward raising more cattle in the non-dairy States have already appeared. The dairymen call this subsidizing competition to steal their markets and demand that the farmers enjoying Federal benefit from other crops under limitation be prevented from adding to their milk production.

All around, it is a most difficult and spiny problem, this business of bringing relief to the dairy business. Efforts toward a solution have thus far been like trying to pick up quicksilver between the hands. What looks like an improvement in one corner of the field

results in disaster elsewhere. Somehow, some way the Government—if it is to do anything—must corral the whole problem of fluid milk, cheese, butter and condensed milk, and control them all and their prices simultaneously. It is a large order, and the odds are that it can be done only imperfectly at best.

Dairy farmers are not excessively hopeful about the possibilities of an effective programme. Their leaders, self-appointed mostly, are proposing newer and more fantastic schemes every day to lift the dairy industry out of the rut. But the man who milks the cows doesn't take all of it seriously. He doesn't believe much in price-fixing, nor in production or acreage control. He'll take the Government's money to quit working, as a sort of windfall. But his own belief is that nothing can raise prices until the country gets back to normal and the mass of the people have money to spend. More and more he looks to monetary inflation as the lever by which this can be accomplished. The general progress of recovery interests him more than the fussing about with farm relief programmes. Perhaps the farmer is more realistic than his leaders; maybe he knows himself and his situation better than they do.

Secretary Wallace can temporarily satisfy the farmers by fixing a price for their milk. But he can not force the consumer to buy the milk if he can not afford to; and he therefore can not control the accumulation of butter, cheese and condensed milk made from the surplus.

That suggests a continued fall of prices for dairy products, and increasing unrest in the dairy country, unless something be done. The answer proposed at Washington, essentially, is control of production to consumable

levels. But such a programme, even if it could be worked out, can hardly affect prices quickly enough to prevent disturbances. It is not pessimism to expect trouble in the Middle West in the next few months, in all probability, because no perfect solution seems possible.

Few farmers believe in farm strikes; but the dairymen are mad and know of nothing else to do to vent their anger. If there is not to be serious trouble the Administration will probably have to buy the dairymen off with benefit pay-

ments—even more expensively than the wheat-raisers, corn-growers and corn-hog farmers, since the dairy business is of such a nature that enforcing a processing tax on middleman or consumer will be doubly hard. Economically we may be resigned to the expectation that it will not work. It will be expensive, and the Treasury will “take a beating,” with small chance to recoup. But it seems the only way to hold unrest in check until the general recovery now apparently under way can heal the situation.



Can the Germans Rightfully Rearm?

BY BERNARD LANDE COHEN

They argue that the Allies, by failing to carry out their disarmament promises in the Peace Treaty, have relieved Germany of its obligation, but is this true?

THE tendency since the War to regard the Germans as an injured nation is responsible for the wide-spread belief that the stand of the Hitler Government on armaments is a natural outcome of what is considered a breach of faith on the part of the former Allies. Mr. Lloyd George, for example, expresses this viewpoint very energetically in the following terms: "Hitler would never have been there to issue his manifesto in the name of the German nation had it not been for the outrageous breach of faith perpetrated by the nations that ruled the League. He is giving dramatic expression to the indignation of every honest man in Germany at the shameless and elaborate trickery and treachery perpetrated upon his great country." This summing up of an intricate problem fully illustrates a disposition of the human mind to simplify issues which in reality are anything but simple, and is characteristic of the carelessness which has dominated the whole subject of disarmament. It would make for clearness of thought if the reduction

of military power which the Treaty of Versailles sought to impose upon Germany were examined on its own merits independently of the larger issue of general disarmament. In other words, should it be found that the limitation of German arms was intrinsically a justifiable act in 1919, it need not follow that we must revise this opinion only because the other nations have not likewise cut down their own armaments.

The main provisions of the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles are as follows:

(1) The German army is limited to 100,000 strong including staffs, officers and men of all ranks. Its reorganization is provided for in great detail and the strength of each unit and even the kind of training is laid down in elaborate tables.

(2) Compulsory military service is abolished and none but volunteers may serve; the intention being to prevent the building up of large reserves that go with conscript armies.

(3) There are numerous and ingenious restrictions designed to prevent the

mass training of men and the creation of territorial and auxiliary forces.

(4) Possession is forbidden of military and naval airplanes, poison gas, tanks, armored cars and guns exceeding four inches in calibre.

(5) As regards weapons permitted, the number is carefully restricted in each case and is dealt with in detail in separate schedules, the aim being to render German military power absolutely static.

(6) The import and export of arms is prohibited, and their manufacture within Germany itself confined to certain specified factories.

Although cut down to the lowest point which any of her enemies thought it worth while to demand, the military power of Germany remained at a much higher level than that of any of the smaller nations of the world. None of the South American Republics, for instance, have armaments even proportionately as great as those Germany was allowed to retain, whatever basis of comparison may be used—population, length of frontier, area or wealth. In 1932, the last year for which reliable figures are available, the Dutch regular army consisted of 19,500 exclusive of those serving in the colonies; the standing army of Denmark was a little more than 14,000, while that of Switzerland was about 46,000. Thus Holland, Denmark and Switzerland together had fewer men under arms than Germany; nevertheless, not one of these minor states seems for this reason to have considered its position insecure or its citizens under any disadvantage, and judging by their public credit, it is evident that the confidence of financiers and investors in their stability has not been diminished by reason of their insignificant military array.

Before the rise of Hitler, Germany had less reason to fear foreign aggression than almost any other nation in the world. Among the heavily armed states England, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United States of America were far from hostile. Even France showed signs of friendliness by withdrawing her troops from the Rhine before the expiration of the delay fixed by the Treaty. France welcomed Germany to the League of Nations on equal terms with herself, and in 1932 virtually canceled her claims to all further reparations. From the point of view of the German taxpayer the disarmament provisions of the Treaty were even a blessing, since he was no longer forced to do military service, while the burden of military taxation, the heaviest in Europe before the War, was very substantially reduced.

Much has been made of the so-called humiliation of Germany under the Versailles Treaty, and of her alleged inequality to other nations. Experts in the art of war are agreed, and history proves, that it is impossible to gauge the actual and potential strength of nations in advance, too many factors being involved. Strength is more than a matter of size or numbers, for in war the imponderable elements are many. For instance, a great deal depends on the ability of the general staff; even such a thing as an efficient espionage system must weigh in the balance; while the possession of a single new weapon could be a decisive factor that would overcome the enemy's superiority in other fields. Of the utmost importance are economic position and industrial equipment, which enable a combatant state to adapt itself quickly to the needs of war; hence it follows that inferiority in actual strength may

be compensated for by superiority in potential strength. In the case of Germany this would seem only too true, her military impotence at the present day being by no means such as the framers of the Treaty had intended, even assuming that all of its provisions were faithfully observed—which is far from being the case. In no other country has civil aviation been so far developed, and to convert a commercial airplane into a bombing plane capable of carrying explosive, incendiary and gas bombs is the work of a few hours. While of little use for other military purposes, they would be capable, in a series of night raids upon enemy centres of population, of creating all the havoc and destruction which have been promised for the next war. As to chemical warfare, Major Lefebure, an English authority on poison gas, may here be quoted with advantage. "The great ease and rapidity with which the German dye factories mobilized for poison gas production has already been demonstrated. It took forty years and more to develop these factories yet forty days saw many of these plants producing huge tonnages of poison gas, and as many hours were sufficient for others." Given the conjunction of innumerable bombing planes and immense quantities of poison gas, and the inequality of Germany, as regards some of her neighbors at least, ought not to be taken too much for granted.

One often hears it said that the limitation clauses of the Treaty are humiliating to Germany. The habit of personifying nations, and making statements about them as though they were objective realities distinct from human beings, should be curtailed if we are to substitute rational analysis for political mysticism. Germany, otherwise than in

a geographical sense, is no more than a pure abstraction, its personality being no less a legal fiction than that of the United States Steel Corporation or the Hamburg American Steamship Company. Germany is not morally a person and therefore could not be wronged or humiliated. Should it be claimed, rather, that the unilateral disarmament has been humiliating to the German people, the statement, though more intelligible, is none the less capable of being reduced to an absurdity. Common experience tells us that the average citizen is too much occupied with his own affairs to give more than passing attention to affairs of state, and that he is rarely disturbed by any political event other than a war. It were preposterous to expect that the employed working man or peasant in Germany should take it to heart because the army of the Fatherland is limited to 100,000. Even in the age of Hitler there are yet abrupt differences between different groups of Germans, and they are not a homogeneous people by any means. A German writer once pointed out that it would be far easier to promote understanding and good will between Germans and Frenchmen than between German Social Democrats and German Junkers. The moral issues of the world have nothing to do with lines of nationality, and a situation which might grieve the National Socialists certainly need not affect the other Germans in the same way, even those that are politically inclined.

THE disarmament of the whole world is the declared intention of the Treaty of Versailles, and in the Preamble to Part V dealing with German disarmament the principle is laid down as follows: "In order to render possible

the initiation of a general limitation of armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow." The subject was likewise referred to in the reply to a German memorandum on the draft of the Treaty. "The Allied and Associated Powers wish to make it clear that their requirements in regard to German armaments were not made solely with the object of rendering it impossible to resume her policy of military aggression. They are also the first steps towards that general reduction and limitation of armaments which they seek to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventatives of war, and which it will be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to provide." Finally, Article VIII of the Covenant affirms the solemn obligation of the League of Nations to bring about "the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety, and the enforcement by common action of international obligations."

The failure to carry into effect this part of the Treaty has been held responsible for the triumph of Hitlerism and the present impasse of European affairs. While the militarism of the neighboring countries undoubtedly helped to prepare an atmosphere in Germany favorable to the growth of the Nazi movement, to conclude, in the manner of Mr. Lloyd George, that Hitler would never have won otherwise is a careless assumption which a closer examination of the facts would scarcely bear out, inasmuch as it would be just as easy to show that the fear of Hitler prevented disarmament as to prove the reverse proposition, that the failure to disarm brought about the victory of the Nazis. Let us suppose that the disarmament conference had been a success. To

conclude that Hitler would then have been led to give up his ambition of becoming the German savior would be altogether too naïve, since it is obvious that plenty of subject matter for speech-making would still have been left for him and his followers. The defeat of Germany in the Great War would still have been a fact; and the Jews, the Communists and the Socialists would in any event have furnished sufficient material for agitation. The onset of the world-wide depression after 1929 opened up opportunities for an able demagogue in almost any country, and even if disarmament had actually been accomplished, it is difficult to see how the economic distress of the German masses could have been alleviated thereby. The payment of reparations had a far greater effect on the lives of the people than such matters as the French having too many guns or spending too much money on fortifications; yet even the stoppage of this tribute did not stem the tide of Hitlerism. When all the known facts about the Nazi movement are taken together, there is hardly any reason to assume that an international treaty on arms would have in itself so affected domestic conditions and the interaction of personalities that the struggle for power within Germany would have run its course otherwise than it did.

Another commonly accepted axiom is that the Allies tricked the Germans into disarming by promising to do likewise, and then failed to carry out their promise. No one has been able to show exactly in what way Germany has suffered, nor why her grievances should be greater than those of other European nations whose interest in disarmament was not less real than that of Germany. The representatives of many

countries exerted their efforts on behalf of disarmament with great zeal and have certainly no less reason to be chagrined at its failure than Hitler and his followers. The militarism of the former Allies ought not to be condoned, but to conclude that a definite obligation assumed by the Germans may now be disregarded and that they are free to join in the race is to admit a principle that could only aggravate the present evil. The promise to disarm, in so far as the declaration of intention in the Preamble to Part V of the Treaty is to be considered as a promise made specifically to Germany, was clearly conditioned upon the carrying out of the disarmament provisions of the Treaty, and it is significant that the Control Commission set up by the Allies has never reported that Germany has disarmed to the level required. Aside from the difficulties inherent in the enforcement of a treaty of this kind, even where no questions of bad faith can enter, many instances of violation have in fact come to light, and if not serious enough to render the treaty entirely ineffective, it remains true, none the less, that the Germans have disarmed only in so far as they were actually compelled to do so. Moreover, since no time limit was fixed for the carrying out of the "promise," and general disarmament is admittedly impossible without an agreement of all the important nations of the world, some of whom, such as Soviet Russia and the United States, were not signatories of the Treaty, it may still be too early to assume that bad faith was shown by any particular group of powers. Certainly, no time was lost in taking up the question, for in 1921 the first assembly of the League of Nations addressed itself to the task by appointing

a Preparatory Committee to study the whole question and to consider means of giving effect to Article VIII of the Covenant. This committee, which came to be known as the Temporary Mixed Commission, drew up a Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance upon which the Locarno Pact was later to be founded. Other committees were appointed to draw up technical plans for submission to the various governments preparatory to the summoning of the Disarmament Conference; and it is in its technical features that disarmament met with obstacles which have proven insurmountable.

AT THE time the Allied statesmen made their declaration for a general reduction in armaments, there is reason to believe that they were quite sincere; but their pledge must be understood as having been given not to Germany alone but to the whole world. The occasion seemed most propitious, after the principal despotic governments were overthrown, and the Germans, considered rightly or wrongly to be the champions of militarism, had been defeated. Universal disarmament seemed, at the time, an easy and natural outcome of the greatest of all wars. It might have been apparent, however, that a joint promise to reduce armaments necessitated a further agreement between the promissors *inter se*; and it should be obvious that the failure to reach this agreement was not due to the continuance of any league against Germany on the part of the other nations, but rather to the emergence of a new series of international rivalries which embittered the relations of the former Allies. Disarmament failed for no other reason than the fact that it proved to be an utter impossibility.

The expressed object of a disarmament conference is an international agreement that would strike a balance between the armaments of different nations, at a lower level than they maintain at present, without involving injustice as between one nation and another. When the difficulties involved in this procedure are raised into the clear light of reality they appear formidable enough to make it apparent that conceived according to this method disarmament is entirely unrealizable.

(1) The system of compulsory peacetime military service is something which nations are unwilling to give up, thereby making possible the creation of large reserves which could be added to the standing forces when mobilization takes place.

(2) An even greater complication is that which results from the rapid progress of invention and its application to the ends of war, for undoubtedly the various general staffs would insist on retaining full liberty to experiment in new forms of warfare, being obsessed with fear lest their rivals by means of secret inventions suddenly gain an advantage over them.

(3) No disarmament treaty could include and limit all the vital industrial and economic factors upon which military strength ultimately depends. Thus, weapons useful in war have peacetime uses of great importance, aircraft being the most obvious example. The same thing may be said of poison gas, since the power to produce it on a large scale and at short notice depends on the possession of chemical factories, which are indispensable for many peacetime purposes.

(4) The limitation of arms, even if accepted, would be most difficult to control. As regards certain weapons, such

as fighting ships, supervision might be comparatively easy; nor could an excessive number of troops be drilled and organized in secret. However, large stores of weapons, ammunition and poison gas could be so accumulated, while the merest suspicion of bad faith would itself be sufficient to undermine any treaty.

(5) A treaty on armaments need not put an end to military competition, for the race would only be diverted into other fields left untouched, or in new weapons subsequently developed.

That disarmament, as conceived at the present time, is a delusion has already been demonstrated by past experience. All kinds of difficulties have arisen in the interpretation of the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, while some of them have been disregarded entirely. Thus, the export and import of war material to and from Germany in direct violation of the Treaty has been connived at for years, and it is now recognized that the quantity of her arms and military equipment is a thing entirely beyond control. In the opinion of experts, bombing planes and poison gas will play a decisive rôle in any future conflict, and in a country as industrially organized as Germany these would be available at once. The events which followed the Washington Naval Conference of 1921 teach a similar lesson. A treaty was signed by England, Japan, the United States and France to limit the number of their capital ships. It has been faithfully adhered to by all the contracting parties, yet there is now going on a naval race between them as intense and costly as the one ended by the Washington Conference, the competition having merely been diverted to war vessels of other categories. Disarmament, so

long as it continues to be dealt with as a mathematical problem, is inevitably doomed to failure, partly because no exact ratio of military power can possibly be established between nations, and also because so little account is being taken of the real causes that underlie the competition in armaments. Problems of fundamental importance require a solution before there could be any hope of stopping the further increase in armaments, or reducing them.

THE growth of militarism before 1914 was discussed by Norman Angell in *The Great Illusion*, a book which later events have shown to be prophetic. He postulates the question why it is that each state fears its neighbors and is busy building up armaments; and answers by pointing out that there is a universal assumption that a nation, in order to find outlets for its expanding population and increasing industry, is necessarily pushed to territorial expansion and the exercise of political force against others; and by doing so it stands to further the prosperity of its people. He then goes on to prove with great ability the essential fallacy of this whole doctrine, and to show that in the modern world the commerce and industry of a people no longer depend on the expansion of its political frontiers; that military power is socially and economically futile and can have no relation to the prosperity of the people exercising it; and that it is impossible for one nation to seize by force the wealth and trade of another. According to this writer, the universal acceptance of the fact that it is bound to bring loss to both sides no matter who wins would in itself lessen the probability of war and thereby solve the problem of armaments.

While it is true that at no time in the history of the world has the opposition to war been more pronounced than at the present day, nevertheless, an armed conflict seems no less imminent than in 1909 when Norman Angell penned his celebrated thesis. Even if the belief in its economic usefulness has been dissipated, it must be acknowledged that the possibility of war springs from an even more primitive impulse than that of economic determinism. History teaches that from the beginning, potentates have made war with no incentive other than that of their own egotism and vanity, and in 1914 this motive was not wanting in Germany at least, where a powerful military and aristocratic caste cared less about the economic pros and cons than about the love of glory and the extension of power. Today, no less than formerly, the ambition and pugnacity of dictatorial groups plays an all-important part in raising the expectation of warfare. Beginning with the rise of Mussolini, the last decade has seen the gradual eclipse of democracy throughout the world, and this decline has coincided with the increasing probability of war. To enforce this impression, we have the noteworthy fact that in no instance is there a likelihood of war between two democratic states. War between France and England, or France and Spain, is very improbable and the same may be said as respects other democratic countries bordering on each other. Peace seems assured between Belgium and Holland, Sweden and Norway, Brazil and the Argentine, Canada and the United States. On the other hand, when we come to consider the possible sources of warfare, we find that in every instance at least one of the parties involved is under the power

of a dictator. Japan, which is in the hands of a military clique, has for many years loomed as an antagonist of the United States, and more recently of Soviet Russia. Italy, since the advent of the Mussolini dictatorship, has had strained relations with her two principal neighbors, Jugo-Slavia and France; while republican Germany was not considered a possible focus of war until Hitler became ruler. It will be seen that wherever there is a likelihood of war at least one of the parties concerned is a non-democratic state.

It may be true, to quote Norman Angell, that "for a modern nation to add to its territory no more adds to the wealth of the people of such nation than it would add to the wealth of the Londoners if the City of London were to annex the County of Hertford." But if by any chance his argument should fail to impress Hitler, Mussolini or the Japanese Minister of War, a considerable part of the world's population has reason to expect war and to prepare for it. Given absolute power in the hands of a few and the personal factor becomes uppermost; the economic and moral disadvantages of war are considerations which may be pushed into the background, and bear no weight against the passion of romantic and adventurous men for more power and greater fame. It must be plain to all that a successful war against the Soviets would rejoice the military party in Japan regardless of the economic consequences, while the annexation of more territory by Italy or the re-taking of Alsace by Germany would add immeasurably to the prestige of their respective dictators.

The present danger of war in certain parts of the world arises from the fact that the most vital decisions rest with a mere handful of people, who may or may not be actuated by humanitarian ideals. In the final analysis this threat can only be removed by a revolution in Japan and the collapse of the dictatorship in Germany and Italy. It is easy to see that there would be no more incentive for the United States to enlarge her Pacific fleet once the military party in Japan were overthrown. Similarly, should Italy and Germany get rid of their dictators, the present tension in Europe would relax itself at once. France could then easily venture to reduce her vast military expenditures regardless of any international treaties; and the cumulative impulse of the present for all the nations to increase their armaments might well be converted into a movement everywhere to cut them down. Disarmament is not to be achieved by means of any artificial system of limitations but only through the recognition of the historical background of the problem. The last sixty years have seen a constantly upward trend in military preparations, owing to the prevalent feeling of insecurity and the presentiment of danger; and the true approach to the problem is the establishment of a new set of conditions that would result logically in the reversal of this trend. The creation of a psychological basis for peace is possible only with the return of responsible government and its adoption throughout the world. The reduction of armaments by gradual stages could then be expected to follow in consequence of a new historic process.

Sons as Lovers

BY HENRY MORTON ROBINSON

Who diagnoses our national melancholia uneconomically as the effect of romantic love

WHEN the ingenious Prince of Aquitaine suggested that his attendant lords and ladies spend their elegant leisure in playing his newly invented game of *Merci*, he was unconsciously appealing to something basic and perennial in human nature. He was offering his subjects a straight play-time proposition—with prizes not so Platonic as is generally supposed. The charm of his little game (which under the name of romantic love has enjoyed considerable currency in the Western world) was obviously this: it had nothing to do with marriage, or housekeeping, or child-bearing, or any of the more irksome forms of reality. No, it was something else again—a delicate pastime to divert the minds and, no doubt, elevate the souls of the grand personages who played it. Cavaliers that they were, they did not take the sport too seriously. All the vows of eternal fidelity, all the inflated language of courtship were understood to be merely the props and conventions of the love game, as played by Provençal aristocrats high up on their castled rock.

Down in the valley the common yeomanry performed the prosier chores of existence. These toilers of the glebe had

neither the leisure nor the address to play the love game, so they mated and spawned according to their lights, which, though dim, were fairly natural. The great leveler democracy had not yet brought the vocabulary or usage of romantic love down to their plane, and they certainly did not have to depend on a *carte d'amour* in getting from one place to another. The loutish swain of that day merely went walking with a good sound girl, and after a couple of elementary tests, married her. She, having no illusions about being a goddess or a cup-winning Miss Derbyshire, turned in a good job with the skillet and cradle. It is not recorded that she was abused or neglected by her husband, or—what is more important—she did not *consider* herself abused or neglected.

But all this was long ago and far away. Since then, social erosion (education, revolution—in brief, democracy) has washed the courtly peaks of Provence down to a lowly pene-plain, bringing many of their peculiarly aristocratic customs, including romantic love, down with them. The glittering coins of speech once used as counters in the love game have been debased with plebeian clay, and a mutilated jargon of the love-

courts now issues from the mouths of persons who have neither the wit to understand what they are saying, nor the emotional balance to take the consequences. "I love you"—a statement difficult for a mature person to make, so far-reaching and important are its connotations—is now blubbered, groaned, crooned and whined by millions of persons who are emotionally incompetent to utter the words, to say nothing of basing their lives on them.

Yet that is exactly what has happened in America. Instead of being a game, to be played in leisure moments and for casual stakes, romantic love has become the governing fantasy of our age, the avowed and overt end of millions of lives. As a race we are obsessed by the shimmering image of what we believe to be due us in love, and shrewd exploiters of the public appetite keep that vision dancing erotically before us. The movies have preempted the theme and given it such a blinding polish that our eyes are a-dazzle with the possibilities of sexual pleasure—possibilities impossible of attainment unless we make upwards of \$25,000 a year. So many novels have described the devious courses by which one man wins the right to enjoy eternal ecstasy (nothing less) with one woman that the subject is reeling with exhaustion. But the novelists reel right on. Every vocal instrument of the age—the radio, advertising, even education—is engaged in whooping up the romantic clamor. We stand goggling at the mirage that whirls before us, beckoning us onward to taste its special delights. To seize our share of the promised thrills we stretch out both hands, overreach ourselves, lose our balance—and that is where the trouble begins.

What trouble? Well, practically all the trouble in the world.

It was something more than pure accident that led the first exponents of romantic love to cast their invention into game form. It is much more fun to play a game than cope with reality, especially when that game provides in bounteous measure all the excitement and variety that actual life yields so charily. But if we go a step further we shall discover that *games are essentially the occupation of children*, and that the game of romantic love is peculiarly an infantile substitute for reality, a play-dream that has expanded far beyond its original limits, and now magnetizes with its powerful appeal all that is infantile in our lives.

The assertion that romantic love is a return to childhood does not depend upon a Freudian or any other psycho-analytic theory. It has the broadest of possible bases in world literature. In every language, romantic literature thrusts man into the *past*, into the time and place of his greatest happiness—a Garden of Eden, a Golden Age, or a condition of noble savagery. Somewhere in this distant past, promises romanticism, men will find a perfect model of innocence and bliss. Now this same romantic urge thrusts the individual back into his *own* past, deep into the golden age of his departed childhood. "Heaven," says Wordsworth, "lies about us in our infancy"—and the modern psychiatrist puts his seal of approbation on Wordsworth's sentiment. For in infancy, the heaven of mother-love wrapped us in a warm, protective mantle, effectively shielding us from competitive existence. Then, if ever, was it sweet to live! The deep luxury of that mother wave on which we floated so peacefully causes early childhood to seem the happiest era of mortality, a refuge to which we run in

memory and desire when the buffets of maturity fall heaviest upon us.

This desperate longing to revisit the past is the chief pillar of romantic love, the foundation of the immature sex relationship that characterizes American life. We expect to find in our Beloved all the security, the solicitude and sacrificial yielding-up of self that we knew from our mother during the first years of our existence. And romantic love encourages the illusion that such a person can be found!

Consider now the fate of a person under the spell of this illusion. He is, in the chief sector of his emotional life, not more than seven years old; frequently he is even younger. But legally and biologically he is an adult, and because he *looks* like a mature person the world expects him to assume the burdens of maturity: social and family responsibilities, and the custodianship of his own emotional life. To lay a teak log on a puppy's back would be just as sensible, and in many cases just about as successful. For the grown-up infant shrinks from the load: he can not carry it, he does not want to carry it. The acceptance of adult responsibility is the single severest trial that men are ever called upon to meet, and even in the best of cases it is achieved only with hesitation and many partial defeats. To renounce childhood completely is so rare that scarcely one per cent of our population ever emerges from psychic pinafores.

The remainder of us find our lives disastrously complicated at this point by the operation of a blight too grimly familiar in Christian education. From earliest childhood we have been taught that the sexual relationship is somehow reprehensible, degrading, "sinful." Our severity on this point is, happily, a far

cry from the Patristic position of St. Ambrose: "Better that the human race perish, than that it be perpetuated by sexual intercourse." But it can not be denied that the old stains of wrongdoing still deface the body and practice of love. By the time we discover the wholesome truth for ourselves the damage has already been done and we are permanently saddled with a burden that weighs only slightly less than an actual guilt-neurosis.

Add this sense-of-guilt to our infantile yearning for peace at the mother-breast, and you get some idea of the impasse into which romantic love has led us. Now, truly, we are in a dilemma. Desiring in the deepest part of our lives to escape the battle with reality, yet fearing punishment if we seek the guilty Nirvana of love, we are beset by terror and confusion. It is as though we were fleeing from a ferocious lion and sought refuge in a cave which harbored a loathsome serpent. There is no escape but oblivion, and we accept aid from anything that will hasten our descent into the soft maelstrom of surrender.

WHAT are some of the aids to oblivion that guilty, harassed Americans are accepting? What are some of the dodges and escapes we make when the conflict presses too sorely? The list is a long strange one, ranging from stock-gambling to necrophilism, but we can enumerate only a few of the chief items here.

Alcohol and drugs are, of course, primary avenues of escape. The theory that men "drink to forget" needs no elaboration from me; I would point out, however, that they do not always drink (or take drugs) to forget conscious events or states of mind, but that they ply themselves with alcohol and

opiates to hush the querulous protestations of voices rising from deep recesses of the unconscious. These voices are either tormenting accusations of incestuous guilt or pitiful wails of loneliness issuing from the shattered conch of a romantic dream. Orestian shades never persecuted their man more viciously. The victim is always in half-flight, literally "driven to drink" by the pursuing voice of conscience or despair.

When nothing but retreat will satisfy the refugee soul, certain forms of mental disease—notably schizophrenia—are the result. Our men and women are breaking down with alarming frequency between the ages of thirty-five and forty, or just at the time when the burdens of maturity are heaviest. Why? I believe that they break down because their psychic fibres have been systematically weakened since childhood by false hopes and promises of what human beings can be to each other. Specifically, the false promise of romantic love is this: "In a lonely world where every soul is condemned to isolation, men and women can escape both loneliness and conflict, too, by snuggling into each other's arms." It is an attractive thesis, but as every grown person knows, it is but thinly true. The returned affection of those we love can do much for us, but it can never entirely support our lives, or be a spear-proof buckler against adversity. Among those who were taught to believe it could are the schizophrenes who crowd our insane hospitals. They were led to expect more of love than love had power to give, and when disillusionment pressed in upon them, they had no inner strength to withstand the charge. And so they sank down into a dream-realm of their own, transferred their romantic illusions from an outer to an inner world,

and thus achieved in fantasy all that reality could never give them.

"Their own problem," you say. But ours, too, since this type of mental disease costs the taxpayers of the United States approximately \$100,000,000 a year—a pretty tithe to be paying for the perpetuation of a Provençal fable.

Meanwhile divorce rages like a barn-fire in countries where the romantic myth is most prevalent. But what else could be expected? When marriage is so naïvely based on emotional bed-time stories, what will naturally happen when the alarm-clock of reality begins to jangle? When the first biologic flush fades from rose to ash, the awakened dreamers gaze at each other in amazement and revulsion. *This* is not the lollipop we were promised; *this* is not what the radio, the moving-pictures and the women's magazines said it would be like. We have been bilked, we have been cheated; give us back our marbles, we weren't playing for keeps, anyway.

Often, of course, these infantilisms never get uttered, for there are enough stably balanced people in the world to know that a lasting relationship with a member of the opposite sex is the hardest won, most dearly bought purchase a human being can make. They accept the challenge of reality and push onward together, knowing that with their complexion, bank balance and mental limitations they could never do any better anyway. But behind a million marriages there lurks the notion that somehow the romance boat has been missed, and that this particular little hero or heroine deserved a better break. If there is enough cash in the till, a divorce is obtained; if there isn't, the thing drags on miserably, with furtive pecks and darts at extra-marital "romance." It is all so fumbling and pitiful, especially since

the illusion persists that a mere change of partners will make everything nice and romantical once more.

I HAVE thus far canvassed a few of the major social ills which, in my opinion, are traceable to our infantile concept of love. The scroll is black enough, yet I regard these ills merely as *symptoms* of a still graver malady that infects our lives. No observer, however insensitive, can fail to realize that such a malady exists, and that a plague of melancholy defeat is ravaging our society. In an atmosphere of puzzlement and loss we move through days that have lost their bright edge of meaning, performing actions that do not result in happiness, and adhering to formulæ that no longer give us peace. This sense of weariness is confined to no single stratum of society: Wall Street and the Corn Belt hold it in common; the pulpit and the congregation know that something is wrong; poet and physician, teacher and student feel its blight. Is it not time we probed beneath the surface manifestations of mental disease and social restlessness, and located the hidden focus of infection that contaminates our happiness and paralyzes our energy at its source?

I believe that this contamination and paralysis spring from the failure of romantic love to satisfy the emotional needs of mature men and women. I believe that we are deathly sick of hobbling along on the half-crutch of romanticism, subscribing to a code of human relationship that is all played out. It is as though we persisted in blueing our bodies with woad, or went about offering hecatombs to Jupiter—excellent practices in their time, but now so triturated, so stale, that nothing of their original meaning remains. To base our

emotional lives on this crumbled code is to court dry-rot or catastrophe—and a glance at our social structure shows that we are perilously courting both.

A storm of voices will object to my laying the ills of the world at the door of love. "Love," they cry, "is the greatest of spiritual forces at work in the human soul; it is the spark of ultimate hope, and our strongest buttress against the evils that afflict humanity." I agree with this lofty chorus, and wish to point out that my indictments are not leveled against love, but against a false conception of love, a conception that belittles the naked grandeur of this emotion by draping it with *confiserie* trimmings. Matthew Arnold knew the function of genuine love when he wrote, in *Dover Beach*

Ah, love, let us be true
To one another! for the world which seems
To lie before us like a land of dreams
So various, so beautiful, so new
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;
And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept by confused alarm of struggle and flight
Where ignorant armies clash by night.

"The world is a miserable place, but love will see us through," proclaims the Victorian—but contemporary poets can no longer make such proclamation. Poets, once the special celebrants of love, now have no tongue to affirm its power and glory—for there is no longer any power or glory to affirm. As in Matthew Arnold's time, there is neither joy, nor light, nor peace, nor help for pain (most good poets will tell you that there never were any of these things, anyway), but in addition to this catalogue of negation we have lost faith in romantic love and are pathetically aware of the nothingness in which we beat our wings.

By elevating woman from a chattel to a chatelaine, and by making more palatable the monogamous diet forced upon us by economic necessity, romantic love has made valuable and positive contributions to Western culture. But it is apparent that the beneficial aspects of romanticism have long been exhausted and that we are now in the sick backwash of a stagnant tide. Riding this tide, both life and love grow greenly ill, both are conscious of their futility, their degraded condition, and both yearn for the open sea of a new relationship and a new use.

They do not yearn in vain. For I believe that a new love is developing amongst us, a love no less sexual, no less spiritually stimulating than romantic love, yet utterly free of the ancient props of troubadour myth, queen-beeism and mother worship. Men and women are beginning to suspect that romantic love has strangled the growth of an honest, healthier relationship between the sexes; they recognize that love is not a game, or an escape, or a sin committed at the maternal bosom, but something tougher and more valuable to confused human beings. And they are being aided in this slow process of recognition by at least three forces now operating in the world.

The first of these forces is closely associated with the gradual disappearance of the Pauline and Patristic elements in Christianity. It is no longer fashionable for clergymen to describe the flesh as weak and vile. As a matter of fact, it is occurring to many people that sexual love, being what it is by nature, was originally the source of all good things and every virtue. But centuries of Christian usage reversed this order, saying that to be the source of all good things, sexual love should re-

tain nothing of what it is by nature. It should cloak, gild, or better yet, deny itself. As a result pudor, remorse, fictive immorality, perversion, prudery and an abiding sense of guilt were fused into the most important of human relationships. But today, as this archaic concept of religion loses its hold upon men, sexual love sloughs off the peculiar morality engrafted upon it by Patristic zealots, and once more shows signs of becoming joyous, natural, the best of all good things. There is no further need to deodorize or conceal it, and though certain reactionary moralists may oppose the new love, it is blowing across America like a fresh, strong wind, sweeping the medieval cobwebs of guilt, fear and virgin-worship out of its temple.

Secondly, we are as a race learning to cut the mother-cord. Psychoanalysis has many enemies, but few of them will deny that it has taught us within a comparatively brief time the tragic consequences of the "mother grip" on our lives. Slowly but certainly we are loosening that grip: all along the line—in the child clinic, in education, in literature, art and *practice* we are preparing the next generation to assert its independence of the mother-principle in love. It may never come about that American babies are actually segregated from their mothers—as Spartan infants were, and Russian infants now are—but there is already a noticeable tendency among mothers to guide with a lighter rein, and to relinquish that rein earlier to the child. Secretly, perhaps unconsciously, the women of America are tired of having their sons as lovers, and their lovers as sons.

Lastly, I believe that we are developing in our own age a new appreciation of reality, as opposed to fantasy and

illusion. It may be the hard times of the past five years, or it may be that we are actually growing up, but whatever the cause, we no longer clamor for moons of the impossible. We are establishing a new knowledge and a new idealism, based not on childish myth or adolescent desire, but on something that will serve as a solid base for the stressful adventure of maturity. Upon this base men and women are adjusting themselves, as rapidly as possible, to the

world of actuality. The old play-dreams concerning easy money, rose-windowed faith and a great and perfect love—all these are being whoofed away by the chilly but invigorating breath of a new life-knowledge, depicting the world not as it *might* be, not as it *should* be, but as it *is*. Such knowledge, which is as far above cynicism as romantic love was above the brute, may not portray life as a bed of roses, but it will prevent us from falling on its thorns.

Morning in the South

BY RICHARD ALDINGTON

THE morning, like a living crystal, blue,
Cloudless and deep . . .

Some god has passed unseen

Leaving an ecstasy in wave and land
And fragrance of his body on the air,
A living hush, part awe, part tenderness,
The promise of the mystery of birth
Which seems more real than death.

Could time stand still,

Poise with unswerving wing at this one hour
When life has stepped into immortal paths
And beauty triumphs like a faultless rose.
Could this sun stand for ever in this sky
For ever pouring forth pure morning light,
This faint warm wind for ever breathe, these boughs
For ever tremble with such greenery,
The air still hold its fragrance, and this sea
Shine like a richer sky to the last verge
Where both embrace. Why should not this endure,
This unexpected touch with kinder gods?

Because it passes, it is beautiful.

The Right to Kill

BY WILLIAM W. GREGG

In a more rational social order than ours it seems unlikely that present liberals' conception of the sanctity of human life will prevail

THE death penalty is under fire. Long unpopular with law-breakers, it has seemed of late to be losing favor with the law-abiding. The National League to Abolish Capital Punishment, headed by Clarence Darrow, who saved Leopold and Loeb from the electric chair, has been conducting active campaigns in many States. Attacks upon capital punishment have had front page news value. On the other hand, the shocking increase in kidnapping has, for a time at least, checked this propaganda by arousing a demand for the death penalty. Where lies the truth?

Sooner or later most opponents of capital punishment fall back upon the general proposition that the state has no right to take human life. Dr. George W. Kirchway says: "Why assume the prerogative of Almighty God?" That society or the individual has no right under any circumstances whatever to take human life, whether in defensive warfare or to save one's life or the life of another, is seldom asserted. Absolute non-resistance is rare in Western nations. It is usually based on religious conviction and is therefore not a matter for argument. The more common

belief that the state has no right to take life as a penalty for crime may also rest on religious grounds. More often it is a somewhat vague sentiment which reflects the humanity of our day as contrasted with the brutality of past ages. The sentiment, however, should not go unchallenged merely because its evolution is understandable, or because it is held by not a few persons of prominence.

It may be noted that practically all the great religions have sanctioned the taking of life in war and for the punishment of offenses not only, as at present, against the state or the individual, but frequently for offenses primarily against religion; as witness the executions of heretics and witches through all the ages. Surely, if nature has been "red in tooth and claw," the leading ecclesiastical systems of mankind have been no less bloody. Yet the cruelty of one hundred and forty-five different capital crimes in England only a little over a century ago should not make us unthinkingly jump to the opposite extreme and hold that no crime whatever is deserving of death.

What life is we do not now know and may never know. Bio-chemistry has not

yet solved the problem. Nevertheless, an inquiry into the reasons which have motivated man both to preserve and to destroy human life may shed some light upon what society's future attitude should be.

A CLOSELY related topic is that of sub-human life. Primitive man revelled in slaughter, whether of men or animals, and often apparently for slaughter's sake alone. Rome popularized on a gigantic scale fights of all kinds to the death between men and wild beasts. Vestigial remains of this same taste for killing are seen today in unsportsmanlike forms of hunting, in bull-fights and in the combats between wild animals which feature many African films. In striking contrast are the views of Mahatma Gandhi, quoted by a recent visitor as follows:

"I seldom wear leather sandals, because I can never be sure that they have been made from the hide of a cow that has died a natural death. It would be repulsive to me if I thought that I walked on the skin of a beautiful animal that had been slaughtered to flatter my vanity. The East has long held to the sanctity of all life."

Of course, from a scientific viewpoint neither human life nor brute life possesses sanctity. Yet neither is understandable. Neither can be produced in the laboratory. Each is equally a "gift of the Creator." Western theology, by attributing a soul to man alone gives human life a peculiar significance. Eastern philosophy, by also attributing a soul to animals and by the doctrine of transmigration, gives unity to all life.

It is estimated that poverty-stricken India supports seventy million head of useless cattle at a total annual cost of 588 millions of dollars. This might be

attributed to the peasant's affection for the animal which shares his toil were it not for the cruelty with which he often treats it. Even more incomprehensible is the fact that his veneration for life includes dangerous wild beasts and venomous reptiles, notwithstanding a death toll of over 21,000 human lives from snake bites alone in 1927. Elsewhere throughout the East there persists this same aversion to the direct taking of animal life. The Chinese camel driver never kills a sick or injured camel lest its spirit trouble the caravan, but unconcernedly leaves it behind to die in the desert. The Western cowboy, in contrast, will use his last cartridge to end the sufferings of his injured horse. In hunting turtles for their shells the devout Hindu does not kill the animal outright, but turns it over on its back and lets it die of starvation. He argues that it then dies by the will of the gods and not by any act of man; that since the gods do not assist it to regain its footing their manifest will is that it should perish to benefit mankind. A like sophistry has been used by Gandhi himself. He was asked if it be a sin to kill a mad dog. After some evasions he finally answered that a mad dog must not be killed, but it need not be fed.

The practice of such beliefs leaves much to be desired. Not only are domestic animals far better treated in Western lands, although not allowed to die of injuries and old age, but millions of Hindus could be themselves better nourished if not burdened with the support of useless domestic animals; while thousands of lives annually could be saved by destroying dangerous reptiles and beasts of prey. In short, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, as evidenced by India, land of the suttee,

belief in the "sanctity of all life" mitigates against due regard for human life; that human life there is cheap largely on account of the very sanctity attributed to brute life; that in actual operation the two ideas are essentially antagonistic.

The roots of the prevailing Western belief in the sanctity of human life are lost in antiquity. The "Curse of Cain" has come down the ages. Long before the traditional "Thou shalt not kill" thundered from Sinai similar prohibitions were in force. They contained so many exceptions, however, express or implied, or were so often breached with impunity that one is tempted to conclude that, until comparatively recent times, there has never been a definite crime of murder.

Social attitudes toward the prevention or destruction of human life may be grouped as follows:

(1) Celibacy. Arguments for such a state are almost entirely of a religious nature. The non-religious viewpoint has usually been negative or hostile.

(2) Emasculating operations. Including the mutilations practised in former ages and the modern sterilization of the unfit as recommended by eugenics and enforced by law in some states. More than 16,000 sterilization operations have been performed in the United States and about 400,000 operations are expected under the new sterilization law just enacted in Germany.

(3) Contraceptives. The conservative religious attitude is largely hostile. Secular opinion is divided, but is apparently coming to favor birth control information and practice for the married.

(4) Abortion. Disapproved under any circumstances by the Roman

Catholic Church. Otherwise generally condemned unless necessary to save the life of the mother.

(5) Infanticide and the killing of the aged or infirm. Anciently practised by many peoples, now condemned by civilized society; subject, however, to certain exceptions hereafter mentioned.

(6) Suicide. Formerly condemned by church and state, now regarded with more leniency. Common in the East as a means of disgracing an enemy or of registering one's devotion to a person or cause, as witness Gandhi's threats of starvation in order to promote the cause of the Untouchables.

(7) Killing of human beings in general. Now prohibited universally except in war, in defense of human life and as punishment for certain extreme crimes such as treason, murder, kidnapping, rape, etc. Twelve States have the death penalty for kidnapping. Only eight are without any capital punishment. In Soviet Russia any crime against the state may be punishable by death.

Regarding abortion, the secular view is that the mother should always be saved at the expense, if necessary, of the unborn; thus showing that human life before birth is somehow inferior to life after birth. This is further shown by the laws now in force. In New York State, for example, the deliberate killing of an unborn child without any surgical necessity therefor is punishable only by from one to four years' imprisonment. An extreme illustration comes from Soviet Russia where at one time the Government in certain districts furnished women, whether married or unmarried, with free surgical and hospital care for abortions in all cases where the child would be unwelcome. This practice, however repel-

lent, may be viewed as the logical corollary of birth control by making it one hundred per cent perfect.

AS REGARDS certain exceptional cases of infanticide and the killing of the aged or infirm, and suicide, public opinion is not altogether settled. It is more than possible that the law on these matters may undergo considerable change in the not distant future.

To be specific, it is commonly supposed that in the case of human monstrosities the attending physician takes the law into his hands and sees to it that such mistakes of nature do not live. Nevertheless, many children are born so deformed or conspicuously handicapped that it would be a mercy to themselves and to their parents if they did not live. But now live they legally must if medical science can keep the spark of life alive. At the other end of the span of life are the aged and decrepit, including the sufferers from painful and incurable disease of all ages who long for death and of whom their dearest friends say: "It would be a blessing if they could be taken." To keep such persons alive to suffer hopelessly seems the refinement of cruelty, a cruelty often prolonged by the very advance in medical science which enables the skilful practitioner to prolong life when he can not save it or even make it tolerable.

Take the stronger case of the deliberate administering of a fatal opiate or poison as an act of humanity by a friend or relative no longer able to stand the strain of witnessing the agony of a lingering death and of opposing the entreaties of the sufferer. Several recent instances have shown that when the facts are undisputed juries will acquit the so-called "mercy slayer," and

without any resort to the insanity dodge. Euthanasia, a "happy or easy death or death for a good purpose," is accordingly demanding legal recognition. It has already been recognized by the new criminal codes of Denmark and Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, the Prussian Ministry of Justice has just recommended a law whereby licensed doctors, upon the certificate of two official state physicians and the consent of the afflicted person and his family, may end the lives of persons suffering from incurable disease. All of which goes to show that in certain by-no-means-rare situations modern opinion not only does not condemn but even praises homicide, all laws to the contrary notwithstanding.

Similarly with regard to suicide, formerly under the ban both of church and society. As the suicide was beyond all earthly punishment, ignominy was heaped on him in generous measure after death. By ancient custom his body must be buried at the cross roads with a stake through his chest. By the charitable fiction of temporary insanity a more liberal view now prevails, although it is still a crime to attempt suicide and although the Roman Catholic Church may still exclude the bodies of suicides from consecrated ground. Over a generation ago the Reverend Thomas K. Beecher, a prominent Congregational clergyman, created a sensation by proposing to legalize suicide. While recognizing that most suicides occur during some temporary emotional stress and so are morally and socially indefensible, he yet felt that self-destruction is sometimes justifiable. His plan was to have the prospective suicide present his case to a carefully selected committee. Undoubtedly many lives now rashly taken could be

saved through the advice and counsel of such a committee, while hopeless sufferers would be enabled to escape further misery without the stigma that now attaches to suicide.

Dean Inge of St. Paul's, London, recently approved of "a modification of the traditional Christian law which absolutely prohibits suicide in all circumstances," for he could not believe "that God willed the prolongation of torture for the benefit of the soul of the sufferer." To the same effect is the opinion of Dr. Green, Canon of Manchester, that sane Christian ethics justifies, under extreme conditions, the ending of one's own life or the administration of easy death to a sufferer. He supposes the case of a victim of malignant cancer of the larynx, incurable and certain to end in an agonizing death, and concludes: "Under such circumstances, might not both church and state allow a man, under due safeguards, to end his life painlessly?" In 1931 an Illinois Medical Association went on record as favoring the administration of a painless death sleep to imbeciles and sufferers from incurable diseases. A university professor recently discovered an imbecile girl confined for seventeen years in a cell in a county home. He was criticized in some quarters for suggesting that she be given a lethal hypodermic to end her misery, and yet we would not allow an animal so to suffer. In short, moderns are coming to revolt at the old idea that we should strive by every medical means to prolong, rather than painlessly end, the sufferings of one hopelessly stricken or dying, even when the sufferer is pleading for the delivery of death.

The practice of infanticide and the killing of the aged and infirm formerly

had a utilitarian basis, for these groups were often a serious burden upon the limited resources of the primitive community, especially in famine and warfare. Little consideration for the slain was involved. Conversely, any such death sleep as suggested would be motivated solely by sympathy and humanity.

PASSING over the destruction of life in war, to which modern civilization now gives a reluctant sanction, there remains to consider the destruction of human life as a penalty for crime. The objection is at once raised that on account of the "sacredness of life" the state has no right to take human life.

High-sounding shibboleths are no longer exempt from critical examination. Moral codes founded on authority claiming a supernatural origin, unless supported by reason, are no longer acceptable to thinking men. The aim of modern ethics is to secure "the maximum of attainable happiness for mankind." The state consequently has the right to decide, in the light of all known facts and untrammelled by any dogmas or superstitions of the past, whether capital punishment is a better crime preventative than a lesser penalty. The eye-for-an-eye theory of punishment is outmoded. Most of us are doubtful about the propriety of taking life merely to punish the murderer or to avenge his victim. We have, however, a very keen self-interest in protecting the living, including ourselves, from possible murderers.

Extravagant claims are made by supporters of the League to Abolish Capital Punishment. The late Dr. Frank Crane went so far as to assert that capital punishment "defeats the very purpose for which it is prescribed. It is supposed to

deter people from murder. As a matter of fact it increases a tendency to commit crime." Just why, other things being equal, the go-getting gunman should prefer to practise his profession in a State having capital punishment is a little obscure. Another writer broadly says: "During no state or period in the history of our social evolution does it appear that punishment ever checked crime." Surely a discouraging statement if true. It is commonly supposed that the summary hangings by the Vigilantes in California in 1851, for instance, checked the prevalent crimes of robbery, murder and horse-stealing.

More guarded are the statements of Warden Lawes of Sing Sing Prison, a leading official of the League. He says: "It is not the nature of the penalty which deters, but the certainty with which a penalty of some sort will be applied." This is the stock argument of the opponents of the death penalty, but is obviously not valid. Assume, for example, that the penalty of a short jail sentence invariably followed murder. Would murder then decrease? On the contrary, he would be a most unbusinesslike gunman who could not profit enough from his killings and kidnappings to warrant brief sojourns in a modern penal institution. However, why mention at all "certainty" of enforcement when no such thing is possible? No police system can ever be one hundred per cent perfect. Inevitably many murders will always remain unsolved and the murderers go unpunished no matter what the penalty. Reducing a penalty can never bring about "certainty" of its enforcement.

Warden Lawes also claims that life imprisonment has a far greater deterring effect than the death penalty. "The executed man passes quickly from the

mind while the criminal in life imprisonment remains a living symbol of the awful consequences of an awful act." This claim must create surprise in view of the strenuous efforts almost invariably made by the criminal to escape the death penalty in favor of a life sentence. The famous Leopold-Loeb trial was popularly accounted a signal victory for the defense in obtaining at great expense for counsel fees only life sentences for the accused. A woman in Ohio who killed her husband with a hammer and was recently sentenced to "life" imprisonment was reported to be "in high spirits and buoyed up by the hope of a parole in eight or ten years and the knowledge that she had escaped a possible death penalty." Seven States have gone back to capital punishment. Evidently life imprisonment did not prove a satisfactory check to murder. Moreover, no life sentence is beyond the possibility of pardon or commutation. Consequently few criminals would not choose "life" imprisonment rather than the utter finality of the electric chair. Otherwise "lifers" generally would commit suicide. Few do. Criminals before trial may talk theatrically about preferring a death sentence to one for life, but such a plea is almost unknown. The average criminal will, like every one else, fight hardest to escape death. "All that a man hath will he give for his life." The penalty the criminal dreads most is concededly the most effective crime deterrent.

An obvious distinction should be taken between murders that are strictly "crimes of passion" and so committed under great emotional stress or provocation, even if technically murders in the first degree, and other killings that are so deliberately planned and executed as to evince an utter depravity and inhu-

manity. Murders of the first class can be but little checked by any kind of punishment or degree of certainty of punishment, or by both together. Murders of the second class, however, including especially commercialized murders growing out of kidnapping, racketeering, robbery and other crimes, are undoubtedly controllable to a very considerable degree both by the severity of the penalty and the likelihood of its enforcement. In brief, the more serious the business risk connected with murder the fewer murders by professional criminals, at least. Just now it is the professional criminal, the racketeer, kidnapper and murderer for profit, who is our chief problem. If he can be convinced that murder as a business is too dangerous for his own life, murder by professionals will stop.

THE nation's annual crime bill is estimated at thirteen billions of dollars. Every year in the United States about 12,000 persons are murdered, 3,000 kidnapped, 100,000 assaulted, 50,000 robbed and 40,000 places are burglarized. About 400,000 persons make their living from crime in this country. Our murder rate is seven times that of Canada and seventeen times that of England. About one murderer out of a hundred is executed here as compared with about one in ten executed in England and Wales. Granting that these figures include murders of all kinds, for some of which the death penalty is not prescribed, the picture is still sufficiently depressing. No wonder we are called the most lawless of all civilized nations. The disgrace of lynching is concededly due in large measure to lax law enforcement. Of special significance is the fact that lynching, racketeering and kidnapping are unknown abroad. Judge Cava-

naugh says: "England has wiped out predatory murder by strictly enforcing the death penalty." Murder is ten times safer here than in England. What wonder, then, that predatory murder flourishes here?

One reason for the comparatively few convictions for murder in this country is the insanity plea. Many murder trials are now mere contests of professional skill between opposing alienists. Of course, if one is legally insane, *i.e.*, if he does not know the nature and quality of his act and does not know that the act is wrong, he is neither morally nor legally responsible. This general principle has given rise to manifold refinements, if not evasions, by which, under pleas of "emotional insanity" popularly known as "brainstorm," "irresistible impulse," "emotional and volitional underdevelopment," "psychopathic personality," "emotional instability," "emotional explosion," "confusional depression," "situation psychosis" and similar terms—elusive as to definition and so easily adaptable to almost any facts in evidence—juries are often persuaded to acquit those charged with murder. In the recent McCormick case in New York an attractive young woman smuggled to her husband in jail a pistol with which he killed a keeper. The Court charged the jury she might be acquitted if suffering from "confusional or epochal insanity." She was acquitted.

Last year the New York Crime Commission recommended a small, impartially chosen committee of alienists to report to the court in every case of doubt as to the defendant's sanity. Many bar associations have advocated similar action. Judge Cardozo recently urged the appointment of a committee of both medical men and lawyers to re-

define insanity as an excuse for crime. The imperative need of these reforms was shown by the Remus case in Ohio. That notorious "bootleg king" who killed his wife was found not guilty by the jury "on the sole ground of insanity." A few months later he was freed from the State Hospital for the Criminal Insane by the verdict of another jury which found him sane. That such a farce is possible under the guise of law is a scandal of American jurisprudence. The practical result of the insanity defense is that many sane murderers escape punishment; other homicides who are hopelessly insane are confined in asylums where they remain a life-long source of danger to their keepers and to other inmates; while not a few insane homicides are later discharged as cured who will always be dangerous as potential killers.

Under modern humane methods of hospital management it is impossible to avoid the ever-present danger of assault by the criminal insane, as shown by the yearly toll of killed and injured inmates, keepers and attendants. An insane man on a county poor farm in Iowa drove his keeper into a corner with a brandished knife. The keeper remonstrated: "If you kill me they will hang you." "Oh, no, they won't," said the lunatic. "They can't, because I'm insane." The same argument was recently used by a killer who had escaped from an institution for mental defectives. The situation of an inmate of an asylum for the criminal insane is like that of a murderer under a life sentence. Except for hurting his chances for release, a murder committed by a "lifer" would go practically unpunished in a State having no capital punishment. For this reason most opponents of capital punishment concede that it should be retained as to

murder committed by life convicts. The common sense of this concession is more conspicuous than its consistency. If the State has no right to take life for one murder, why may it take life for a second murder?

Two generations ago in Massachusetts several children were found brutally slain. The details of the killings were unprintable. A seventeen-year-old boy by the name of Jesse Pomeroy was convicted of the crime. Insanity as a defense had not then reached its present state of popularity or it undoubtedly would have been pleaded on the theory of the Hickman case, where the very gruesomeness of his killing of a ten-year-old girl was claimed to be conclusive evidence of his insanity. Nevertheless, he was declared sane and suffered death for his crime. Pomeroy, however, escaped the gallows on account of his youth, and in 1876 began a life sentence which lasted until his death a short time ago at the advanced age of seventy-three. Repeated efforts to free him failed, because of evidence that his desire to kill persisted to the end. He had to be closely guarded, for he made numerous attempts to escape.

Several questions are suggested. If society has no right to take life, what right has it to wreck a life by keeping it behind prison bars for fifty-six years? And if, as all agree, society must at all hazards and even by the living death of a literal life imprisonment protect its citizens from known killers, why may it not permanently remove such killers by euthanasia? As between a painless death sleep or a virtual burial alive for over half a century in Charlestown State Prison, which alternative is the more humane? And what about the expense of keeping alive something in human form that is yet not human because it

has a bestial bloodlust for the lives of innocent children? The same problem is presented as to the insane whenever the disease is certainly permanent. Is not the lethal draught or undetected poison gas preferable not only for the criminal insane, but also for all hopelessly insane who for their own safety or for the safety of society are now doomed to life imprisonment?

THE reluctance of modern juries to bring in death verdicts is sometimes due to a feeling that the murderer is not responsible for his act in that he has not had a fair chance in life; that he is the product of a criminal environment for which society is to blame.

The problem of human responsibility has been debated down the ages, but its solution seems no nearer. The criminal jurisprudence of Western nations is based on the prevailing view that every sane individual is a free moral agent and therefore responsible for his acts. This view Clarence Darrow rejects. He asserts that we are all mere puppets or automata and denies the right of society to punish any slayer with death. The question he raises, however baffling to the philosopher, seems academic here. For even if the slayer be a mere automaton and the logical result of a slum environment, or if his criminal bent be merely the product of his endocrine glands, he is none the less a menace from which society must be protected. So why should he not be humanely destroyed?

The instinct of vengeance, although abhorrent to criminology and the highest religious sentiments, nevertheless is most persistent. It is apt to crop out at any time in mob violence and lynching. Whenever we hear of a peculiarly atrocious crime such as the kidnapping or

murdering of children we find ourselves instinctively saying of the criminals: "Hanging is too good for them." Unconsciously we take the viewpoint of past ages when inflicted death was made as horrible as possible. If, however, it were generally recognized that criminals, like the rest of us, are not free agents, however much we all act and have to be treated as such in our social relations, all idea of vengeance would necessarily be eliminated. For such a feeling can not be aroused by an animal or a mechanism, no matter how dangerous to human life. Insanity, if of a certainly permanent type, would then have to be abolished as a defense for murder. Legal insanity of a non-permanent type would still remain a defense, the criminal then being confined in the hope of his subsequent recovery.

The general acceptance of a mechanistic view of conduct would probably bring about in time a change in the kind of death penalty inflicted. One State already uses lethal gas for executions and two other States have just adopted it. Although shooting, hanging, the guillotine and the electric chair are all practically certain and instantaneous deaths, considerable mental suffering is involved. This could be largely removed by euthanasia, or by giving the condemned criminal his choice of a painless death. Doubtless society would be the gainer by using the most humane method of execution possible, for it would then be clear to the criminal classes that the death penalty is not due to revenge, but is actuated solely by regard for the safety of society.

PERHAPS the principal reason, aside from an occasional maudlin sentimentalism, for the relatively few convictions for murder in this country is

that both juries and the public at large do not regard all legal murders as equally deserving of punishment. A homicide resulting from a feud battle between two sworn enemies, for instance, each of whom has been openly trying to kill the other, is certainly of a different class from the unprovoked killing of a woman or child. One murder leaves us cold. The other makes us see red.

It is arguable that, similarly, the law might well recognize some further limitation of first degree murder to conform more closely to modern views on certain killings, perhaps deliberate and premeditated from a legal viewpoint, but committed nevertheless under great stress or provocation. This situation, however, is usually handled equitably by the jury, both by giving the accused the benefit of every possible doubt as to premeditation and by the fiction of an irresistible impulse. Similarly the accused is given the benefit of every doubt in cases based on circumstantial evidence. The so-called "unwritten law," whether pleaded or not, often sways our juries. In France juries are especially lenient towards the "*crime passionelle*." There is, then, a twilight zone of legal first-degree murder where both modern criminology and popular sentiment regard the death penalty as unjustified; but in such cases juries here rarely inflict the death penalty. The complaint against our juries is not that they are too severe, but far too lenient.

As regards the great majority of undoubted first-degree murders, nevertheless, including especially cold-blooded killings for profit by professional criminals, there seems to be no valid social or scientific reason to discard the death penalty. Why should the State of Illinois, like the State of

Massachusetts in the Pomeroy case, be put to the expense of guarding for life deliberate "thrill slayers" like Leopold and Loeb? If the perpetrators of the Lindbergh crime should ever be captured why should they be supported for life at the taxpayers' expense? Have they not deliberately forfeited all right to live? Three of our Presidents have been assassinated. President Roosevelt narrowly escaped a bullet intended for him, but which killed the Mayor of Chicago. President Lincoln's murderer was killed in resisting arrest and the other three were executed. It is difficult to see how justice would have been better served had these cold-blooded assassins been given life sentences or sent to asylums under insanity pleas.

So-called "life" imprisonment in the United States really means, on account of parole systems, time allowances for good behavior and possible pardons, an average confinement of not much over a dozen years. Most deliberate and professional killers will commit further murder if the opportunity offers. They often commit several murders before being brought to trial. Not infrequently they attempt to intimidate witnesses and even judges by threatening to "get" them later. With the large financial resources often available to the underworld it is impossible always to prevent the smuggling of arms and tools to convicts. Many murders both in and out of prison are committed by "lifers" after their conviction, especially in prison riots, escapes and attempted escapes. Consequently, a life sentence does not guarantee, and never can guarantee, no more murder by the "lifer." It necessarily follows that, entirely apart from any deterring effect on others, society is far better protected by the death sentence than by the life sentence.

The executed murderer doesn't commit more murder. The "lifer" frequently does.

"Medium security" prisons cost over \$2,500 per inmate. Costs of supposedly "escape-proof" prisons of the fortress type for desperate and long-term criminals are two or three times as great. Doubtless future civilizations will note with amazement the meticulous care with which, at enormous expense, we often preserve the lives of such extreme anti-social elements as condemned kidnappers, bandits and professional gunmen, while denying euthanasia to the hopelessly insane and the sufferers from incurable disease. In fact, modern methods of dealing with crime often seem to be a reversal of nature's law, "so careful by the type, so careless of the

single life," by showing an extraordinary solicitude for the murderer at the expense of the great mass of law-abiding citizens who furnish in large measure his victims. Every forty minutes some one is murdered in the United States. Who of us may be next?

With the coming of a more rational social order that will be better able to revalue from a scientific viewpoint the old tabus regarding the taking of human life, it is possible to foresee the emergence of a socialized purpose to eliminate such human life as shows itself conspicuously either inhuman, or unhuman, or unable to function happily; in order thereby to help bring about a safer and fuller living for that normal humanity which holds the hope of the future.



Mothers in Fiction

BY LOUISE MAUNSELL FIELD

Among the many curious emancipations of late years is the fiction-mother's release from early death or imbecility

MOTHERS have lost most of their importance. Lost it, at least, in so far as their rôle in present-day fiction is concerned. From beings theoretically regarded as little short of divine, of powers almost omnipotent in their relation to their offspring, whose past, present and future alike they were supposed to influence strongly, if not altogether to control, they have degenerated into very little more than so many bystanders. Even though, as persons, they may be both notable and influential, as mothers they are completely ineffective. Whatever part they may play in business, society, arts or civics, in the lives of their grown and even in those of their less than half-grown sons and daughters they count, according to our fictionists, for just about nothing at all. And this entirely aside from any degree of virtue, intelligence or decision of character they may possess. Yet never before were there so many, and such admirable mothers in fiction as at the present time.

It is in truth this very loss of importance which has swelled the ranks of the likable fiction-mothers, by making it possible for them to continue their existence on this earth. In those days when the cult of the female parent was

working over-time and in full force, those days when mothers, as mothers, were conventionally canonized and popularly expected to be perfect embodiments not only of self-sacrifice and every other virtue, but of all kinds of wisdom as well, there were two things, and only two, that a novelist could do if he—or she—wanted to get the heroine into difficulties. And a heroine without difficulties simply wouldn't be any heroine at all. An author could, if he chose, make his heroine's, or for that matter his hero's, mother a complete fool, since even in that comparatively optimistic period the fact was recognized that maternity, however sacrosanct, did not necessarily produce or imply intelligence. This method was popular, as the abundance of moronic mothers in Victorian and in Edwardian fiction testifies. If, however, the writer for any reason objected to portraying the mother of his heroine as an utter fool, perhaps feeling that he was arranging trouble enough for the poor thing without adding a silly mother to her burdens, the only other thing he could do was to exercise the fictionist's most valuable privilege, and "kill off" the inconvenient parent.

The mortality rate among fiction

mothers of ordinary brain power was terrific. Few survived the first chapter, and if one of them did contrive to live a little longer, it was simply in order that she might presently provide the novel with one of those deathbed scenes long the keenest joy of fiction. Fathers survived quite frequently, but mothers perished literally by the hundreds; a single ray of intelligence, however faint, sufficed to seal the doom of any one of them. To the Victorian novelist, executing the heroine's mother was even more a matter of routine than depriving the aforesaid heroine of her virtue before starting his opening chapter is to the truly modern writer of today. Charlotte Brontë hesitated not at all, but made a clean sweep of all her heroines' mothers, and for good measure, despatched their fathers also. Jane Eyre, Lucy Snowe, Shirley Keeldar and Frances Henri are every one of them orphans before the first chapter begins. Jane Austen, less—or more?—ruthless, killed off the mothers of two of her heroines, secured the absence of a third, and presented the three others as exceedingly silly. Dickens and George Eliot followed the same methods; so did Thackeray, while Walter Scott, kindly soul that he was, executed his heroines' mothers with the utmost neatness, promptness and regularity, and usually made assurance doubly sure by exterminating those of his heroes too.

THOUGH a tacit it was certainly a tremendous compliment that these and the vast majority of before-the-War writers paid the average woman. For their supposition and that of their readers, one so much taken for granted that any sort of comment on it was considered superfluous, was that, given the

wise and loving guidance of what was then known as "a good mother," no heroine could possibly get into difficulties enough to provide a novel with the requisite number of pages. Robert Browning was not a novelist, but he permitted his Mildred of *A Blot on the 'Scutcheon* to sum up this point of view quite perfectly, and in the fewest possible words:

I was so young, I loved him so, I had
No mother, God forgot me, and I fell.

Today, of course, no heroine even in her wildest or most atavistic moments would ever dream of pleading her extreme youth as an excuse for anything. The younger she is, the better she knows; or ought to know; or at any rate, thinks she knows. Nor does any young woman of today ever "fall." Most certainly not. She merely acquires sex experience. (A change of viewpoint which incidentally has deprived the hard-working fictionist of more than one favorite and well-tried plot.) But even in the days when hidden pitfalls dotted the path of a self-respecting heroine, it was confidently assumed that if mother were not an imbecile her presence would provide a complete safeguard, preventing the heroine not only from tumbling into the gulf, but even from so much as trembling on the brink. If with such wise, loving and dependable guardianship at hand she nevertheless persisted in slipping, she was obviously one who had no desire to walk straight and upright, and was consequently quite unfit for the position of heroine.

Since depravity was then regarded as undesirable, and such pathological cases as that of Michael Arlen's lady with *The Green Hat* comparatively unpopular in fiction, the only reliable

method of permitting a heroine to wander yet keep the reader's regard was to assassinate her mother; preferably before beginning the book: unless the writer, as happened but very rarely, were subtle enough to make that mother a Lady Esmond, whose exasperating virtues would permit a Beatrix to go to practically any lengths, and still not forfeit the reader's sympathy. But if it was merely desirable that the heroine should make comparatively unimportant mistakes or find life somewhat difficult, then it sufficed to portray mother as a Mrs. Bennet or a Mrs. Nickleby, whose congenital imbecility compelled their daughters to find their own way amid the gins and pitfalls sure to besprinkle their paths for from one to three volumes. Even heroes, though far more latitude was allowed them than was ever permitted to heroines, in the matter of mothers as in every other, were liable to find themselves at least partly orphaned at an extremely early age.

But this belief in the advisability of a general extermination of mothers has to a very great extent disappeared from our recent fiction. Not entirely. The mother of that well-known person, *Anthony Adverse*, went, it will be remembered, to an extremely early grave, and was herself a half-orphan. Sinclair Lewis assassinated the mother of *Ann Vickers* no less promptly than did H. G. Wells the mother of *Ann Veronica*. Hugh Walpole saw to it that his *Vanessa* was safely interred before he allowed her daughter Sally to mess up her life with the aid of an undesirable young man. But among the more notable three or more volume family histories recently completed, this of the Herries is the only one which employs the old-time favorite device. In each

of the other three, mother is alive, intelligent and totally without influence. Consider Lady Cherrell and her two daughters, Clare and Dinny. Lady Cherrell is represented as a charming woman whose husband after many years of marriage is still deeply in love with her. But so far as Clare and Dinny are concerned, she is of such very small importance as to be little short of entirely negligible.

THAT her mother is quite rightly not the least enthusiastic over her engagement to Wilfrid Desert troubles Dinny practically not at all, while Clare, when she leaves her husband and positively refuses to return to him under any conditions whatsoever, does not give her mother her reasons. Dinny is one of the loveliest of modern heroines, brave and high-spirited, warm-hearted and loyal and generous, but throughout the three volumes of her history there is scarcely one of her relatives who does not have a larger share of her confidence than is bestowed upon her mother, scarcely one who is not more genuinely important in her life. Yet the little we see of Lady Cherrell leaves us convinced that she is not merely a likable but a lovable woman, by no means lacking in intelligence or sympathy, a mother who might well have proved a very good friend indeed to her daughters.

Scarcely more, perhaps even less important to the next generation is Judith Hillington, mother and step-mother of J. D. Beresford's *The Young People*. Judith was intelligent, and in her youth had been considered extremely modern, but from her children she won little love and less confidence, her influence over them being a minus quantity. She could not prevent the younger Judith

from departing with a married man, nor Clare from herself making a mistaken marriage, nor Miles from falling victim to the wiles of Anitra. As for the conclusion of Avis Bryden's history, related by Eden Phillpotts in *A Shadow Passes*, it is largely involved with the failure of her effort to bring her son Peter to her own way of thinking, or at least to rouse in him some reaction such as she desires. Yet Avis Bryden could scarcely be regarded as lacking either keenness of wit or force of character. No woman could possibly commit as many murders as she did, planning and carrying them out so adroitly as to remain quite unsuspected, and at the same time live her life in such an apparently admirable manner as to win the respect of all and sundry, without a good brain and an exceptionally large endowment in the way of energy and will-power.

Lady Cherrell, it must be confessed, was a gentle soul, who if required to swat a fly would, one feels, do so only with reluctance and a strong sense of being required to fulfill an obnoxious though perhaps patriotic duty, while Avis Bryden went on serenely murdering any and every one who chanced to get in her way. Certainly the two women had little in common; little, that is, except their lack of importance to their children, and influence over them. Peter Bryden did, it is true, feel his mother's death as a good deal of a relief; that habit of killing people which seemed to be growing on her threatened at any moment to prove inconvenient, and in so far as her potentialities in that respect troubled him, she did matter to him. But her manner of obtaining importance is one scarcely to be recommended to mothers in general. Nevertheless, it

must be admitted that Lady Cherrell, who seems to have had no criminal tendencies of any kind, was scarcely so much as a shadow in Dinny's life, less significant even than the mother of Lily Mars, who, as Booth Tarkington tells us, did occasionally provide her daughter with a convenient excuse for doing something or for leaving it undone.

Pearl S. Buck has recently written an entire and a remarkably fine novel on *The Mother*. By using a Chinese peasant woman whose name we never know as the book's central figure, she has made it possible to present an embodiment of the primitive, just-above-the-animal type of parent. This kind of mother, while not precisely turning against her young nor becoming indifferent to them as soon as they are grown, loves best those who retain longest the characteristics of babyhood. She delights in bearing, feeding and tending her children; but she has not intelligence enough to grasp their need of anything more. She sees her younger son's resemblance to his father and loves him for it, because it was through his father, "the man," as Mrs. Buck calls him, that she was able to fulfill her function of giving birth; she loves this same younger son, too, for his childishness and his irresponsibility; but of his inner life she knows precisely nothing, so that his arrest as a Communist merely bewilders her. Her lack of thought for her unhappy little daughter is perhaps typical of China, where girl-children are of small account, but it is more probably a trait of her own special type, that primitive type of motherhood which is primarily and almost exclusively physical. The mother of Mrs. Buck's novel is possessive; she loves best what is tiny and young and helpless, clings to her, depends on her,

allows her to feel superior. The elder son, who helps her as best he can and tries, boy though he is, to play a man's part, alienates her by his very reliability; her daughter's blindness awakens no love but only pity, not because she reproaches herself for her failure to do anything for the child's sore eyes until they are past help, but because the girl's sightlessness reminds her of her sin. As a type of primitive motherhood she is superbly drawn, and there are many like her, even today, the human race having as yet not wholly emerged from the Stone Age, but she has little if any of the good sense, the wisdom, sympathy, understanding and foresight which the novelists of yesterday and their public attributed to mothers, thereby making it advisable if not necessary to ordain such an appalling mortality among them, a mortality scarcely equalled even by that now prevalent among the fathers of detective story heroines. And to be the father of the heroine of a detective story is, as every one knows, to court a sudden, violent and frequently extremely messy method of departing this life.

IT is a curious and an interesting fact that as the influence of those mothers whom fiction writers permit to survive has declined, their general mentality has improved. Large numbers of foolish, flaccid, lazy mothers still exist in fact; in fiction, their number has diminished, though by no means disappeared. Perhaps because modern ideas of heredity suggest that some one of the children of hero or heroine would be quite alarmingly likely to resemble his or her grandmother. Imagine how very disconcerting it would prove if the son or daughter of Nicholas and his Madeline should turn out

to be a replica of Grandmamma Nickleby! And think of the acute suffering which would be endured by Mr. Darcy should one of his children by any chance resemble his wife Elizabeth's mother, Mrs. Bennet! Moreover, it must be remembered that Mr. Darcy's own mother, the Lady Anne, was the sister of Lady Catherine de Bourgh, and perhaps not unlike her. The mere thought of a household one of whose members resembled Mrs. Bennet, while another was a youthful edition of Lady Catherine, has a horrid fascination which makes any mere ordinary ghost story seem tame by comparison.

The mother of the modern heroine, though she may have as little influence over her daughter as Lady Cherrell had over either Dinny or Clare, is nevertheless a genetically excellent, and often thoroughly desirable grandmother. When she does influence her children's lives, it is usually by virtue of a strong sense of humor which prevents her from taking any of their idiosyncrasies too seriously, and a pronounced talent for working underground. There are a number of mothers of this type in recent fiction, and very pleasant people they are.

Naturally there was a transition period, and during this, mother, once the object of so much veneration, and even actual worship, became suddenly changed into a hideous fetic, whom it was the author's duty to attack with every weapon he could lay his hands on. Of this type, Louis Bromfield's *A Good Woman*, is a particularly notable example. Emma Downes, doing her very best to mold her son to suit herself and her own narrow ideas, and thereby ruining his life, was an admirable instance of the revolt against the old-time idea that mother knows best.

From an example and an idol, mother was changed with somewhat startling rapidity into an obstruction and a Horrible Warning. The pelican parent, all self-sacrifice and devotion, and presently expiring in the odor of sanctity, who had so long held the centre of the stage, abruptly gave place to the vampire who, instead of feeding her children with her own blood, sucked theirs. But the fictional vogue of this especial type did not last very long, possibly because there are too many mothers among readers for it to win any great favor save as an exception, possibly because authors found it necessary to invent too many unusual circumstances in order to explain her influence and make her children's submission plausible.

For the change from the once almost universally accepted canon that, although a hero could be separated from his maternal parent sufficiently to render her effect upon his life one of small moment, the only way to give a heroine a history was to divest her mother either of her wits or of her life, is in truth a change from a somewhat fanciful idealism to attempted realism. The notion of the mother-goddess became so integral a part of thought that the mother's claim to reverence and devotion was regarded as a matter of course. The only method of getting any sort of independence in fiction for either man or maid, without half-orphaning them, was to make the mother either a complete fool or such a timid, tender creature as Helen Pendennis. And from our modern world women of the Helen Pendennis type have, thank Heaven, disappeared so completely that one can not help asking one's self whether they ever were one-quarter as plentiful in real life as they used to be in fiction.

Considering what bores they were, one is glad authors usually preferred the easier method of an early demise.

IN OUR own day, when so many ideas and beliefs have fallen by the way-side, it is extremely difficult to uphold the obviously obsolete one of the autocracy of mother. The remarkable thing is that so many writers still find her an encumbrance and feel it necessary to dispense with her before starting the first chapter. You need only look around you to see how small her influence is in fact, even over a daughter. If ever she really ruled at all, and one is inclined to doubt whether she was at any time the absolute monarch she was reputed and acclaimed, she has long since abdicated. The modern heroine, like her real life contemporary, goes her own way. If by any chance she happens to be an exceptionally affectionate daughter, she quite probably acts on the theory that what mother doesn't know can't hurt her; if merely indifferent, she doesn't care whether she knows or not. As far as her parental background is concerned, the modern heroine is often as detached as if she sprang from the traditional lily-pad.

And if daughter follows her own paths, so too, it must be admitted, does mother proceed serenely along hers, relieved of every last vestige of the responsibility with which, rightly or wrongly, but nevertheless conventionally, she was burdened. For if this is in many ways an age of mass production, of standardized plumbing, standardized clothing and amusements and ideas, it is also one of a new individualism, a new demand that even heroines bear their own burdens, accept the responsibility and pay the penalty for their own mistakes. If the younger gen-

eration is no longer answerable to its parents, it is no longer able to blame them for its own shortcomings, nor find in the fact that the female parent has departed from the land of the living an ample excuse for any errors it may choose to commit. But the greater gain is that of the parents, now able to allow the younger generation to go its own way in theory as it has always done in fact.

Fiction, which in these days of rapid changes is often hard pressed to catch up with real life, is at last beginning to

perceive that the supreme influence with which it once credited mothers in general and the mother of a heroine in particular is now a thing of the past, if indeed it ever existed to the extent once supposed. And with this realization is coming a new liberty for the mother in fiction. If she has lost much of her importance, she has at least acquired the right to possess an average amount of intelligence without imperiling her life. No longer is congenital imbecility her only chance of escaping an inordinately early departure to the tomb.



Sea-Serpents and Scientists

BY P. W. WILSON

*The emergence of a fabulous monster in Loch Ness is greeted
with debatable reserve by men of science*

IT is no part of my intention to offer a belated biography of Bobby, the sea-serpent of Scotland, as he swims like a submarine in Loch Ness, leaps like a kangaroo in front of motorcycles and automobiles, raises his slender neck in order to gaze over the landscape with maidenly eyes, and implants his four-toed footprints on mud where plaster casts are possible. Enough that Bobby has been seen and, indeed, watched by an increasing number of people, otherwise in their right senses, that he has been photographed at long range for the movies, that he is drawing tens of thousands of curious tourists into the Highlands and that the British Government has issued strict orders for the protection of the merrie monster from molestation. Bobby may eat up goats, *table d'hôte*, with heather for salad. He may be accused of gently but firmly bashing in the skull of Malcolm MacDonald, the minstrel who appears to have been so incautious as to call upon the amphibian, uninvited, in a cave which he had selected for retirement. But Bobby is now too valuable as a sensation to be mistaken by sportsmen with shotguns for a deer of the forest.

The fascinating aspect of Bobby's escapade is, after all, psychological. On

sea-serpents, ancient or modern, I do not pretend to be an authority. All my life I have abstained strictly from the alcoholic inducements which on these occasions are said to contribute to what, around Loch Ness, is called "perfect visibility." Indeed, I have to confess that it is not Bobby who, at the moment, puzzles me. What I can not understand is the strangely inhospitable attitude towards Bobby on the part of professional zoölogists.

Whatever may or may not be the truth about Bobby's identity, here, after all, is happening what beyond challenge has proved to be by far the most interesting event in the modern annals of natural history. Yet there does not seem to have been a ripple of attention on the placid surface of the Darwinian mentality. So far as we may gather from accounts in the press, not one apostle of evolution or expert on reptilian anatomy thought it worth while to take even a tourist's ticket on the Royal Scot and enquire of eye-witnesses around Loch Ness what they thought, at any rate, that they saw. These academic pundits, who are so fond of lecturing Fundamentalists on the duty of discarding dogmatic blinkers, sat back in their armchairs. They did not accept the evi-

dence. They did not reject it. They simply indicated by their prolonged nonchalance that evidence—unless they themselves produce it—is not in their line.

For months, there were accounts of Bobby. But the accounts did not come from the scribes and Pharisees of the universities and colleges, only from the common people, and to apply a famous passage, did any scientific thing come out of the Highlands of Scotland? Complacent in a monopoly of all truth and all research, not one college, not one university sent out a search or research party. It was a newspaper—*The Times* of London—that instituted an inquiry, nor did the editors select a professor for the investigation. It was conducted by a naval officer, in whose shrewdness, otherwise displayed, the British Admiralty had every confidence. If it had not been for Lieutenant-Commander A. T. Stuart, a most astonishing phenomenon—whether it be defined as credibility or credulity—would have passed without one word of erudite record. And it is amid the enlightenment of the Twentieth Century that this pachydermatous indifference to what disturbs preconceived ideas is possible.

THE claim of science has been, it will be admitted, a little haughty. The mere layman has been told, *ex cathedra*, that here is an instrument for seeking and safeguarding actuality. Science, we assume, is a kind of ouija board on which man, immune from prejudices and emotions, lays a passive hand, and so awaits the automatic writing which he describes as “results.” Positive or negative, it makes no difference to the Lamaistic automaton in his Tibetan temple what those “results” may be. The sole aim is truth; and truth, when

disclosed, is accepted with a genuflection that sometimes throws the doctor’s hood over his eyes and adds the golden tassel of the doctor’s cap as an assistance to clear perspective. What could poor Bobby do to rival these academic glories? His only gown was an antediluvian frill around the neck and that was conferred on him by no college—only by God—which did not matter.

It was Kant who, in the Eighteenth Century, confessed to misgivings over these scientific infallibilities. The scientist, so he argued in effect, is as human as anybody else, and never more human than in his science. His ouija board is no more impersonal than the pen that writes these words. It may be a subconscious impulse that sometimes influences the hand of the alleged automaton. But an influence is no less personal because the person himself is so absorbed in his predilections as to be unaware of it.

There is no more exquisite instrument of precision than the balance of a chemist. Enclosed in glass, the scales rest on a razor edge, and it is only by averaging oscillations that we can weigh one thing against another. What would we say of a chemist who allowed the positive mechanism of his scales to rust and the negative mechanism alone to operate freely? The whole of his calculations would be subject to that general and comprehensive bias.

And it is precisely this bias that the poor sea-serpent has had to combat. Whenever he has shown his head above water, science—instead of saying, “This is a head—let us learn about it all we can,” has led mankind in an uproarious bout of slapstick. A sea-serpent! It is as absurd as devils and angels and all the rest of the phantoms that do not happen to be dreamed of in the scientific philos-

ophy. Long since it has ceased to be etiquette for scientists to admit the possibility that, after all, there may have been an element of reality in Jonah's whale, and Bobby, with all his many friends, has suffered a similar ostracism. Like natural selection in Tennessee, they are prohibited.

Thought is not a single process like hitting a nail on the head. Thought is as complex a function of the brain as the use of a chemist's balance. It includes criticism, doubt, denial. It should also include a capacity to believe. Is it possible that this capacity—sometimes called faith—may be atrophied by disuse while criticism, doubt and denial are overdeveloped? And was it this atrophy that, of late, has lent such dignity to the somnolence of the zoölogists when, as a Fairy Prince, Bobby tried to awaken these Sleeping Beauties in the unfrequented museums where they enjoy their slumbers?

I hold no brief for institutions, whether they be sacred or secular. On the whole, I think that man is and always will be greater than any institution which he has been so optimistic as to develop. But I see no reason why all the brick-bats should be thrown at the dusty windows of the churches when the cobwebs in the colleges are at least as obstructive to the light of day. For the churches to be cautious over the truths of science which often last for a year or two is no more culpable than for the colleges to reject the truths of religion which sometimes have endured for a score or two of centuries.

The churches learn by experience, and if some of them are apt to be cautious may there not be a reason? It was a science, quite as clever as our own and similarly confident in its inerrancy, that in the Ptolemaic period misled

the church into supposing that the sun moves round the earth and, unfortunately for Galileo, the church believed this interesting "result" of the latest astronomy. Over the solar system, the church was bitten badly, and no less badly would she have been bitten if she had pinned her faith to what Darwinians taught fifty years ago about the animal creation. What is there, then, in this most recent scientific handling of the sea-serpent to entitle Darwinians or any other kind of zoölogists to instruct the Pope or anybody else in the duty of accepting evidence? In the Darwinian Garden of Eden, the only serpent may be a sea-serpent. But evidence or no evidence, he is evicted from that somewhat pedantic paradise.

WHAT was there, after all, so unlikely in Bobby's maladroitness emergence to the surface of scientific ignorance? For generations, we have been telling one another that the sea has still its secrets unexplored, that in the depths of the ocean there are marvels untold even by Beebe. Also, we are seeing everywhere the disappearance of species—lions and tigers and the rest—which do not happen to be eligible for the stockyards of Chicago. Naturally, we would infer that on the high seas, as on the prairie and in the jungle, there would be surviving occasional specimens of creatures, once familiar to the eye, and that these survivors, like fish themselves, would be inclined, more and more, to shun the course of steamers with their huge and powerful propellers disturbing the waters. The occasional appearance of infrequent monsters in lochs and fjords might thus have been taken for granted as a strong probability. Bobby might have been and, indeed, was actually foreseen in advance. Vari-

ous writers argued *a priori*—as people have argued about undiscovered planets—that he was a likelihood and their arguments are on record.

But the prejudices of science could not be broken down. It was not only that Bobby was “unclassified” which, zoologically, is tantamount to heresy. He was discovered by the wrong people. Why should professors who have devoted their entire lives to adding alphabets to illustrious names listen quietly and courteously to mere farmers and young ladies who have only their eyes to guide them, and to other Galilean witnesses? If Bobby wants to be believed, he must flap his way on to the campus at Yale or the King’s Parade at Cambridge and, in the language of polysyllabic correctitude, prove that his blunt tail accords strictly with the Proterozoic fossils there held to be supreme over plesiosaurian theses. Even so, he must produce clear proof that he is not in reality a humorous emanation of some dramatic society that is fed up on Sophocles and prefers to cultivate the deceptive novelties of mammalian impersonation.

Basking amid a wilderness of scientific skepticism, Bobby may recognize friendly companions. Over meteorites—to give an instance—scientists are now most eloquent. Really, one would suppose that meteorites are to be included among scientific “results.” If, however, scientists had had their way, the very word meteorite would have been unknown. So impervious to this particular new knowledge was the scientific cranium that, as a matter of fact, one planet had to be literally bombarded with thousands of meteorites before the slightest impression was made on what Dempsey might call the scientific ivory.

How absurd to the physicist seemed

these legendary thunderbolts, hurled by Jove like lightning onto this superstitious earth! How preposterous to take seriously the image at Ephesus that fell from Jupiter and was mentioned—sure indication of unreliability—in the Bible! It is true that the thunderbolts, like high explosive shells, left cavities, and that sometimes they could be dug out, unexploded. But these authorities who accused William Jennings Bryan of refusing to read the writing on the rocks, persisted in declaring that the rocks themselves were no more than a myth. As the *Encyclopædia Britannica* puts it, with bland and unrepentant irony, “nevertheless it was not until after the publication of the detailed report made by the French physicist Biot on the marvellous fall of about 2,000 stones which took place at L’Aigle in France on April 26, 1803, that the fact of solid bodies falling from outer space was finally accepted by scientists.”

As long ago as 1892, Dr. A. C. Oudemans of Arnhem, inspired by the precedent of the meteorites, collected no fewer than 187 authenticated accounts of sea-serpents or alleged sea-serpents, whatever a sea-serpent may be. That was forty years ago, and since then, there have been further and numerous accounts. The London *Times* republishes what appears to be a genuine photograph of a huge sea-serpent, washed ashore dead at Santa Cruz, California, in 1925. This photograph includes a background with people and it is not easy to see how or why it should have been forged.

IT MAY be said that all this is very unfair, that many scientists are sincerely and humbly treading the path to truth as they see the path, and that it is easy for a journalist, in his irresponsi-

bility, to throw stones at people who at least avoid as far as possible the temptations of an egotistic publicity, preferring the monasticism of the laboratory, faculty clubs and other brain trusts. Just so. But if scientists are to be judged by those among them who are humble and sincere, so should clergy be judged. The yardstick, like the dollar, should be honest.

Every profession, journalism and other forms of science included, is a trade union, and no trade union is impartial when its susceptibilities are aroused. A recent illustration of scientific *intransigence*, equal in all respects to the spiritual *intransigence* of Savonarola, has deeply impressed public opinion, as it happens, in Great Britain.

There was a young man called Herbert Atkinson Barker who trained himself for the law. But in the tips of his fingers there was genius as definite as the genius in the tips of the fingers of a Brahms or a Rubinstein, and Barker could not be discouraged from setting bones that were out of joint. No fewer than 40,000 cases were treated successfully by what today is known as manipulative surgery, and on this mission of mercy the medical authorities declared relentless war. Any doctor who dared to have dealings with Barker was driven out of the profession. The qualified practitioners would neither set bones themselves nor permit any "amateur" to set them.

The endeavor to treat Barker as a criminal became a national scandal. In Palace and Parliament, there arose a growing indignation and, in due course, the medical authorities, despite all their prestige, were overruled. Barker received a knighthood and the active campaign against him was stopped. Only the sullen enmity smoldered on. And

the whole of that persecution of scientific initiative was defended as modern science by the persecutors. To the surgeons, bone-setting was the sea-serpent.

If this is the way in which scientists behave when, in his consideration for the comfort of His children, the Almighty raises up some special agent of the healing process, what can we expect when, at Lourdes or anywhere else, an amelioration of suffering is attributed to the divine love? Every case at Lourdes is medically certified. The certificates are signed by doctors who are non-Catholic as well as Catholic. But does that make any difference? Miracles are like the meteorites of yesterday and the sea-serpents of today. To scientists of the skeptical school, it would be most humiliating to admit their validity. Even to suggest such a surrender of professional pride is an insult.

A result of closing the eyes is that one does not see. An immense mass of information about meteorites and about miracles has been diverted from the avenues of knowledge by the non-receptivity of scholarship. Instead of collecting testimony, the scientist has belittled it. The search for truth has been standardized as a censorship.

So with the sea-serpent. Any one sensibly solicitous for the truth about leviathans and behemoths, lashing their tails in deep waters, would have encouraged the officers of ships to record precisely whatever they might see of the unusual during a voyage. Nine out of ten of such officers are not only trained to keep an accurate log book but are known to be personally reliable in their observations. At little expense, a vast volume of varied impressions, sea-faring as well as sea-serpentine, could have been collected.

But what has been the policy pur-

sued? The sailors have been forced by ridicule into silence. The best of them—for instance, in navies—have known that merely to hint at a head on a neck amid the waves would be to ruin all chance of promotion. Where sailors have made so bold as to state what they have observed, the account has been dismissed as one of those sea-serpent stories that enliven the silly season. Some of the

stories are, doubtless, only stories. Some of the sea-serpents may be—as one theory has it—the tentacles of great squids. But one thing is certain. In his own special field, the scientist has left on record what can only be described as a failure to overcome the engrained prejudices of what has been organized into a powerful and frequently intolerant hierarchy over the realm of knowledge.

Winter Tree

BY BERNICE KENYON

WHAT is there colder than the leafless tree—
 The snowless tree, that every wind harasses,
 Lifting its bitter boughs defiantly
 From roots like iron among the frozen grasses,
 Waiting for night to take the stony slope—
 A restless night with sharp high stars attending—
 What is there colder and with less of hope
 Than this bleak tree, in winds that have no ending?

Oh to be quiet in the creeping frost—
 To stand unmoved, unheeded, and at peace;
 Clouds closed above till every star is lost;
 The night grown still at last—to stand released
 From this long strife with all the winds that blow—
 Warm—almost warm—under soft falling snow!

The "Failure" of Woodrow Wilson

BY C. HARTLEY GRATTAN

What is the fundamental reason why his international ideals have fallen on such evil days?

ANY ONE looking over the world ten years after Woodrow Wilson's death is led unescapably to one major conclusion: the world has abandoned the Wilsonian principles. The emotions that raised them to the heights just before the Versailles Peace Conference have completely evaporated. Even in the case of those principles which found expression in practice the result has been so entirely opposite to what Wilson intended that it is difficult to understand how such poisonous flowers can have come from such idealistic roots. Yet in spite of this almost total collapse of Wilsonism as a philosophy of politics his name and fame march on and, wrenched from proper context, his words are cited by leaders who have departed widely from his principles. There is a strange residuum of power in his viewpoint which makes him a figure to reckon with even though the world has, in very large measure, gone contrary to his intentions, and that is true even when it is recalled that men who more accurately forecast the general drift are now rapidly becoming forgotten. Wilson certainly looms larger in

the public imagination today than Clemenceau; he overshadows, except momentarily when the successive volumes of his memoirs appear, David Lloyd George. Wilson, it must not be forgotten, represented some deep-seated aspirations of mankind and not even the defeat of them at the hands of immediately subsequent generations can entirely blot out the memory of the man who clothed them in resounding rhetoric.

Even cynical, knowing intelligences like Harold Nicolson manage to retain for him a respect that has in it a large measure of seeming irrationality. For how can Nicolson give so much praise to Lloyd George's conduct at the Peace Conference and at the same time praise Wilson? The answer is clear enough to all who have read Nicolson's *Peace-making*, for there it is made plain that as a "practical" diplomatist Nicolson admired Lloyd George's capacity for negotiation, while as an idealist of internationalism he admired Wilson's principles. A complete man would have combined these two in a single body of flesh. Wilson failed men like Nicolson,

and many millions who had no such grasp upon the complexities of diplomacy and hence no understanding of how difficult it is to apply ideals in the face of opposition which is experienced in retaining its position and gaining its objectives, simply because he found it impossible to be as agile mentally, as sharp and keen at taking all that it was possible to get when it was possible to get it, as was Lloyd George. The latter tried to go as far as circumstances would allow in Wilson's direction; he wanted a better peace than the British people as a whole; but he had no vested interest in any set of ideals and compromise was his middle name. He defeated Wilson and supported the true opposition, represented by Clemenceau, only in so far as his suppleness became a vice and not a virtue, but where to draw the line between these two when one is immersed in complicated negotiations requires great expertness of judgment. Therefore, as a practical man, Nicolson admires Lloyd George. But the total effect of his book is to convince the reader that there is gall in his admiration and that his finer feelings tell him that, with all his deficiencies, Wilson was the greater man and will be so considered by posterity.

We are not Woodrow Wilson's posterity; we are, rather, his contemporaries; but world history is moving at such a rapid tempo that it is possible to see with some clearness the consequences of Wilson's ideas. The whole story requires more space than is available for this essay which, by necessity, will require considerable simplification of intricate matters even to outline a fundamental contradiction in Wilson's thinking. The contradiction is, luckily, both fundamental and fairly obvious and the wonder is that he himself never

saw the necessity of attempting a reconciliation of the two ideas he was struggling to effectuate. In the long run the two forces he was seeking to control were tested by actual world history and, at the moment, one of them is in the way of triumphing. It is not, unfortunately, the one Wilson was keenest on seeing triumph; it is not the one which will make the world happier; it will not lead us to peace and prosperity. Basically what happened to Wilson is that he involved himself in a contradiction because he thought superficially about both aspects of it. Yet if he had balanced the strength of the opposing forces, his optimism would have led him to throw his weight in favor of the least strong of the two. That is what he did without complete analysis at the Peace Conference. Perhaps if he had been less of a verbalist, if he had been less habituated to dealing with the world's problems in terms of literary formulæ, and more used to concerning himself with the fundamentals of modern life, the economic bases of our politics, he would not have been led so far astray. He would, that is, have approached the "practicality" of Lloyd George. In that case, of course, he would never have stirred the world, would never have been a great prophet, and, ironically enough, would have gone down to just as utter a defeat as that which overtook him!

THE two forces which struggled for mastery in Woodrow Wilson's mind were nationalism and internationalism. He strove to effectuate the first by the principle of self-determination and the second by the League of Nations.

Both of these ideas had long and complex histories before Wilson introduced

them among the principles upon which a lasting peace could be built. Great work had been done, great reputations had been made, by men thoroughly imbued with the spirit of nationalism over a period of three centuries. The international ideal was even more ancient and the idea of effectuating it through a league of national states had a considerable history behind it before Wilson adopted it as a foundation stone for the kind of peace he was willing to offer the world. Both ideas, moreover, had roots in the actual workaday world.

Few thinkers were prepared at that time, and not very many today, to deny that beneficent results would follow from a more intensive cultivation of the international ideal. The arguments were simple and have become somewhat shopworn by use. It was pointed out that during the Nineteenth Century the peoples of the world had woven a complex net of interrelations, based upon the interchange of goods and services, but rising to the cultural level. Many agreements had been made and successfully kept over a period of years to facilitate these relations, communications being particularly subject to international coöperation. The extension of such agreements to more and more matters was confidently expected and the prospect of summarizing them, so to speak, in a supernational organization was very attractive. Even more attractive was the prospect of utilizing this trend for the purpose of settling disputes which, in all the ages past, had issued eventually in armed warfare.

The participants in these contacts, the weavers of this net of international coöperation, were, however, nationalists or at least members of national states. Few examples could be cited where the participants had resigned in any partic-

ular their sovereign rights and it was not seriously anticipated by realists that they could suddenly be persuaded to abrogate such rights, though in the long run it was hoped that they might do so. The drive, it was argued, was in the international direction and just as the Nineteenth Century had seen the triumph of the nationalistic principle, so the Twentieth would witness the triumph of internationalism. It was strongly felt that the disintegrating effects of extreme nationalism would become so oppressive that the peoples of the world would demand that their governors participate to the full in any organized movement toward complete international organization. The ultimate ideal was the World State in which all peoples would participate as equals and in which nationalism would be no more than a principle allowing the development of diverse cultures. We would have political monism and cultural pluralism.

As argumentation, as a logical exposition of the consequences of observable trends, it is difficult to find fault with this train of thought. As an ideal toward which to move it was admirable and only the most malignant personalities could reject it. The great tragedy was that it was an argument built up by selecting just those trends which were least characteristic of the conduct of national states. Its strength was considerably diminished by looking the nationalistic drive straight in the face. Casting up an impartial balance sheet, it was perfectly apparent that nationalism was the stronger force of the two and the verdict of history has been in favor of nationalism, as every student of contemporary affairs knows. Why was this true?

The answer is to be found in the na-

ture of nationalism and the nationalistic state of Western Europe. The nationalistic state grew up out of the ruins of feudalism, a form of economic organization which allowed the areas under a single political control to be very small. Indeed it might be argued that it was only possible when the area under a single governor was small, for the social surplus developed was chiefly available in goods and services which had to be utilized in their "raw" form; they were not, that is, convertible into money because of the lack of a free market. The national state became possible in proportion as the free market developed and in its first form its economic roots were in a commercial economy, the commerce being carried on by the middle class while the functions of government were left to the king and the aristocracy. The aspiration was to bring both under a single head, or rather government, for the king was, while sometimes an arbitrary ruler, the symbol of unity, since his will was only important in so far as servants could be relied upon to carry it out in concrete situations. The integrating principle was the desire to gain as large a free market as possible, but subsidiary principles were identity of language, geographic considerations, more or less accurate traditions of unity in some earlier period of history and the like. Frequently important accessions of territory were based on nothing more tangible than marriage between ruling families and as a result some fantastic structures were created which could not sustain themselves for any length of time. Gradually, however, the units familiar to us developed: France, Germany, England, Spain, Holland and so on, but they did not go through their development simultaneously or at equal speed and several subsided into

obscurity when the bases of prosperity under the new dispensation shifted.

For no more had a fair degree of stability been achieved on a commercial basis than a new force appeared which, while continuing trends already observable, really raised them to a higher pitch of intensity. The industrial revolution, when coupled with a capitalistic economic organization, exacerbated nationalism in a fashion which brought disaster upon the world in a century and a half. With industrial control as the new base, the middle class extended its power and influence and, in a series of revolutions, gained control of the principal nations of the world. A more or less complete identity was established between the political government and the economic interests of the dominant class. This involved the satisfaction of certain demands which had in them the seeds of war, for to be completely useful to the real rulers of the nations, the states were required to gain exclusive control of certain kinds of resources. The state was the active agent in asserting that, in fact as well as theory, this exclusive control did exist and it was frequently necessary to use force to confirm the assertion.

Some of the principal interests of the dominant class of the nationalistic states of Europe were—and still are—first, a free market for the goods and services being produced, a market which quickly and necessarily transcends the national boundaries; second, free access to natural resources both within and without national boundaries; and third, protection against the competition of the representatives of other states who may also want access to such markets and resources. Out of these interests and their satisfaction came imperialism or the control of markets and resources beyond

the original boundaries of the national states, a control which was only completely realized when the coveted areas were incorporated with the state, a process accompanied by war and overriding cultural, racial and language lines. Obviously since the economy on which these states were based demanded the satisfaction of such interests, conflicts resulting in war were an inevitable consequence of its operation. And as the economy developed from scattered national bases, the importance of all the factors involved became greater and greater. As a matter of fact, stability was never achieved in Europe itself and since the necessities became pressing after Europe had extended itself overseas under the impulse toward expansion given by the commercial revolution, the conflict was carried on on a world-wide front almost from the beginning. It was a conflict of national states at "home" and a conflict of imperialisms abroad. Europe was the hub of the universe. The consequence was a series of bitterly fought wars culminating in the World War waged chiefly in Europe. It was at this point that Woodrow Wilson appeared to offer a solution for the pressing problems of the world. His solution had both national and international aspects, as we have noted, and he placed the emphasis on the international aspects. Why?

The answer that comes immediately to mind is cold and superior: he was ignorant of the relative strength of the two impulses he wished to control. Not because I think it lese-majesty to say that Wilson was ignorant, but rather because I feel that such an answer too often precludes analysis, I prefer to look very closely at the situation he was handling and show how time has proved that he overestimated the

strength of internationalism and underestimated the strength of nationalism. His cultivation of the latter, it now appears, was a disastrous mistake and his heavy betting on the strength of the former a pathetic anticipation of history. For unlike many who see clearly the fact that nationalism is triumphant today, I take it to be in its last stages, in an extremely diseased condition, and I believe that internationalism will triumph in the end, though only when the nations of the world operate on radically different economic bases.

THE principle of self-determination, as enunciated by Wilson, was in essence an attempt to satisfy the rebellious, revolutionary impulses of subject peoples, particularly those within the Central Powers, his enemies, who had been brought under the control of expanding states along with important resources. It was aimed pretty directly at the Austro-Hungarian Empire which was built upon a crazy foundation of mutually hostile peoples, some of them with small national states outside the boundaries of the Empire to stimulate their rebelliousness, and others completely absorbed within it. To a lesser extent it was aimed at Germany which also held in subjection some non-German peoples, particularly Poles. If it had been seriously intended to apply universally it would have greatly embarrassed most of the associated and Allied powers on whose side Wilson presumably was, and particularly Russia. And when the Russians withdrew from the War, the principle was applied to certain areas with the result that numerous small states came into being along the western border of the former Tsarist empire. The upshot was, even in restricted application, to multiply the

number of national states in Europe and to cultivate the spirit of separatism wherever a nationalistic spirit existed or could be stimulated into life.

Now these new states were erected on the most inadequate foundations. More attention was paid to such tenuous and indefinable matters, in so ancient a continent as Europe, as "race," language and culture, than to the vastly more important matter of the economic structure which was to sustain them. Hardly one of the new states of Europe is a true economic unit and even those which approach to that status do so at the sacrifice of the principles which were used as guides in their construction. Any authoritative survey of Europe today, such as that by G. D. H. and Margaret Cole, brings out clearly that (1) the economic structures of most of the new states are very inadequate; and (2) that while some subject peoples were released from oppression, every new state in Europe includes subject people today! The total effect, then, of the application of this Wilsonian principle has been to multiply the number of nationalistic states without finally solving the vexed problem of subject peoples. The unescapable conclusion is that the problem can not be solved in this manner. But that is not the worst aspect of the situation. Far more important is the fact that, in trying to satisfy one impulse, Wilson ignored a far more important matter, and brought into being states which could not possibly develop balanced economies. The classic example is Austria, the case of which is so extreme as to be astounding.

Of course Wilson was not utterly blind to what he was doing and he hoped to counteract the effect of the economic deficiencies by cultivating the international spirit and so developing

a balanced economy on a European or even a world basis, rather than on the basis of national units. The failure to realize the principles which were to make this possible has resulted in the tragic situation of today. This failure seems to me vastly more important than the collapse of the League of Nations which is, really, but one aspect of the larger disaster.

What was the flaw in Wilson's argumentation which made it possible for him to miscalculate on this point? Well, to be monotonous, he failed to understand the power of nationalism, not in its cultural aspects which he wished to cultivate, but in its economic aspects. He did not see that there was no true international spirit possible while the nations of the world were based on a type of capitalist economy which is only healthy as long as it is capable of indefinite expansion and which can only expand by invading the rights and privileges of other nations. Even when it is expanding, as history shows, it is subject to temporary collapses from which it recovers by discovering new outlets for its products, when it is stimulated by accidental discoveries of gold, or the invention of new and revolutionary techniques demanding huge capital expenditures, like railroading. In the struggle to maintain each independent national economy in some kind of equilibrium every other nation is a potential enemy. There could only be a unified world capitalism if the foreign market were an undeveloped Mars with a high capacity to absorb goods and services. Naturally as European capitalism got older and more and more of the world was drawn into its orbit the possibility of finding new outlets for its energies became more and more restricted and each nation sought to escape from the

consequences of this blocking of its expansive impulses by an intensive cultivation of its own preserves. This was the characteristic activity of the post-War years. The result was tariff walls, import and export restrictions, bounties and subsidies to new industries, particularly those supplying goods hitherto brought from abroad, and so on. If the crisis within any nation became intense enough, if the prospect of the middle class losing its control of the national economy became fairly immediate, resort was had to various extreme protective measures which go by the generalized name of fascism. And whether developed under "democracy" or fascism, economic nationalism makes successful internationalism an impossibility. Finally, a continent of conflicting nationalisms is worse off almost in proportion to the number of national states flourishing on its soil. That is why North America is better off than Europe. Instead of pacifying Europe Wilson contributed to its final downfall by his programme of self-determination. He planted seeds which grew up to be weeds to choke out his internationalism!

The larger view of Wilson's tragedy, then, leads us far from any consideration of the defeat of his League of Nations idea in the United States Senate, though it might be observed in passing that the gentlemen concerned were, while frequently absurdly malignant, really acting in response to a resurgence of American nationalism which found expression in one-hundred-per-centism. It leads us rather to a consideration of the trend of capitalistic economy in the

post-War world. Woodrow Wilson failed because he tried to reconcile the conflicts of this economy on the basis of verbal formulæ. His training was such, his mental habits were of a kind which led him to slight economic considerations and they eventually revenged themselves by betraying him.

IN THIS review I have rather chosen to show how, inherent in Wilson's ideas, there was a destructive contradiction, than to lay out the oft-told story of the operation of nationalistic vindictiveness at the Peace Conference itself. Surprisingly enough, Harold Nicolson argues that if the American delegation had been given a free hand the resulting treaty would have been one of the most masterly documents in all history. This is a tremendous tribute to the knowledge of our experts, coming as it does from a member of the British delegation. Perhaps such a treaty would have been better than that obtained by the balancing of nationalistic interests as far as possible and then attempting to control them through a League of Nations. But since it would have been based on Wilsonian principles, the element of superiority would only have been this: that the contradictions inherent in his views would have taken somewhat longer to become apparent. As it happens, the immediate operation of conflicting drives, their operation in the Peace Conference itself, certainly hastened the revelation of the fundamental difficulties of European and world society. The logic of history was against Wilson and a free hand would not have brought him a permanent victory.

Seadromes

BY HUGH DUNCAN GRANT

The meteorologist for this bold scheme to bridge the Atlantic by air describes the undertaking and some of its implications

A NEW attack on the transatlantic isolation of the United States threatens to bring the Old and the New Worlds as close as the flight of aircraft can make them. And, strangely enough, it threatens just when international trade is at a low ebb and when isolationist policies are prevalent the world over.

During the last five years air transportation in the United States and Europe has shown a steady, consistent growth, despite the fact that almost every other commercial activity has been steadily declining. In the past year United States planes have covered 50,000,000 miles. Airways so unite the far-flung portions of the British Empire that Capetown now is only eleven days distant from the homeland, Calcutta less than seven. Australia will ultimately be an eleven days' journey instead of more than twice as much. Airways have been established connecting every principal city in North and South America. Schedules have been speeded up from ninety to 150 miles an hour, with 200 in immediate prospect. Military planes have attained a speed of over 300 miles an hour. Commercial routes are flown to all parts of the

world. People are rapidly being educated to travel by air. But aviation is still an infant industry, and the airplane has yet to spread its young wings across the oceans in the expansion of commerce and in the satisfaction of a common need as it has done over the continents.

Now ocean flying, to be popular and useful, must of course be safe. For various reasons it is not so today. There is the inherent weakness of all aircraft which attempt long range flights. Fuel is heavy. The commercial success of an airplane trip demands the maximum amount of load. If this weight-carrying capacity is consumed in fuel, the ship must operate at a loss. Although planes have been built to fly more than 2,000 miles non-stop, the economic flight of an airplane demands a maximum range of 500 to 600 miles. Flights longer than this distance must, therefore, face the fuel-load problem and the question of increased flight hazard. The airplane's swift flight has turned attention to the importance of short jumps between landing places. And the conquest of the Atlantic, given our present and immediately forthcoming types of aircraft, is believed by many to depend upon the

airplane's being able to break, with some frequency, the distance between American and European shores.

In the North Atlantic, at first sight, the Arctic Circle seems an ideal short cut to Europe. It has quick jumps along the arc traversing Labrador or Newfoundland, Greenland, Iceland and the British Isles. Though such a development has been envisioned as a not unreasonable hope within five years, the practical obstacles are immense. To the peril of blind flying in the prevailing fogs, and violent, sporadic winds, there is added the hazard of ice formation on the wings. This can destroy their lifting power, forcing a plane down into watery oblivion. Even in the more temperate zone of flight, atmospheric conditions are far from being wholly favorable over portions of the Atlantic. Between Newfoundland and Ireland coastal fogs and mid-ocean storms add considerably to the hazards and flight distance of the Great Circle route, made famous by Alcock and Brown, and in 1927 by Lindbergh.

For an all-the-year-round practical air route one must, therefore, turn to the safer southern route, where Bermuda, about 700 miles off the American coast, and the Azores, double that distance from the Spanish peninsula, are the only aids to the airplane in its transatlantic flight. On this route, one finds the best weather, the gentlest winds, but also the longest distances, the most water to cross, the least land to strike and the longest water jump by 200 miles. By eliminating Bermuda from the course, however, as does the projected seadrome development, and flying along the thirty-ninth parallel of latitude, direct from New York to the Azores, the distance is very materially reduced—to 3,115 nautical miles. And

from a meteorological standpoint the seadrome airway is superior even to most transcontinental land routes now in operation. Records going back many years show on the average but three and rarely more than ten days with fog per seadrome per year or about one per cent of the fog frequency on the eastern and more northerly routes. The average air temperature for the year is sixty-one degrees, with a water temperature of sixty-six, thus constituting a temperate year-round climate ranging from sixty degrees in winter to eighty in summer. Selection of this course may mean the difference between successful operation and an economic, if not tragic, failure, for the weather is still one of the most serious obstacles in long-range oceanic flight.

IN ANSWER to the question how flying across the Atlantic can be made reasonably safe, continuous and commercially practicable, many plans have been put forth in recent years, but the seadrome system, which recently won favor with the United States Government, stands out as an ingenious, and, it may be, a feasible solution. While in novelty it reminds one of the imaginative tale of a Jules Verne, many evidences point to its practicability. It is a plan that has withstood the most laborious engineering tests in a gradual development going back some eighteen to twenty years, in evolution, test and design. Just as the aeronautical engineer applied what he knew of the movement of air to the development of the airplane, so the marine engineer, gaining from aeronautical experiment, utilized knowledge of the movement of water in the sea to develop a revolutionary type of ocean craft—a dependable floating landing stage, the biggest iron and

steel structure ever to float in water and be, at the same time, securely anchored to the bed of the ocean in water two to three miles in depth.

The seadrome, as submitted theoretically, is a steel and iron open-work structure consisting of a six-acre deck, rising on stream-lined columns, as if on a forest of stilts, one hundred feet above the waterline and supported by buoyancy tanks submerged forty feet below water. In order that this floating structure may have motionless stability, circular balancing chambers, filled with iron ore, extend below the ballast tanks to a depth of 208 feet in the still waters underlying the wave surface. (While being towed from the shallow water, where assembled, to their anchorage places in the ocean, seadromes will have, through additional ballast, a draft of approximately forty-four feet, compared with a draft of twenty-eight feet during construction, and when they are finally located, the ballast chambers, filled with pig-iron, will be telescoped to their fullest depth.)

A ship provided with a landing deck, similar to naval aircraft carriers, is obliged to roll and pitch in a high sea, making anchorage impossible and flying operations extremely hazardous. Only an even surface, unaffected by the movement of the waves, can be relied upon under all weather conditions. In theory—for no full-sized seadrome has yet been built—the seadrome meets this requirement. In practical tests made with models in small bodies of water, churned into waves proportionately higher than the ocean ever knows, the models remained stable, including a thirty-five foot one launched in the river at Cambridge, Delaware. Waves which utterly swamped a sixteen-foot-to-one-inch model of the *Majestic*, left the

drome riding on a perfectly even keel, swinging to her miniature cable like a schooner in a land-locked harbor. A thirty-mile wind blowing at the time of the launching (computed as to the square of the increase in the size of the regular size seadrome over the model) was equal to a tempest of 150 miles per hour. Wavelets of from twelve to sixteen inches in height (computed in direct ratio to the increase in the size of the model) were equal to towering rollers of from thirty to forty-five feet in height. The columns, or floats, being stream-lined like the body of an airplane, were shown to offer no resistance to surface waves, which, rushing through them unopposed, caused no damage either to the columnar assemblage underneath or to the elevated landing stage. This is further important, observing that a storm wave striking a horizontal sea-wall has an impact force of three and a half tons per square foot. Imagine, therefore, what would happen if any portion of the seadrome were so constructed as to resist the energy of the waves!

As iron and steel offer the greatest resistance of the metals to the corroding effects of water, all floats, weights and braces of the open seadrome structure will be of rust-proof iron and steel. Chain, for example, rather than cable, is to be used at the anchor connection to minimize wear and avoid kinking of the cable or fouling of the anchor.

The landing deck, made of steel and resting on twenty-eight stream-lined columns, will be 1,225 feet, or almost a quarter of a mile, long, 300 feet wide in the centre, or amidships, tapering to 150 feet in width at each end. It will be so constructed that, if necessary, it can be lengthened to 1,500 feet. The surface deck will be unobstructed for

the landing and taking off of aircraft so as to give substantially a clear deck for airplane operations, but, on the under, or between, decks, provision is made for gasoline and oil tanks, repair stations, storage rooms for other supplies, personnel and hotel quarters.

In design the seadrome, as proposed, is not square for the reason, among others, that a square field is less economical than the oblong landing platform of the seadrome. No arresting gear is necessary on the deck, such as is used on airplane carriers, to halt the run of a plane on the deck and cut short the landing space needed by the plane. The "illimitable" flat surface of the ocean will allow a plane to get landing speed a distance away from the seadrome, and then drop simply and comparatively slowly onto the deck. Once the plane has landed and unloaded, it will be removed automatically to the hangar on the deck below. For this purpose, an elevator—probably the largest in commercial use—will be employed, having platform dimensions of about 120 feet by seventy feet.

The drome will be moored to a huge buoy one thousand feet away, with provision, in the event of overstraining, to drift a mile with the prevailing winds and currents. And since the centre of wind pressure of the seadrome is aft of the centre of water pressure, it will trail into the wind at any wind velocity in excess of fifteen miles per hour. This condition is necessary for the safe landing and take-off of planes. In addition, electrically driven water propellers may be used to prevent yawing after coming up into the wind.

Power is also provided for emergency use, sufficient to maintain the seadrome on station, should the anchoring system become ineffective: each seadrome will

be equipped with 2,400 horsepower. To compensate for the swing of the seadrome around the anchorage system, the goniometer element, controlling the direction of the radio beam, is connected to a Sperry gyro-compass with the result that the original beam will always be maintained constant in direction. Each seadrome will be provided with the standard marine-type radio-compass receiver, which can be used to give bearings to ships and shore stations by means of the long-wave radio phone, on the wave bend that has been assigned for shipping. In emergency, therefore, small ships can be refueled at the seadromes, make minor emergency repairs or secure various kinds of assistance, thus rendering aid to navigation generally.

The buoy will be held in position by two mammoth 18,000-foot standard steel cables secured to a 1,500-ton reinforced concrete anchor sunk into the bed of the ocean. Spherical and segmental in shape and more than one hundred feet in diameter, the anchor will be self-righting and non-fouling, thus avoiding the remotest danger of cutting free from the cable. In addition to the two anchoring cables, a third, unattached to the anchor, will be hung from the buoy into the ocean and hoisted at intervals to check for corrosion. The anchor, mushroom type, is provided with a buoyancy compartment which, in effect, makes it a circular boat and gives it sufficient buoyancy so that it can be towed to the anchorage site, flooded and sunk with its connecting cable. The mass and shape are such that, somewhat like an inverted saucer, it will not move horizontally or turn over under the maximum stress transmitted to it by the seadrome. It is depended upon by the inventor to imbed itself in the

red clay ocean floor and to withstand a pressure five times greater than can be imposed upon it by the resultant of wind, waves and tide beating down upon the seadrome.

Such a system of anchorage prevents the seadrome from exerting a sudden jerk on the anchors tending to sever the cables, and permits the drome at all times to swing so that its length is pointed windward. In several respects these are conditions favorable to the pilot. Just as readily as if he were to descend at any airport on the mainland, the pilot will, thus, be able to land head-on to the wind on a commodious ocean field-deck as steady as an island. In a sense he can land on the seadrome more readily than at an average airport, for the seadrome will always be in the best position for the run of a ship down its long deck. Nor need it be nearly as big as a land airport, since it has no obstacles on the deck surface to be avoided. The margin of safety for the entire structure has been set at five to one, that is, for the computed strength of a necessary member in the seadrome will be added strength five times greater.

EACH seadrome will be laid out as a miniature city with a personnel of one hundred and twenty-five resident employes and accommodations for a floating population of from three hundred to five hundred persons. Included in the seadrome structure between decks will be a service building for maintenance and ship repair. Also, a weather bureau, replete with meteorological instruments, a radio station and beacon lights. On the opposite sub-surface area between decks will be the hotel consisting of fifty rooms, varied recreation centres, gymnasium and swimming pool

which will extend out into the open for out-of-door swimming, a miniature golf course, pool and billiard room, stock quotations, motion pictures, radio programmes, bowling alleys and several tennis courts. Passengers desirous of breaking their trip midway may spend the night in one of the drome hotels where, if imagination does not run riot, they will have at their command the conveniences and many added pleasures of a modern health resort while floating on ocean water at least two-and-one-half miles deep.

The dromes will be in constant communication with each other and both sides of the Atlantic by radio, while pilots will be guided by radio beacons from stage to stage. Floodlights and boundary lights similar to those of an airport on land will provide for night landings, and improved blind flying equipment, similar to that proved by the Daniel Guggenheim Fund, will guide pilots down to safe landings in fog. Planes will be equipped with radio direction indicators enabling them to hold a straight course from one seadrome to another. In a word, a complete airport service will be provided, together with navigational and radio aids, including ocean patrol service by watercraft over the air route. As contemplated, the system will assure accurate directional navigation and constant two-way communication between seadromes and land terminals, and each plane in flight will be in touch with all stations.

On the seadrome airway, amphibian planes will be used, sufficiently seaworthy to land safely at sea in an emergency, although no water landings are contemplated in the project. Should a plane be forced down between stations for any reason, however, fast ocean-going motor cruisers will be dispatched

to tow it to the nearest seadrome. One of these boats will be attached to each station. Patrol boats, of the Coast Guard type, equipped with radio communication sets, will operate also from land terminals. The patrol boats will be guided to the planes by radio-phones and, in emergencies, radio-telegraph signals, which are provided with emergency equipment to be operated on the surface of the ocean. Consequently, a disabled plane, forced down at the midpoint, may be reached in about three hours. Even if a plane should be caught in a fog the directional radio beam compass will guide it to the nearest seadrome, and should the structure be completely obscured, the pilot could make a water landing near by.

INTEREST in seadromes has been shown by Ireland, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Portugal and Italy. Eventually transatlantic air services may be operated by all of these nations over the seadrome system. European governments and air transportation companies have studied the project and offers of coöperation from international sources have been received. Immediate plans are under way for five seadromes to be built with governmental financial aid in the United States, following the building and testing experimentally of a quarter section of Seadrome Number One to be placed 375 nautical miles southeast of New York. According to construction estimates, submitted in an application to the United States Government for a loan of \$30,000,000 under the provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act, it was calculated that the transatlantic airway, consisting of five seadromes, approximately 500 miles

apart, could be built for about \$34,000,000 and that eighty per cent of this total would be spent for labor. It would give employment to 10,000 men for two years. It would also indirectly give employment to a number of other men in various industries and, when completed, provide permanent employment for many more. It would mean, fundamentally, the opening up of an entirely new field in aeronautical development, fitting definitely into the picture of America's industrial future.

After aeronautical experts of the Department of Commerce had investigated the project, Secretary Roper announced that the proposed seadrome airway would "assure efficient, safe, dependable and profitable twenty-four-hour-mail, passenger and express service between the principal cities of the Atlantic Seaboard and the Western European Capitals."

Eugene L. Vidal, Director of Aeronautics of the Department of Commerce, concluded that Federal operation of the seadromes "would be consistent with the Government's long-standing policy of providing aids to both air and marine navigation." He recommended, in line with the suggestion of the Seadrome Ocean Dock Corporation, that Public Works Administration funds be provided to build a quarter section of one seadrome at a cost of about \$1,500,000. This section, which has a displacement of 18,000 tons, almost as big as a battleship, will be built and thoroughly service-tested, before final commitment to completion of the first full unit. It was estimated that it would take about four months to build the quarter section. Mr. Vidal reported:

"The first island, 500 miles off the Atlantic Coast, could be located in such

a position as to enable air service to start from several cities on the coast, such as Boston, Providence, New Haven, New York, Newark, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Richmond, Norfolk, Wilmington, N. C., Charleston and Savannah. At the other end of the route courses could branch off in fan-shaped fashion for London, Paris, Lisbon, Madrid, Rome and points in Northern Africa."

The estimated cost of five seadromes anchored on the Atlantic route is no greater than that of a new, ultra-modern twenty-eight-knot transatlantic liner of the *Bremen* type. Great Britain and France are building ships each of which will cost about \$35,000,000, which is the estimated cost of the entire seadrome system. Such ships can not afford to operate without a heavy subsidy. On the other hand, it is estimated that seadromes will be self-supporting and eventually in the profit-making class. Air transport engineers prevision an increase of twenty-five per cent in traffic the second and third years of operation and a yearly increase of ten per cent thereafter. On this assumption, the Seadrome Airway will be able to compete with the steamship companies in first-class passenger fares.

European mail will be a large source of revenue. An airmail tariff of twenty cents a letter has been suggested, and at that rate engineers estimate the mail income accruing to the seadrome operation from tolls at \$6,000,000 a year. Other sources of revenue make the total annual income, when the line is in established operation, executing four round trips daily, approximately \$11,000,000 a year, with a constantly increasing trend. These figures have been based on conservative estimates made by experts who studied the project as well

as the experience obtained from existing airways.

The seadromes will collect revenue from the total air transport business carried over the chain system, and will do so independently of the nationality of the airway companies. Contracts covering toll fees for airway operation will be made, based on a fixed toll and fee guarantee. These toll rates will equal approximately twenty-five per cent of the gross income of the airway operations, equivalent to ground charges now associated with overland airway operations.

THE international status of newly founded man-made islands in the ocean is not without interest and, in recent years there have been scores of legal opinions on the subject. Assuming that they will function in accord with the recognized principles of international law in such a manner as not to "shock the conscience of humanity," seadromes will not be taxable nor will they be subject to registration. Because they are man-made islands, anchored to the bed of the ocean, and therefore not subject to the sumptuary laws or taxes—city, county, State or Federal—of America or any other country, the seadrome owners, irrespective of nationality, claim to own the ocean bottom underlying the islands and may claim the right to protection for a limit of twelve miles around each seadrome station site.

The absolute authority of a nation ends with the three-mile belt of the marginal sea adjacent to its territory, but international law recognizes that a state may do "certain acts not assertive of territorial claims." Consequently, there is no legal objection foreseen which can be interposed to bar a sea-

drome several hundred miles off a nation's coast. Neither is it considered necessary to have new international agreements to put in operation ocean airway services between the nations of America and Europe or between other foreign powers. In the absence of special international agreements permitting airway operation between specific countries, terminal airway services connecting these countries with the seadrome system can be operated by the nationally registered planes of the particular country concerned.

For the first time in history a human invention makes effective and permanent occupation of the high seas possible. Just what consequences this will have on the principle of the freedom of the seas remains to be seen. The seas have been free and open only in comparatively recent times, the principle of occupation and appropriation having been practised for centuries by such nations as England, Spain and Portugal. After the battle of Trafalgar, England voluntarily gave up this principle and the idea of the open seas became, as it is today, the universal practice of nations.

The advent of seadromes has already been reviewed in international councils. The general question of sovereignty over airports on the high seas and whether they should come under the jurisdiction of the League of Nations was discussed at a meeting of the International Aëronautical Juridical Congress convened in October, 1930, at Budapest.

After much discussion relating to their standing in terms of international law, representatives of twenty-two foreign nations decided that the League should have power of intervention in seadrome affairs. The fact that America

is not a member of the League did not enter into the discussion, according to a report of the proceedings published subsequently by the Department of Commerce.

The status of a seadrome, if the country operating it goes to war, was also considered. One delegate suggested that seadromes be declared neutral in time of war; another member offered an amendment to the effect that in case the seadrome owner becomes a belligerent, the control of the seadrome should be turned over to a neutral state.

The following resolutions regarding ocean airports were adopted:

"Any airport of the high seas, created for the needs of air navigation, whether it be the property of a private individual or a state, may be established on the high seas only under the authority and responsibility of a state, whether or not the state possesses a seacoast.

"The state, under whose authority this airport of the high seas comes, regulates the conditions of admittance to and use of such airports.

"If the airport on the high seas is open to the public, no discrimination may be made between aircraft on the basis of nationality.

"States must make known reciprocally their intentions to create airports on the high seas.

"In case a delay is caused because some state is opposed to the creation of such airport on the high seas, the dispute shall be carried before the League of Nations which shall settle it.

"If for any reason whatever the League of Nations can not be advantageously impressed, or if it can not settle the dispute, the parties will have recourse to obligatory arbitration."

It may still be a question, however,

whether the jurisdiction of the League can apply so long as seadromes are American property. Presumably under the flag of the United States, will they be dealt with as so many hulks under the maritime code of the nations?

There is also the question of law and order. Removed permanently hundreds of miles from the domestic jurisdiction of the United States, these floating islands will have their populations—sometimes small permanent staffs, sometimes augmented by large numbers of passengers, perhaps storm-bound, *en route*, while those in charge of flights await favorable meteorological reports. Not only Americans, but, it may so happen, a cosmopolitan foreign group will be involved in the maintenance of order. Assaults, robberies, even murders, may furnish fresh thrills for masters of detective fiction, let alone the threat of American racketeering reaching its sinister arm Europe-ward in some new crime wave. Whose police will be on these floating islands? What court will render justice? If the seadrome is operated by a British company and owned by an American company, just what is its nationality? Regardless of its ownership and its operating membership, does the seadrome itself have a nationality? If not, who ever heard of an island of any value being without nationality once it was discovered?

THE projected seadrome development is essentially an American invention. Invented, patented, financed and built as planned in America, it may be surmised that seadromes will be the equivalent of American-owned islands over which the United States will exercise absolute sovereignty. On the other hand, anchored actually not within the

jurisdiction of any country or countries but in the international waters of the free and open ocean, many fine legal niceties and technicalities, perhaps far-reaching in importance, consequent upon past and prevailing principles and practices of the law of the nations, may come within the purview of international maritime jurisprudence and resultant diplomatic action.

With the transatlantic airway so near at hand, the American Government is put to the task of determining the future international character of the floating islands, as such, the use they would be put to in case of international conflict, and the development of protective devices in case of the latter. How can these properties be defended and what is their utility in war? Should they be fortified, and if so, would international complications follow the establishing of a group of such islands, say in the Pacific, or would such an act arouse the sensibilities of the Japanese?

On the basis of their practicability, such anchorages might be converted into vital spots in a new struggle for world air power. Can seadromes be armored to provide against both surface and undersea attack? Irrespective of their public or private status, will they have weapons for defense? Or will they depend upon the command of the air attainable by the fleet wings which come and go from their broad runways?

The power of modern aircraft as a weapon is simply enormous. A seadrome, therefore, may possess a strong bulwark of defense and may play a part in future warfare. Possibly armored and surrounded by mine barrages impeding attack from both surface craft and submarines, these islands will give a new meaning to the independence of nations. They will bring the world's

most powerful nation within striking distance of the European Continent and may thus raise world problems in aviation control. An airplane at present can not fly across the Atlantic non-stop with a war load of bombs and other fighting equipment. Attacks from the air must be based on sea carriers, or in the near future, it may be, from the motionless decks of the seadromes, strategically located in mid-ocean and capable of housing no fewer than fifty planes at one time. The offensive and defensive rôle of the airplane in war need not be barred, therefore, by the widest ocean.

Functioning as an island airport and intermediate refueling station, the seadrome is submitted as an answer, with scientific endorsement on both sides of the Atlantic, to the many problems confronting oceanic flights. The result is that regular airplane service between Europe and America is, in all likelihood, within two years of actual accomplishment. Through the courageous endeavor of adapting not the airplane to the ocean but the mighty ocean to the gnat-like airplane with its fundamental limitations, man seeks to disarm the tempest and to cheat the tides.



THE LITERARY LANDSCAPE

by

HERSCHEL BRICKELL



ONE thing is certain about the literary prospects of the new year. There is to be no dearth of fiction, either in quantity or quality. Just why nearly all the novelists should suddenly go in for long books, as if at a given signal, although anybody who knows the

inside of the situation realizes that such signals are never given, and if they were, would be ignored, must remain a mystery. But the fact remains that novels are long this season, and a study of publishers' catalogues shows that the style is good for at least the first half of the year.

As yet, there is no rival for the 1,200 pages of Hervey Allen's *Anthony Adverse*, but the four- and five-hundred pagers, and upward, are to be found in abundance, making it possible for the average reader to keep himself supplied with fiction with very few purchases, which is not exactly a comforting thought for publishers or authors in general. The *Ulysses* of Mr. James Joyce, now available under the imprint of Random House by grace of the efforts of Bennet Cerf and Donald Klopfer of that organization, plus the decision of an intelligent judge, will keep a good many readers from further explorations if they take it as seriously as

it deserves. In this connection it is well to note that Paul Jordan Smith's *A Key to Ulysses* (Covici-Friede, \$1), is also to be purchased, the best simple explanation of the mysteries of the world-famous book.

Naturally one speaks of the size of the new books only to call attention to a

tendency of the times. What counts is how good they are, not how much of them there is. And it is a pleasure to say that if the year's run keeps up to the early samples, it will be one of the best seasons in several years, perhaps just another sign that we are emerging from the valley of the Great Depression. So naturally pessimistic an observer as the Landscaper finds it necessary to add that we are climbing out by methods that inspire little except fear in his timorous bosom, but it is certain that our mood of black despair has definitely passed, and that for a time, at least, we are better off. Perhaps it is foolish to ask more; it is like worrying about the next war instead of being thankful that at this exact moment the world is reasonably at peace.

A Good Irish Novel

THE literary surprise of the early season was an Irish novel, Sean O'Faolain's *A Nest of Simple Folk*

(Viking, \$2.50), that is, a surprise that it should be quite so good as it turned out to be when the author had done nothing previously except some short stories. These were of excellent quality, but did not forecast any such richness and power as is to be found in the first novel. A book of four hundred pages of small type, it is crowded with people of many varieties, principally members of one family, in whom is symbolized the tragedy of Ireland, both inner and outer. The scene is the country in and around Limerick, and the mood varies from stark tragedy to comedy, but without any of the usual Gaelic mysticism or horror; in short, the book is kept in a human and understandable key.

The style is so good that it is not possible to avoid commenting upon it, no matter how well aware one may be that readers in general are but little interested in such things. Mr. O'Faolain writes vigorous, sturdy English prose, with just enough of the Irish in it to give it the right flavor, and without resorting to troublesome dialect. Perhaps it is a fair criticism of the book that it tends somewhat to formlessness, that it flows along like a river, but this is not so important as the skill with which its people come to life, and the keen and vivid sense of life and living that is in the novel from first page to last.

The politics of the period covered plays its part in the drama, and the futile protagonist, Leo Foxe-Donnell, is a Fenian leader who spends a good part of his lifetime in prison, but, as in the instance of the style, the Irishness is not too complicated or difficult for any one to follow without consulting an encyclopedia. It looks at this moment as if the novel were on its way to becoming a best-seller; it is a very fine book, which the Landscaper puts well toward the

head of the list of recent offerings in fiction.

Mrs. Buck Again

OF NOVELS by established authors, Pearl S. Buck's *The Mother* (John Day, \$2.50), a story of Chinese peasant life that is *not* Part III of the trilogy begun with *The Good Earth* and continued with *Sons*, is an exceptionally tender and moving study. It is a novel without names, a simplified account of the life of a woman who was the embodiment of the maternal instinct, in a village made up of a few huts, which is also unnamed. In less deft hands, it is not hard to imagine that such a novel might make dull reading, but Mrs. Buck exhibits impressive talent in the way she has handled her problem of having her characters symbols and individuals at one and the same time.

Much of the charm of the story lies in the appeal of the Biblical prose, and in the feeling for winds and clouds and the perpetual round of the seasons on the farm that sustains the family of which the mother is the centre. But the feeling of the continuity of life is an important theme in itself, and Mrs. Buck makes admirable use of it without letting it interfere with the movement of her narrative. More than one reviewer has called the new book her best, an opinion in which the Landscaper is not quite able to concur, but it is no let-down, different without being at all inferior.

A Rousing Sea-Yarn

AN EMINENTLY safe recommendation among the early books is the sequel to *Mutiny on the Bounty*, in which Charles Nordhoff and James Norman Hall retold one of the best of all sea

stories and made a work of art of it. The new book is *Men Against the Sea* (Little, Brown: Atlantic Monthly Press, \$2.50), and centres about the famous open-boat voyage of Bligh and his nineteen companions, the rest of the *Bounty* story with which many people are familiar in outline. Messrs. Nordhoff and Hall have done their best with it, however, and it reads like a brand-new story.

Naturally it will have a strong appeal to the many readers of the first book, who will not find that, like most sequels, it is in any sense less thrilling, but there is a chance that it may be even more widely read, and it can stand alone, although the Landscaper's guess is that few who get their hands on it will be willing to pass up Part I. For its infallible interest to the masculine element, *Men Against the Sea* warrants a three-star rating, a really great adventure story retold with splendid skill, but the Landscaper does not suggest that it will appeal only to men. On the other hand, some of the most enthusiastic comment on the other book came from women.

Other New Novels

SOME others among the current novels by established authors are Anne Parrish's *Sea Level* (Harper, \$2.50), the story of a world cruise, handled in Miss Parrish's acid and penetrating manner, and a book that marks a certain maturing of talent that will interest her followers; Neil Bell's *Bredon Hall* (Little, Brown), a five-hundred-odd page tale of a family of boat-builders on the Sussex coast that is one of the best things Mr. Bell has done, a solid, well-wrought, and engaging tale; and *Passions Spin the Plot* by Vardis Fisher (Doubleday, Doran, \$2.50), which is Volume II of a tetralogy be-

gun with *In Tragic Life*, and which is concerned with the struggles of Vridar and sex; the heroine's name is Neloä, who takes her pleasure where she finds it, while Vridar is busy being pure. The Landscaper expressed his admiration for *In Tragic Life* at the time it was published; the new book strikes him as a somewhat tiresome repetition of adolescent difficulties into which no sense of humor ever creeps, and all is stark and tragic. Maybe life is like that in the Idaho valleys of which Mr. Fisher writes, but one is somehow a little skeptical.

Another novel by a newcomer which the Landscaper thoroughly enjoyed was *Gentlemen—the Regiment!*, by Hugh Talbot (Harper, \$2.50), a long and robustious tale of a rivalry between two English military families in the last century, which winds up with the Crimean War. Stemming from a common ancestor somewhere back in the dim dawn of history, one of the families has become all of the bulldog breed, stolidly English, while the other is "Frenchified" and charming. A Romeo-and-Juliet romance is inevitable and happens, but it matters less than the people who swarm through the pages of the book, and the color and vividness of the yarn. Mr. Talbot—he is an English schoolmaster who adopted Talbot as a *nom de plume*—means to say something about his country, too, if one is of a mind to seek it out. It is quite possible, however, to enjoy the book without worrying about its depths. It brings a novel theme to fiction, and the handling is excellent.

Our Public Schools

AN INTERESTING thesis novel, which is an exposure of the problems, some of them, of the American educational

system, is *Just Plain Larnin'* by James M. Shields (Coward-McCann, \$2.50). Mr. Shields is himself a teacher of long experience and has written an inside story of what happens when a community tries to make its schools more than places of deadly routine, the battle of progressive education against old prejudices. This is a strong indictment of the public school system, and might serve as a weapon of reform; its truth will be recognized at any rate, and it is a well-done story on an important topic.

Detective stories do not often make their way into this department, but the Landscaper would be failing in his duty if he did not report that one of the recent books that gave him the greatest amount of pleasure was Dashiell Hammett's *The Thin Man* (Knopf, \$2), Mr. Hammett being the distinguished author of *The Maltese Falcon*, among other books, and generally recognized as the top of the heap in his field. *The Maltese Falcon*, by the way, is now available in the Modern Library edition, a recognition it heartily deserves, since it is one of the finest thrillers ever to be put between covers.

The Thin Man is a murder-mystery, cut more or less according to pattern, with the difference that the detective seems entirely credible and all the people talk and act as if they had wandered in off the streets, or right out of the first pages of your favorite newspaper. They are a mad lot, most of them, but real. And the punch of Mr. Hammett's stream-lined dialogue, which is like nobody else's, never fails. There is a good deal more to be said on this subject, as the author in question is unique in his field, but other books are waiting, and the Landscaper closes the matter by recommending *The Thin Man* as ace writing, much too good to be missed,

whether you ordinarily like detective stories or not.

Other Selections

SOME of the other new novels are Phyllis Paul's *We Are Spoiled* (Morrow, \$2.50), a remarkable first book by a very young English girl, full of strange suggestions of evil, and beautifully written; *The Cross of Peace* by Sir Philip Gibbs (Doubleday, Doran), the tragedy of a French officer who loved humanity more than his native land and died a martyr to the cause of peace; *The Cadaver of Gideon Wyck* by Alexander Laing (Farrar and Rinehart, \$2), a horror story with none of the ingredients missing, which the Landscaper found almost too horrible, but which others consider a masterpiece in its field; and *Wedding Song* by David Burnham (Viking, \$2.50), the depressing tale of rich Americans abroad and their foreign connections, done in the Hemingway manner and not a book to recommend to the optimistic, although a talented novel.

Before this article is printed, Sinclair Lewis's new novel will also be available, but what with the length of all the other new books, the Landscaper has not had a chance to read it, and so must report on it later. It is called *Work of Art* (Doubleday, Doran, \$2.50) and tells the story of Myron Weagle, who wanted to own the finest hotel in the United States, and who did. It is in the fashion, 452 pages long.

Non-Fiction Also

THE non-fiction shelf stands up very well, also, and indicates that the season will not have to depend upon its good novels alone for distinction. Biography looks more promising than it has for some time, there is at least one

highly unusual and diverting travel book and, one need hardly add, the usual number of volumes on what's the matter with us, what ought to be done about the money situation, whither are we drifting, etc.?

Of the biographies, one of the most delightful is John Tasker Howard's *Stephen Foster: America's Troubadour* (Crowell, \$3.50), a long, fully detailed, and well illustrated account of the life of a man about whom almost nothing is known in spite of the widespread influence of his songs. Mr. Howard has told his story well, recreating the America of Foster with fine skill, revealing the personality of the composer, and discussing his musical ability with knowledge and critical judgment.

Paderewski: The Story of a Modern Immortal by Charles Phillips (Macmillan, \$4.50) is a full-length story of a composer and pianist who came to be a national hero and the virtual father of his re-born country. There is an introduction by Colonel E. M. House, in which Mr. Phillips's work is praised in highest terms. *Ignace Paderewski: Musician and Statesman* by Rom Landau (Crowell, \$3) is also available, the author being a Pole and a close friend of Paderewski, so that the biography is more intimate than Mr. Phillips's, but no more interesting or valuable.

More About Elizabeth

THE season is a poor one indeed that can not turn up at least one good study of the Virgin Queen, and J. E. Neale's *Queen Elizabeth* (Harcourt, Brace, \$3) is the latest addition to the long list. Incidentally, there are none better than Milton Waldman's *Elizabeth the Queen*, published only a few months ago, and one contemporary book on the subject that is likely to

survive, because of the freshness of its interpretation. The Neale volume is the work of a professor in the University of London, and is a lively presentation of the familiar story, being especially rich and attractive in its background. It is scholarly and thorough, without being in any degree sensational.

E. A. Rheinhardt's *Josephine, Wife of Napoleon* (Knopf, \$3) is a fine biography on a subject of interest that has not been worked to death, the first really modern biography of a strange woman. Mr. Rheinhardt's *Napoleon and Eugénie* was a great popular success in Europe and won him the recognition of the critics in this country; his *Josephine* has an unusual slant, for he sees the woman through the eyes of a modern psychologist, as wholly innocent of the history that is in the making all about her. His book has a touch of novelty in its contention that the beautiful Creole did not die of a broken heart.

A charming autobiography is *At 33* by Eva Le Gallienne (Longmans, Green, \$3.50), the brief, but none the less interesting, account of the life of a young woman who has known excitement almost from her birth, and who has seen one of her great dreams come to fruition, the New York Civic Repertory Theatre. She still dreams, and is ambitious to see her theatre plans carried much further. Her book is full of stories and personalities—she knew Bernhardt and Duse both well, among many other people—and she writes with modesty and simplicity of a career that has been full of color and violent ups-and-downs.

The First Billion: The Stillmans and the National City Bank by John K. Winkler (Vanguard, \$2.50), biographer of Morgan and Rockefeller, is a thin book about the elder Stillman, the

tight-lipped little man who won a reputation for wisdom by saying nothing with great enthusiasm, and his son, who saw Moses Taylor's bank hit the billion-dollar class, and watched his own personal life go to pieces under the impact of scandal. There was a better story than this to be written, if not of the Stillmans, who are not very interesting people, of their bank. Maybe Mr. Winkler can console himself with the thought that the story of Samuel Insull is yet to be written, and what a tale that will be if it is properly done! Insull was the perfect symbol of boom-time America, one of the most fascinating of all our long line of buccaneers.

Basil Matthews has done a long account of the life and achievements of another type of human being in *John R. Mott: World Citizen* (Harper, \$3), the story of a business man with ideals and his work in the cause of international amity.

America's Problems

TWO of the newest books on our present situation, and its whys and wherefores are *The Economics of the Reconstruction Program*, by seven Harvard economists (Whittlesey House, \$1.50), a small volume with a lot of good sense in it; and *Kemmerer on Money* by Edwin Walter Kemmerer (Winston, \$1.50), in which one of the most famous money-doctors of the world advises a return to the gold standard and suggests a way it can be managed. In the earlier book are to be found these articles: "Depressions" by Joseph A. Schumpeter, "Purchasing Power" by Edward Chamberlain, "Controlling Industry" by Edward S. Mason, "Helping the Worker" by Douglass V. Brown, "Higher Prices" by Seymour E. Harris, "Helping the

Farmer" by Wassily V. Leontieff, and "Economics and Politics" by Overton H. Taylor. There are some free swings at President Roosevelt's policies in this little book, which appeals to the Landscaper as one of the best available, not too difficult, comprehensive and sane.

Another new book that has to do with money is Arthur M. Wickwire's *Weeds of Wall Street* (Newcastle, \$3), in which the evil ways of the Stock Exchange are once more pointed out, with especial emphasis upon pool operations, which, if one may believe the newspapers, have not been stopped by the Roosevelt "revolution." Mr. Wickwire is merely saying that the sucker who plays the market is up against a rigged game, which is not exactly a new warning, but perhaps it can not be repeated too often. United States Senator Peter S. Norbeck said of the Wickwire book: "If your book had been read by the investing public in 1928 we would not have had the debacle in 1929," which is very high and very silly praise: not all the books in the world could have kept the public away from the market in 1928, especially with a lot of economists saying every day that we had at last discovered the secret of permanent prosperity.

Spoofing the Jungle

OF NEW books about strange places, the Landscaper's favorite is Peter Fleming's *Brazilian Adventure* (Scribner, \$2.75), a gay and light-hearted account of a voyage into the jungles of Matto Grosso, the Great Forest, in search of news of the English explorer, Fawcett, who disappeared almost ten years ago while in search of buried cities. Mr. Fleming is a literary man by profession and a wanderer by choice; he joined the expedition to Brazil after

reading about it in the Agony Column of the London *Times*. It turned out to be much more entertaining than he expected. Despite the flippant tone of the book, he and his companions saw some real adventure, but he, at least, refused to be impressed. Few of the familiar Brazilian dangers escape without being scoffed at, including crocodiles and the man-eating piranha. Mr. Fleming was also very little impressed by the Brazilians themselves and his book is not calculated to increase Empire trade with South America. But it is good reading.

Other books under this classification include *Roman Roundabout* by Amelie Posse-Brazdova (Dutton, \$3), a successor to *Sardinian Sideshow*, and of the same species, good gossip, humor, etc.; *Cannibal Quest* by Gordon Sinclair (Farrar and Rinehart, \$2.50), travels in New Guinea, Borneo, Bali, Mandalay and Baluchistan, by the slangy author of *Footloose in India*, this time with much more startling discoveries, including an abundance of cannibals, mainly women; and *Tia Barbarita* by Barbara Peart (Houghton Mifflin, \$2.50) which is really a book of reminiscences of a woman who saw life all the way from Dublin, which she left at the age of eighteen, to Texas and New York, including a long stay in Argentina, a delightful story of a good life, illuminated by the attractive personality of the author.

The War in Paris

THE miscellaneous books this month include several of the Landscaper's favorites. First among these is Michel Corday's *The Paris Front: An Unpublished Diary 1914-1918* (Dutton, \$5), something entirely new in the way of War books. M. Corday is a Left Repub-

lican, which means that he is a pacifist, so he saw the War behind the lines from an unusual point of view. An official in the Civil Service and the close friend of such writers as Anatole France, Tristan Bernard, Romain Rolland and many others, he had every opportunity to see the show from a choice seat, and as he watched it unfold, he set down his cynical comment from day to day. The result is a book that is unique, the record of an idealist watching a world go to the devil. All the hysteria, the hatreds, the greed of profiteers, the ambitions of politicians, the politics of generals are to be found in the diary, which is as powerful a sermon against war as has ever been preached, and not at all dull, as sermons are likely to be.

The Landscaper has come across few books in years that gave him as much satisfaction as this record, and recommends it without reservation. It was never worse needed, with the world drawing closer and closer to another war, in which people will act exactly as they did in the last one. And how they acted! M. Corday saw and knew and understood; his eyes were not blinded nor his vision distorted by the bunk on which we were all fed.

Another of the important new books is Fannina W. Halle's *Women in Soviet Russia* (Viking, \$4.50), a complete study of the position of Russian women from the earliest days to the present, with the emphasis, naturally, upon what is happening under the present equality of the sexes. This is an altogether different type of book from the run of writing on Russia; its author is an exceptionally well educated Russian woman, who has perspective and judgment. She does not pretend that conditions are ideal as yet, or that the

Russian woman is on her way to Utopia, but she knows that a fascinating experiment is under way, and she writes of it informatively and entertainingly.

Touring a Library

SOMETHING of an entirely different order is Charles J. Finger's *After the Great Companions* (Dutton, \$3), a book of literary enthusiasms by a man who had the good fortune to discover his own favorite authors, and who has enjoyed many writers spoiled for most of us by college professors.

Mr. Finger's tastes are of the most catholic variety, although as an adventurer himself he leans strongly toward books of derring-do. His tour of the library ends with lists of books that ought to be in other libraries, especially where there are children in the house, as in his own. His book is good reading—there are plenty of quotations, as samples of what he likes—and likely to inspire almost anybody to run down some of his excellent leads. Certainly few living people have read either so well or so wisely as the editor of *All's Well*, that remarkable small magazine from Arkansas; Finger is a man of our times worth knowing about on a large number of scores.

A sociologist's idea of how America got the way she is is to be found in James H. Tufts's *America's Social Morality* (Holt, \$3), a survey of contemporary life in this country that touches upon all phases. It would be a better book to read if it were not so conservative; the author takes no chances whatever with any of his statements and makes one wonder just where he has been all this time himself. He touches upon race problems, marriage, business, politics, gangs, Prohibition, prostitution and many other outstanding phases of

the American scene, furnishing a large store of information and statistics on all these subjects. What he has to say about "The Moral Dilemmas of Business" is especially pertinent and cogent; until there is actual and definite improvement at this point, very little that the New Deal or any other regulatory measures can do will push this country forward. It is no simple matter, however, as Mr. Tufts points out, or as anybody knows who has even had direct contact with the workings of the business system.

A Visit to Hell

DIRECTLY bearing on this general subject is the latest visit of Art Young to a region about which he has written and drawn more than once. This is Hell. His newest contribution is called *Inferno* (Delphic Studios), and has a large number of Mr. Young's cartoons and decorations, in addition to plenty of text. The Hell he writes about is curiously like our own United States; it seems that the Devil has been in hot water lately because the Speculative Financiers took over his domain and ran it so much more efficiently than he ever had that he was forced into virtual retirement. In other words, Mr. Young doesn't care for the capitalist system, and takes this way of saying so.

Culture in the South, a large and imposing symposium edited by W. T. Couch, director of the University of North Carolina Press, and published by that press, is another one of the more important recent books. It contains thirty-one essays on various phases of life on the other side of the Mason and Dixon line, in which a wide diversity of points of view is expressed, and from which a picture muddled enough to resemble this country emerges.

What of the Future?

How much of the tradition of the ante-bellum period is worth preserving and what are its chances of survival is the subject of one of the best essays in the collection, with Josephine Pinckney as the author. Donald Davidson writes of the literary situation, and wishes there were more Southern novels like Stark Young's *River House*, speaking rebukingly to Ellen Glasgow for the ironical handling of her own part of the country, and to James Branch Cabell for turning his back on Virginia and writing of Poictesme. In fact, Mr. Davidson seems to think there is a definite Southern tradition which ought to serve as a guide for people who write books. But even if this were true, would all the people who write books be interested in the tradition, sympathetic with it, or willing to be guided by it? The answer is no. The South, like every other section of this country, breeds every known variety of personality, and offers every known problem for these personalities to work on; there is no chance of any kind of regimentation, even if it were desirable.

It should be explained, perhaps, that

both Mr. Davidson and Mr. Young belong to the group of Southerners who announced their allegiance to an agrarian way of life a few years ago in a book called *I'll Take My Stand*. The good old Southern Landscaper found that book highly romantic, because it seemed to him to represent a nostalgic dream, a yearning for a way of life that was probably never half so delightful as it looks now, and even if it had been perfect, has passed forever. How anybody who really knows farm life in the Southern United States could go agrarian remains a mystery to this observer. There were, if memory serves, no dirt farmers among the gentlemen who "took their stand."

Mr. Couch's own introduction to the volume is excellent, and so is his essay on the Negro in the South. There is a vast deal of information in the book; what it all means, the Landscaper does not even pretend to know. The South as a section is today without leadership, devoid of political thought and represented for the most part by low-grade politicians, a section that doesn't know where it is going or how to get there. In the last respect, to be sure, it is no worse off than the rest of the world. . . .



Notes of a Cosmopolitan

BY BARBARA E. SCOTT FISHER

WE HEAR people continually bemoaning the "passing of the last frontier." We read of it in weighty magazines, have it propounded to us in lugubrious tones over the radio, and are led to assume that the adventurous spirits of the country that once gathered themselves together and carved purposeful lives on the frontiers must now become affiliated with reforestation camps or walk the streets. And yet we have Alaska—a land so replete with possibilities and opportunities to those who would still make a place for themselves in the sun that it seems incredible we do not hear of it on every side. Alaska should be brought more often to mind. It is simply waiting to be discovered all over again by Americans at large.

An indication of the approachableness of the Alaskan natives was pictured recently in many of our daily papers when Colonel and Mrs. Lindbergh dropped in on them in neighborly fashion at the beginning of their flight to the Orient. These pictures showed the natives as they are—friendly, sturdy, intelligent—a people to know more about. Touches such as this keep us aware of the fine quality of friendliness that one finds in Alaska, a new type of gold waiting to be drawn on.

"Seward's Folly"

EACH year sees Americans more awake to what Alaska means to them. This summer, for instance, Miss Florence Hale, editor of *The Grade Teacher*, will take a group of some two hundred teachers on a special tour of Alaska. Steamers carry greater numbers of tourists up the delightful "Inside Passage" to Seward each summer. How amusing it is now to look back a scant fifty years to the time when Alaska was first granted a territorial government and realize that its purchase by the United States was being ridiculed and lampooned from one end of the country to the other! They dubbed it "Walussia," the "Land of Icebergs," and hardest of all to reconcile today, "Seward's

Folly." But Secretary of State Seward, to whom most credit is due for consummating Alaska's purchase, was a very far-seeing statesman. He is said to have considered the transaction the most important of his official career, though he estimated "it may take two generations before the purchase is properly appreciated."

Once it took gold—"bright and yellow, hard and cold—heavy to get and hard to hold"—to put Alaska on the American map, but times have strangely changed and a better balanced aspect of the substantial things of life in the United States may prove more potent for Alaska's progress than her old lodestar of gold. Americans are beginning to recognize that industrially and agriculturally she has much to offer. These possibilities as well as those in forestry, mining and commerce appeal strongly to the American business man and to the home-seeker. The sportsman and vacationist find its countless streams, trails and game regions—its mountains and matchless scenery a constant challenge.

Alaska's Bird Land

NATURE lovers are aware that interior and northern Alaska is one of the greatest breeding places for birds in the world, a resort of immense flocks of geese, ducks and swans from various parts of the continent that come for nesting, to fatten on the wild berries that ripen during the intense Arctic summer. It is estimated that no less than eleven varieties of edible berries, such as wild salmon berries, red and black currants, blackberries and cranberries, bear their fruits during August. When you add these to the quantities of flowers, great trees and clear flowing streams and lakes, you can see why this region drained by the Upper Yukon is a veritable Eden for birds. Many swallows, martins, sparrows and a few robins also make their summer pilgrimage to Alaska, but at the first sign of winter off they take themselves to the south—to the Caribbean, the islands of the South Pacific, and to both sides of the continent

guided by their unerring sense of direction. Marvelous travelers, these birds!

Rockwell Kent on the Frontier

ROCKWELL KENT snared much of the majestic beauty of Nature as she expresses herself in the Alaskan wilds in the masterly black and whites with which he illustrates *Wilderness*. He writes, "I wonder if you can imagine what fun pioneering is. To be in a country where the fairest spot is yours for the wanting it, to cut and build your own home out of the land you stand upon, to plan and create clearings, parks, vistas, and make out of a wilderness an ordered place!" Yes, there is still plenty of frontier in Alaska. And if you must have a bit of gambling to give it the proper local color, make the acquaintance of some of the natives. They are inveterate gamblers, and you will be surprised at the amount of damage they can cause with a handful of different colored sticks. They don't even need dice. One of the players shuffles the sticks, designated as crab, duck or whale, etc., according to their color. He then counts out a certain number and places them in piles under cover of bunches of moss. Your job is to guess which pile hides the whale, the crab or the duck. Sounds mild enough, but when you walk off with a man's wife, and his family and possessions thrown in if you win, it's no joke. You don't gamble with Alaskan aborigines unless you mean business.

Native Alaskan aborigines are divided into three groups: the Innuitt or Eskimo, which race predominates in number; the Indians proper; and the Aleutian race which conforms most fully to the ways of civilization and as a rule recognizes the Greek Church—a relic of the Russian occupation which still winds a colorful thread through the background of Alaskan history. In fact, the name Alaska is derived from a word used by the Aleutian Islanders at the coming of the Russians—Alyaska, or Alasku, a word they applied to the mainland of the Alaskan peninsula.

Along the Inside Passage

IF YOU choose to go to Alaska by boat from Seattle, as many Americans do, the steamer skirts the coast along what is known as the "Inside Passage," weaving in and out between countless islands that shelter the coast from the open sea. Ketchikan will be your first port of

call, and here, if you are interested and arrive at the proper season, you may walk along Ketchikan Creek which flows right through the centre of the town, and see the valiant fight of salmon to leap the falls and reach their haven of calm fresh water for spawning. At Wrangell one of the outstanding recollections you are likely to carry away is that of curious Indian totem poles, their painted eyes staring straight before them, oblivious of the tawdry civilization about them.

Glaciers—Dead and Alive!

EN ROUTE to Juneau your boat slips past one of the most amazing sights imaginable—Taku Glacier, composed of two rivers of ice, one alive, the other dead. I'll take my glaciers dead, but if you prefer the lively variety you may see the active stream of Taku drop its huge icebergs into the sea with a thunderous roar. Of course they have breathing spells between splashes and don't drop off every day—which lends zest to this part of the journey.

Sitka was the capital of Alaska when the Russians spoke of it as "Our Possessions in America." Reminiscent of Baranoff, that little man with red-tinged flaxen hair fringing a bald crown who, because of his uncompromising honesty and enterprise, became the moving and directing spirit of Russian America, Sitka still wears a Russian air. It clings to its ancient Russian blockhouse, and in St. Michael's Cathedral, the oldest shrine of worship on the Pacific Coast, still glitter many of the treasures that recall the once lavish splendor of the Russian church.

Our Alaskan National Park

CORDOVA and Valdez each have their interesting points and side trips which good highways and automobiles make particularly attractive to the tourist. From Seward, however, you may travel by the Alaska Railroad directly up into the very heart of Alaska—to Mount McKinley National Park, and to Fairbanks. Over this route you pass through Anchorage, and as a rule stop over night at the fine hotel in Curry, to gather your breath, as it were, for the splendors that await you in your first sight of Mount McKinley's twenty-thousand-odd feet of gleaming splendor. The Indians called this mighty mountain Denali, the Most High. At the Mount McKinley Park Station you go by automobile to the base camp in

the Park at Savage River, whence you can spend days that never weary in their interest by following trails and roads on horseback, by old fashioned stage-coach, automobile, or by airplane winging through the sky. Who says our frontier days are over?

300th Anniversary of Oberammergau Passion Play

THIS summer from May 21 until September 16 Oberammergau will again present its renowned Passion Play in commemoration of its three-hundredth anniversary. So insistent already has been the demand for reservations that the number of performances has been increased to thirty-three. These take place on Sundays and Wednesdays, with occasional performances on Mondays. The last Passion Play was given in 1930 and attracted some fifty thousand American travelers, and if drastic price reductions which have been made by the German Railroads and by the Oberammergau village authorities have their usual weighty effect with the traveling public, this year will see as many or more Americans occupying seats in the great amphitheatre at the performance, and enjoying their happy association with the Oberammergau villagers.

Among the Villagers


THOSE who visit Oberammergau invariably return with feelings of kindest remembrance for the village people. Their immaculate little homes, frescoed and gay with window boxes of flowers, seem to us like so many charming play-houses and set us in the mood for simple things and sincerity. As a rule the people are master woodcarvers, dividing their talents between intricate church ornaments and ingenious toys, but you see among them also very clever potters and artists. Anton Lang, who on three occasions so magnificently played the part of Christ, is a potter as well as a wood-carver of distinction, and cherished pieces of his handiwork are found the world over in the homes of travelers who prize them for their extraordinary beauty as well as for their association. This year, as in the 1930 performance, Anton Lang will contribute his masterly share to the play in the Prologue.

Alois Lang, as in the 1930 performance, will assume the rôle of Christ. In fact, many of the

★ VACATION IN THE U.S.S.R.

Travelers abroad in 1934 will find the Soviet Union one country in which travel Dollars have not been deflated. Travel rates in dollars have not been increased over last year. The most fascinating country in the world may be visited at moderate daily rates on itineraries of from 5 to 31 days . . . Everything included: meals, hotels, guide-interpreters, Soviet visas and all transportation within the Soviet Union.

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important rôles in the drama are continuing in the hands of those who have so capably played them before. Anni Rutz will again be responsible for the impersonation of the Virgin Mary. Klara Mayr, however, is a newcomer who will appear this year as Mary Magdalene, taking the place of Johanna Preisinger, who has been married. She is the daughter of Guido Mayr who on two previous occasions portrayed Judas, so she must be well grounded in the necessary qualifications which each must have in order to take part in the Passion Play. As only one member of a family may participate in the play, Guido Mayr has resigned in favor of his daughter.

Qualifications of the Players

AN INTERESTING light is thrown on the Passion Play when you realize that the principal parts are cast by popular vote, and can be given only to those who are native villagers. They must have unimpeachable moral character, dramatic ability, and whenever possible they are chosen so that their physical characteristics qualify them as nearly as possible to "look the part" without the aid of make-up, wigs, false beards, etc. That which lends dignity and sincerity to the occasion, and which is undoubtedly the lodestar in the whole matter, is the endeavor of those who take part in the play to conform their daily lives as nearly as they know how to the highest aspects they can conceive of the Biblical characters in the drama. It was no light thing that the little village of Oberammergau pledged three centuries ago: to give this play as an expression of their gratitude for deliverance from the Black Death. There was a sincerity in their gratitude which has never dimmed.

As this year's performance is a jubilee occasion, an introduction to the main performance will be staged, portraying the events which led the villagers to take their solemn vow. Those who have seen it (it was rehearsed last summer) describe it as a "touching and impressive drama," thoroughly achieving the object set by Johanna Georg Lang, artistic director of the Passion Play, to bring the people's vow to them anew, and "to have the people of Oberammergau go well prepared into the great event of this Passion Play of 1934." Each performance lasts from eight in the morning until six at night, with a two-hour intermission.

New Leisure for Travel

WITH the new leisure which has been thrust upon us, whether we would or no, comes fresh inspiration for leisurely travel. People who have been accustomed to snatch a hurried two weeks in the summertime, find themselves with anywhere from four to six weeks this year in which to further acquaintance with their newly discovered selves. It is quite an engaging adventure for all of us, and many are finding a broader urge to travel.

These added weeks of summer leisure will permit many more Americans than usual to visit Scandinavia—not just Norway, or Denmark or Sweden—but all of them and with sufficient time to see each one enjoyably. Though these countries spring from a background made vivid with the stirring pulse of Viking tradition, they have developed characteristics of singular individuality. One of the most striking features about them all is their genius for harmonious coöperation with each other. Certainly the Nobel Peace Prize could be awarded more rationally from no other part of the world.

Scandinavia Wins New Friends

A FAVORITE way to see Scandinavia is to make the trip on some one of the tours that follow the old trade route of the ships of the Hanseatic League through the Baltic. This cruise carries you to the capitals of Northern Europe and also includes Finland. Another exceedingly popular tour which takes about two weeks on its own account is that which goes to the North Cape, but it well repays those who would make the acquaintance of the famous fjords along the coast of Norway, and see for themselves the glamorous glory of the Midnight Sun.

As I write, Scandinavia is very much on the map in New York with the splendid Danish opera star, Melchior, winning new laurels at the Metropolitan and Greta Garbo, in her inimitable way, weaving magic about the fictionized life of the Seventeenth Century Swedish Queen, Christina, in her latest film. Smile if you will, but this photoplay will tend more than you may dream to replace the exceeding importance of the Swedish match in the minds of the American public with a new and quite alluring Swedish romanticism.

Sweden Through the Ages

WHEN you go to Sweden and would trace somewhat of the life of the Swedish people down through the ages, you will be drawn as if by a magnet to the great Northern Museum in Stockholm, and to the Open Air Museum in Skansen, the unique gifts of Arthur Hazelius to his native land. Here with infinite patience and perseverance this great appreciator of Swedish folk-ways and folk-lore collected not only material objects reminiscent of the life of the people, but traveled about the countryside, gathering Swedish songs and stories from those who remembered them at first hand, that they might be preserved. These museums, and those which have grown up as offshoots from his idea, show the objects as nearly as possible in relation to their original settings. Backgrounds are faithfully produced, and in the open air museum where a house has been transplanted, they have even brought the same kind of flowers that grew beside the doorstep in the old garden. Sweden owes Hazelius a great debt for the preservation of many of their handicrafts. If you are keenly interested in learning the secrets of Swedish weaving and wood *slyod*, as most people who travel in Sweden become, you will want to go to Säterglänsan, Insjön, in Dalecarlia, where you may take practical and theoretical courses in these arts all year round. The summer festival at Ingessunds, near Arvika in Värmland, gives opportunity to hear Swedish folk music. And from June 29 until July 8 this year an important exhibition of the industry, woodworking, arts and handicrafts of Sweden is scheduled at Eslöv in Scania.

Cosmopolitan Denmark

NO ONE ever forgets his visit to Denmark, the one-time "whispering gallery of Europe," or to Copenhagen, its gay little capital. All the royalty of Europe used to come to family reunions in Denmark, yet a more democratic and cosmopolitan European nation is scarcely imaginable. Perhaps that comes of the travel instinct which seems inseparable from the Danes, for their love of the sea is proverbial. Those Danes who do not follow the sea perceive a great part of the world's shipping that goes through to the Baltic as it passes through their Free Port at Copenhagen. Situated on the

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highway of ocean traffic from the Atlantic to the Baltic, merchandise of all kinds is landed, stored and trans-shipped at Copenhagen to other parts of the world free of duty. Copenhagen possesses the largest harbor on the Baltic which makes its name, the Danish form of which is Kobenhaven, meaning Merchant's Haven, wholly appropriate.

Following the lead of our gracious Ambassador to Denmark, the Honorable Ruth Bryan Owen, many Americans are perceiving the charm of a motor trip through the lush green countryside of Denmark. Whether it be the forests of dainty birches, quaint old castles, or the fairies of Hans Christian Andersen, who

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lived in a house that might have come out of one of his own fairy tales on the Island of Funnen, Denmark beckons alluringly to the tourist. Besides the butter is delicious, the cows unutterably contented, and the people unfailingly cordial. Copenhagen is well called, "the City with a Smile." And smiles are surprisingly contagious.

Norway Sparkles Under the Midnight Sun

TO SKIRT the island-sheltered coast of Norway and drop anchor occasionally in the mysterious havens of her shadow-strewn fjords as your boat steals up through the silence of the Land of the Midnight Sun is to etch the very soul of Norway indelibly in your memory. From coves such as these the fearless Vikings set forth in their dragon ships to range the seas. And off your thoughts fly to follow them on the very wings of the Valkyries, whose eerie cries seem echoed by the great flocks of sea birds that rise from the rocks in swirling clouds at the approach of your steamer. Norway has created an Arctic haven for birds in West Spitsbergen, which includes many small islands and reefs along the coast. Here the auks and puffins and kittiwakes disport themselves without molestation, and many other birds migrate to these northern regions to raise their families.

In taking the cruise to the North Cape you may start from Oslo, Bergen or Trondheim but you will never experience one dull moment during the entire cruise which takes you up through the Lofoten Islands, Narvik, Tromsø, and never ends until you have seen the Midnight Sun face to face.

A New Russian Experiment

WITH the American recognition of the Soviet Union an accomplished fact, American travel to Russia is bound to increase and the friendly relations between the two countries be enlarged. That the U.S.S.R. has been anticipating this amicable interest is foreshadowed in an experiment of last summer at the First Moscow University which has crystallized in the Anglo-American Institute of the First Moscow University—a summer school for foreign students, teachers and others who are interested in the education and social life of the Soviet Union. All instruction is to be car-

ried on in English and purposes to provide foreign visitors to Soviet Russia with the academic facilities and programmes which are necessary for serious study and research. The Anglo-American Institute is sponsored in the United States by the Institute of International Education.

An American summer school in Russia such as this, will allow travelers of a most studious turn of mind to combine this definite routine with opportunities for seeing the workings of a real Soviet university. For those who wish to share the life of typical Russian students accommodations in dormitories will be available. Regular hotel service will be provided for those who do not desire quite so much of Russia all at once. But as every traveler knows, there is nothing like settling down and living with the people of a foreign country for a while to form a true basis of understanding. Because of this the Anglo-American Institute bids fair to have far-reaching results.

In the Red Square

MOSCOW is a lively centre from which to glean your first impressions of the U.S.S.R. Arab historians made a note of it as a strong fort as far back as 1147. In that day the city had four walls, but today it is quite content with the two ancient walls that remain—the Kremlin and the Kitaigorod, the Old Merchant's Town—massive reminders of a powerful past. These form part of the bounds of the Red Square in the heart of Moscow—a symbol of the Russian people, inextricably interwoven with the dramas of their destiny. We may think of the Red Square as having gained its name during the bloody days of the Revolution, yet in the distant past when the word *krasny* (red) still held the meaning of *krasivyy* (beautiful) some visioned person, long since passed into limbo, gave to the Red Square its significant name. His tribute was to its outward beauty unaware of the significance hidden in its future.

Here in the Red Square, under the vast shadow of the Kremlin, gleams Russia's memorial to Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, built of stone carried from all parts of the Soviet Union—fitting memorial to their great leader. No matter how empty the vast Square appears, there is always a crowd surging around this simple building of polished red and black stone whereon is written the one word: Lenin. But

the first of May and the seventh of November each year, even the vastness of the Red Square vanishes before the onslaught of an enthusiastic throng of people who pass before the tribune on Lenin's mausoleum and pledge themselves in the oath: "I, the son of a working people, pledge myself to serve the working people." On such a day the scene in the Red Square is one to remember.

Moscow Knows How to Play

Moscow is also given to the lighter things of life. It is a city of theatres where an evening's choice of entertainment runs the gamut from the Belshoi Theatre with its performances of opera and ballet, both classical and modern, to the very newest experiments in theatrical technique at the Meyerhold and Kamerny Theatres. One never forgets that the Moscow Art Theatre, founded by Stanislavski and Nemirovich-Danchenko, was a product of Moscow's artists, and you are reminded of this when you visit one of the most amazing museums in the world, the Bakhrushin Museum in Moscow, which houses everything dealing with the Russian theatre, from programmes to backdrops, that an enthusiastic collector could lay his hands on. Here you will ramble through rooms that contain an outstanding collection of art that is precious in old and modern theatrical repertoire.

You may not be overenthusiastic about museums in general, but those in Moscow are so eminently significant that you can hardly chew them, even though there are some two hundred in the city. After all there is something very appealing about the Toy Museum, and if you have any of the child in you and ever loved a doll house, the museum which reproduces the home life of a Russian nobleman of the nineteenth Century stirs forgotten feelings. There is a Museum of the Liberation of Women, which is something to ponder, as well as those dealing with the Revolution, the Red Army and the Lenin Institute.

The Volga a Colorful Highway

AFTER Leningrad and Moscow, the voyage down the Volga offers alluring possibilities. An overnight train ride from Moscow brings you to Gorki, formerly Nishni-Novgorod, where you begin your journey by boat. Gorki is a vivid old city with a Kremlin two

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
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centuries older than that of Moscow, and, if anything, more typically Russian in design. The strange square towers of the Gorki Kremlin which crest the hill and dominate the town below are in curious contrast to the modern city which has sprung up largely in connection with the huge new automobile plant that bids fair to become the "Ford" factory of Russia. Following the course of the Volga is to travel one of the medieval routes of trade that has been a highway since the dawn of history, only your voyage on boats that are comfortable. Kazan, Samara, Stalingrad and many smaller towns draw your attention on this storied river, and weave their bright thread through the memories of your visit to the Soviet Union.

Canada's 400th Birthday

Those touring in the Province of Quebec this summer will be on hand for the celebration of the 400th anniversary of the founding of Canada. In Gaspé, Quebec, Trois Rivières and Montreal, as well as smaller places, there will be festivities.

On April 20, 1934, just four centuries will have lapsed into limbo since Jacques Cartier set sail from the little port of St. Malo on his great adventure. He reached Newfoundland on May 10, 1534, and after exploring its northeast coast, set a course to the southwest which eventually brought him to Prince Edward's Island, and later, on July 12, to Percé on the coast of Gaspé. Here, where the railway station so prosaically stands today, he planted the cross ornamented with royal fleur-de-lis, which officially marked the discovery of Canada.

Now every American who has motored over the splendid highway that winds gracefully around the Gaspé Peninsula is familiar with the friendly hospitality of the people of Gaspé. They know how pleasant motoring can be, in fact, throughout the entire Province of Quebec, where at the end of the day they are assured of stopping places in which cleanliness, modern comforts, and good cooking are to be had. Combined with this attraction, the celebrations in connection with this fourth centenary of Canada make the prospect alluring indeed.

In Gaspé the celebration will wear quite an international air, as large delegations are expected from England and France who will join the official representatives of the Province of Quebec and the Government of Canada.

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